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Preface
This book originated from my PhD thesis which I submitted to the
University of Kent at Canterbury (England) in July 1984. I have substan-
t ial ly revised the text, adding two new chapters and condensing a few
others.
I have benefited from the help and opinions of many people, both in
Britain and in Iran, while writing this work. My thanks are due to Frank
Furedi, my supervisor, and David Reason, the Director of the Inter-
disciplinary Studies Programme, University of Kent, for their intellectual
assistance and stimulation. I owe a special debt to Henry Bernstein, a
very good friend, who at every stage advised and encouraged me, and
whose scrupulous readings and criticisms did much to improve the content
of the book. Professor Robin Cohen, Professor Ervand Abrahamian and
A. Hatef read large parts of the manuscript and made valuable criticisms
and suggestions. S.A. Smith kindly allowed me to see his very interesting
unpublished (at the time) thesis, and A. Ghotbi helped in preparing the
first draft of the questionnaires - to all these my especial thanks.
Finally, I would l ike to express my appreciation to the many friends
and associates, both in England and in particular in Iran, who despite the
diff icul t political conditions did not hesitate to assist me in various ways.
Notwithstanding the hostile attitude of the state bureaucracy in Iran, I
have been able to obtain valuable information with the help of a number
of worker mil i tants and state employees. Although I cannot name them
individual ly here, I do wish to record my gratitude to them all. It only
remains to say that I alone am responsible for any errors of fact and




The Problem and its Significance
Post-war capitalist expansion has been marked by an extensive integration
of the remotest areas of the Third World into the world capitalist system.
The development of capitalist relations in the peripheral countries has
dramatically altered the class structure and, more specifically, has pro-
duced within those countries working classes of a considerable size.
Whether these newly emergent urban wage-labourers and immigrant
poor constitute the working class or proletariat perse has been a matter of
controversy among scholars. Some dispute it; see, for example, Third
World Proletariat? (Lloyd, 1982). Others (without actually defining their
terms) assimilate the working classes under the blanket term of the urban
poor, whose grievances and actions are supposed to be without any of the
characteristic features of class struggle.
Whatever the conceptions of scholars, the working classes of the
Third World do continue to wage their own struggles. These are in
response to their actual position as wage-earners who are exploited by
capital and who are oppressed both by the political form of the peri-
pheral capitalist states and by the pre-capitalist remnants of domination
embodied in the ruling ideologies and institutions. Third World
working-class struggles have been spreading in recent years from the
mines of South Africa to those of Bolivia, which have been the
stronghold of resistance against successive military coups; from the
Egyptian strike movement in January 1977, which escalated into an
uprising of the rural and urban poor, to the insurrection one year later
by the Tunisian national Trade Union Centre (Cohen, 1982, p. 285);
from the Iranian oil workers' strike, which played a crucial part in
bringing down the ancien régime to the current struggle against the
mi l i t a ry regime in Chile which is virtually led by the mil i tant workers of
the copper mines.
An alternative radical approach is being developed which, on the
evidence of extensive field research, attempts to go beyond the phe-
nomenal forms of Third World working-class practices to examine their
real dynamics. R. Cohen (1972, 1979, 1980), R. Sandbrook (1975), P.
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Waterman (1979, 19X3), C. van Onselen (1976), among others, have
made valuable contributions to this area in recent years.
The present study is concerned with the workers of Iran and their
experience of workers' control during the revolutionary period following
the insurrection of February 1979. It attempts to examine the objective
existence of the working class in terms of its economic identification and
significance (Chapter 3) and the process of its proletarianization (Chapter
4). It gives a sociological analysis of the divisions in the labour market and
looks at conditions of work and the workers' struggle to organize them-
selves in the workplaces (Chapter 5). It then goes on to investigate the
actual role of the workers in the anti-Pahlavi revolution (Chapter 6). But
the major substance of the book concerns the emergence of particular
forms of work and workers' organi/ations, shuras or factory committees,
in the industr ia l workplaces; these called for the extension of the revolu-
tionary process and for a permanent class struggle. The shuras were
ins t i tu t ions of workers' control; they wanted to modify the division of
labour in the workplace and to give workers control over the processes of
production, distribution and exchange (Chapters 7 and 8).
I attempt to evaluate the experience and demise of the shuras
(( 'hapter 9). I a t t r ibute their defeat both to their internal contradictions
and to external pressures, in particular those imposed by the new state.
I1 seems, rather regrettably, that this work is the only systematic
research which has been carried out (at either the theoretical or the
empirical level) on the position of the Iranian working class both in
normal circumstances and in a revolutionary crisis.1 Its relevance is
therefore twofold. On the one hand, there is a serious lack of analysis of
the umrfaing aliirt experience of the Iranian labour movement and the
inabi l i ty u l uyn lum to carry out a substantial reappraisal of the predica-
ment of the working class in all its economic, sociological, politico-
ideological dimensions. I hope that the present work will act as a spur to
fu r the r investigation on the position of the Iranian working class. Yet, I
must stress t ha t th i s hook is not a history of the Iranian working class in
the three years after the Revolution. It is simply concerned with one
important and novel aspect of struggle: workers' control.
On the other hand, and no less s ignif icant ly , I wish to consider the
in t e rna t iona l dimension of the working-class movement. The expansion
of world capital has generated as i ts counterpart a world working class
The struggle of the Iranian workers is a part of the global and, in
particular, Third World, labour movement. An analytical approach to
particular labour issues wil l serve as a contribution towards a better
understanding of all Third World workers' movements. Thus this book is
not merely the story of the I ranian workers' struggle for workers' control.
It attempts logo fur ther and relate th i s experience to the idea of workers'
control fier u'.
Introduction
Workers' Control and the Third World Experience
The question of workers' control in the Third World is particularly
interesting. At first glance it might appear that the idea of workers'
control is specific to the proletariat of the advanced capitalist countries.
That is because much less attention has been paid to the general condi-
tions of workers' struggles in the periphery, let alone their particular
experience of workers' control. Any consideration of Third World workers
in academic circles is quite recent; and this neglect is compounded by
academic doubts as to whether Third World workers really form a working
class.
On the other hand, in the West, various forms of workers'organiza-
tions and practices such as 'consultation', 'co-determination', 'job-
enlargement', 'productivity bargaining' and 'works councils' to settle
grievances at plant level have been erroneously identified with the
concept of workers' control. The terms industrial democracy, workers'
participation and so on, have been confused with workers' control proper.
Here, we must note that these industrial institutions and practices in the
West were distinct from the radical rank and file organizations of workers'
<'<>unril\ which emerged in European countries in the revolutionary situ-
ations of the 1910s, 1940s and the late 1960s.2 (In the following Chapter I
attempt to clarify the concept of workers' control.) In this book, workers'
control is used in the 'strong' sense of demands by workers to exert
control over the processes of production and administration of produc-
tion, and the implications generated by such demands.3
In this sense, the possibility of struggles for workers' control in the
Third World countries tend to be denied (when it is acknowledged at all)
on the following grounds:
a) The repressive and authoritarian nature of management regimes
in the industries of countries dominated by foreign capital (Mapolu, 1976,
p. 200).
b) The fact that political democracy generally is less deeply rooted
in Western countries, or is absent altogether.
c) Workers' control is too 'advanced' a demand for the 'young' or
'backward' workforce of the Third World to mobilize around.
The above arguments appear to be based upon a problematic assump-
tion that workers' participation is a policy initiated from above, supported
by the state legislations, and not a struggle from below. Also, in this sense
of the term, which takes an ILO-type corporatist approach, the extent of
workers' participation does not go beyond that represented by trade union
participation; unl ike workers' control, in trade unions it is the union
officials who conduct limited, joint consultation with the management. In
fact, the historical examples I shall provide below challenge these views.
The relevant question is thus, not whether Third World working classes do
experience workers' control, but rather how and in what conditions they
are materiali/ed, and in what ways they are distorted and fail.
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As an alternative to the above line of argument (and the assump-
tions it is based upon) I would argue that there are some specific structural
features of capitalist development (and socio-economic development in
general) in the periphery that provide conditions favourable to demands
and movements for workers' participation and workers' control:
a) One feature is the chronic inability of capitalist states in the
periphery to establish ideological hegemony (i.e. ruling through consen-
sus), thus providing special opportunities for oppositional movements,
including those of the working people.
b) Similarly, economic 'backwardness' (low level of capital accumu-
lation) inhibits any significant cooption of workers through economic
'incentives'. Together with almost perennial crises of ideological
hegemony, this means that reformist measures have little chance of
success. Independent trade unionism, for example, tends to assume a
highly critical and political character.
c) Together with their general 'backwardness' within the world
economic system, Third World countries experience the unevenness of
capitalist development especially sharply, above all with new industrial
technologies — and their attendant labour processes and management
regimes — introduced by multinational companies. The strains and con-
flicts associated with such unevenness are much less easily contained
within 'business unionism', and are more likely to generate demands for
workers' control.
d) The capitalist state, capitalist class and bourgeois values are
generally weak and less deeply rooted in the Third World countries. The
weakness of these structural factors and their related social forces, which
tend to preserve the status quo, means that resistance against change and
alternative socio-economic structure is concomitantly weaker.
e) Although, generally, the working Classes of the Third World have
less experience of organization and political education, the relatively
simpler organization of work and the labour processes can make possible
a higher degree of control by the working classes over the organization of
work and production, as the following examples illustrate.
Following the French withdrawal from Algeria in 1962 workers and
peasants took over control of production, at a time when the absence of
colonial managerial elements created a vacuum which had to be filled by
the native producers (Clegg, 1971). Later, however, through the institu-
tionalization of self-management, the state granted real (as opposed to
formal) power of control to the new managers.
In 1972 in Tanzania, following President Nyerere's declaration for
'workers' participation' (Mwongazo), a series of workers'occupations of
the factories took place. The workers demanded ful l and legal control of
the workplaces. The action surprised many observers who had not anti-
cipated that the workers would even strike. Nyerere's Mwongozo was in
fact traue union participation. It was a manifestation of a radical populist
policy which aimed to raise productivity and to create a corporatist
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ideology (i.e. cooperation of workers, management and the state for the
good of the nation) in the industry by securing the cooperation of the
unions (Nyerere, 1970 in Mapolu, 1976), whereas the workers' demands
in 1972 reflected a desire for real control (Mahyo, 1975; Mapolu, 1976).
A few years later in the aftermath of the downfall of the dictatorial
Portuguese regime (1974), a movement for mass participation escalated
and organs of workers' control were set up. Pressure from below and
desire for a self-managed economy was so strong that it forced the
constitution to recognize the principle of workers' control. But this was
restricted to the sphere of production and was successful mainly in
small-scale enterprises. This workers' control was in conflict with un-
altered bourgeois modes of distribution and exchange, which remained
outside workers' control (Goodey et al, 1980; Wise, 1975). The capitalist
states, the multinationals and the domestic industrialists undermined the
movement by resorting to economic sabotage. The state at first acted
merely as an axis of balance of class forces. But as the moment of
revolutionary enthusiasm passed, an essentially capitalist strategy was
adopted which entailed a de facto dismantling of the workers' committees.
In Chile, the victory of the Popular Unity in the 1970 general
election created a political situation in which the working class initiated
expropriation of private enterprises and multinationals, taking them into
workers' control. Allende's socialist party had already envisaged a pro-
gramme of workers' participation, based on the formation of cordones
industrielles at the enterprise level. The three years of Unidad Popular
government were marked by an intense class struggle, as the power and
initiative of the working class was released and the bourgeoisie and its
international allies resisted by organizing the subversive strike of the
bourgeoisie in 1972. The workers extended the social property sector
(state-owned nationalized and expropriated enterprises) and took control
of planning. Cordones industrielles were set up to co-ordinate the opera-
tions of enterprises and provincial co-ordinadora planned their activities.
( 'ommondas or communal councils were created to integrate the workers,
peasants, students, housewives, unions and the committees for the control
of food supplies and prices as a single body (Raptis, 1973, p. 54; also
Zimbalist & Petras, undated; Zimbalist and Espinosa, 1978; and Smirnov,
1979). A further instance is provided by the experience of the Iranian
workers to the examination of which this book is devoted.
These examples show the desire of workers to exert control over
their work environment. This challenges the view that workers, especial-
ly in the developing countries, are merely interested in bread-and-butter
issues. In some cases allied political parties played an important part in
spreading the idea of workers' control and in others the movements were
ent i re ly spontaneous. In all cases the achievements were short-lived and
were eventual ly either crushed or transformed. A crisis of hegemony and
a low level of capital accumulation may be conducive to the emergence of
workers' control, but the very same factors may act as obstacles to both its
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emergence and development, especially in the context of capitalist
economy. In a capitalist , developing country, a competitive and weak
position of capital leaves l i t t le room to accommodate the in i t i a l ly dis-
ruptive and restrictive effects of workers' control on capital. Nor does
such a method of production seem politically viable; the undemocratic
character of developing states cannot accommodate i n s t i t u t i o n s of
workers' control. (The conditions in which workers' control may develop
in a developing country are discussed in the final chapter.)
Yet the short life and eventual disintegration of these movements
should not be wholly attributed to their location. They were undermined
by physical liquidation (Chile), the politics of integration and transforma-
tion (Portugal, Algeria), and lack of clear political perspective. These
factors can also operate in advanced capitalist countries.
A crucial factor needing investigation is the inner contradiction and
shortcomings of the movements themselves. Some scholars l imi t them-
selves to merely praising the workers' control struggles, assuming that
the i r failure cannot lie with the workers themselves. They attribute the
failure exclusively to external factors: suppression or betrayal. In this
s tudy, I shall deal with the internal problems of workers' s/i/m/s in Iran.
My emphasis is not the'incompatibilityaof workers' control with efficiency,
but the problem of the persistence of a predominantly capitalist division
of labour which conflicts with the logic of workers' control. How is it
possible to modify and eventually eliminate the division of labour? It is
this problem, I would suggest, that should be the focal point of both
theoretical discussion and empirical investigation.
Field Research
I originally planned to do research on the historical development of the
I ran ian working class. From its inception this was a hard task, especially
in view of the severe l imita t ions of sources. I had already begun to do the
relevant general reading when I made a return visit to Iran some three-
months after the Revolution. The few months I spent there changed my
plan of research on the working class. The shuras, the grass-roots popular
insti tutions which had developed in offices, schools, districts, farms,
factories and in the armed forces, were generating a widespread interest.
I was more or less fami l ia r with a rather romantici/ed view of factory
shurus through the left-wing papers and my activist friends who were
directly involved. When I came back to England I pursued the idea of
researching these developments. My second long visit to Iran from
October 1980 to June 1981 led me to engage with the more immediate
question of what the factory shura.\ were ( in this period), and it was then
that I managed to conduct my field research, despite enormous difficulties.
To obtain first-hand information I conducted field research mainly
in four ins t i tu t ions:
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a) The Institute of Industrial Hygiene and Protection of Labour
Force, Ministry of Labour, where I managed to obtain data on conditions
of work. I examine this issue in Chapter 5 in the section on physical
oppression.
b) The Ministry of Health, which provided documents concerning
the frauds and overcharges levied against industrial workers under the
medical insurance scheme.
c) Three hospitals for industrial workers in Teheran, where I formally
interviewed 120 industrial workers, obtaining detailed information about
the process of the i r proletariani/.ation in economic, cultural and ideologi-
cal terms. The analysis in Chapter 4 rests heavily on this data.
d) Fourteen modern plants in Teheran (and one in Tabriz) which
speciali/.ed in four main sectors of industrial production: domestic
appliances, electronics, metal and cars. These factories provided the
major source material of my study.
Visiting factories was my prime objective and obtaining official
permission to do so my major concern. Frankly speaking, I had at the
outset little hope of obtaining a permit card. But I tried and succeeded —
but only after fifty days. During this period my request was rejected
outright several times by the Deputy Minister of Labour with such
excuses as 'you might be a communist', 'who knows, you might be a CIA
agent', 'honestly, believe me, factories are explosive'. I persisted and
answered every question. Eventually, after nearly two months, during
which I learnt a great deal about the Ministry, an official assumed the
'responsibility' of issuing the Letter of Permit. According to our arrange-
ment, I produced two kinds of questionnaires. The first was the formal
questionnaire, copies of which were to be sent, via the Ministry of
Labour, to 30 modern factories in three industrial zones throughout the
country; the completed forms were to be received by the Ministry. I
therefore produced 2,000 copies of these questionnaires. The second
questionnaire was to be completed by myself inside selected factories.
Questions in this were grouped in two sections addressed to workers ami
management.
The agreement of the Labour Minis t ry was conditional on the
limitation of my questionnaires to the past, to the Shah's regime; no
q uestions about strikes were allowed, or about the profit-sharing scheme.
The response to the formal questionnaires was almost nil. In some
plants the workers had torn the questionnaires in half— a show of distrust
of the Ministry of Labour. I had to complete a limited number of them
afterwards by direct interviews with workers in the hospitals in Teheran.
The results of the informal interviews and open questions were, on
the other hand, quite satisfactory. While conducting interviews I asked
about the issues which really interested me: the formation and composi-
tion of the shunts, the political si tuation in the past and present, manage-
ment strategies against the shunts, and so on. This method was effective
despite the fact that, in some cases, the management and the /calots of
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the Islamic Associations were scrutinizing me very closely. I would direct
the discussion, hut I would allow the workers to say what they wished to.
In some cases the interview would develop into a discussion involving all
the workers in a shop, with their differing politico-ideological orienta-
tions; I would tape-record the whole conversation. The most useful
interview sessions were concerned with the.v/iwra leaders of the factories;
at times these lasted for many hours
My success in conducting investigations in the plants was conditional
mainly on the political atmosphere. If a democratic shura was in power,
as at Metal Works, Fanons, it would provide further facilities helpful to
my research without the requirement of the management's consent. In
contrast, where there was no factory shura (perhaps as a result of forceful
dissolution) and the management was the absolute power, genuine in-
vestigation was either entirely impossible (as at Eadem Motor Diesel and
Tractor Sazi, both in Tabriz) or was very restricted. In either case man-
agement would refuse to allow me to visit the workshop and talk to the
workers, on the grounds that 'if you go inside, the workers will stop work;
you don't know; the workers have changed.' And indeed, stoppages did
happen in a few cases after my interviews. To avoid a potential threat of
problems in these situations, I had to adopt a guerrilla-type tactic of
research — ask and run.
The pattern of informal interviewing and the number of workers
interviewed therefore varied plant by plant. On the whole I managed to
interview some 150 workers, including 22 shura leaders. I managed to
make closer contacts after the official interview with the mili tant workers
whom I had met inside the factories. I would contact these workers
outside the workplace in their free time and we would have long con-
versations. These workers in particular provided valuable information
concerning the functions of shura and management.
I had planned to visit 30 large industrial units. But the dramatic
political change during the June Days of 1981 which led to the dismissal of
President Bani'Sadra and widespread violence against militant workers
and the forces of opposition halted my study. In those days, I could only
watch the mil i tant workers with whom I had talked being arrested. It
should be noted that all names of people, and of some factories, are
fictit ious
Notes
I Although there are useful contributions by, for example Ghotbi (1979,
19X0), ( ihas im (1979), Rah-i Kargar ( 1981 ) in Farsi; and Goociey (19X0) and Azad
(19X0) m English.




3. In this book the term workers' participation is used to denote the general
problematic of participation of workers in the decision-making of enterprises. In
this sense, workers' participation may refer to participation in various degrees,
from above or below, embodied in mere consultation or genuine workers' control.
Table 1
Details of Plants Investigated
Date of No. of Product
Plant* establishment Capital employees




















































































The names here are all fictitious to preserve anonymity of informants.
2. Control Relations in a
Capitalist Enterprise
The notion of workers' control has heen surrounded by contusion. Its
meaning is never really defined and the extent, degree and spheres of
workers' discretion are obscure. The idea is at times identified with the
limited trade unionist gains made under capitalism, and at times is associ-
ated with a major revolutionary social transformation in which workers
play a prominent part. Workers'control is taken to indicate such a variety
of practices that we may wonder whether it is an objective fought for by
workers or introduced by capital itself. This chapter attempts to deal with
these issues. In the first instance I shall examine the abstract notion of
control in a capitalist enterprise and then the historicity of control.
Certain concepts wi l l be introduced to establish an historical , as opposed
to formal is t ic , approach to the issue of control in capitalism.
The reader interested only in specifically the Iranian experience of
workers' control may skip this chapter without a loss of continuity.
What is Control?
The notion of control in a capitalist enterprise implies the adoption, by
both capital and labour, of certain decisions and practices in the work-
place. Capital's control is maintained by various managerial strategies
which are examined in Chapter 10. Here I am concerned with the notion
of workers' control.
By workers' control in industry, I mean the effective control by
workers over the processes of production, and administration of produc-
tion, and the implications generated by such practice. I shall for the
moment concentrate my analysis on the sphere of production. In itself,
control over the production process is an abstract notion. Workers'
control is assumed to mean that workers take certain decisions about the
production process, divorced from their historical time and place. This
study is concerned with specifying the historical determinants of worker
control. But before so doing, we s t i l l have to characteri/e it at a general
level, which involves looking at the sal ient features of the capitalist
production process.
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The capitalist production process is really two unified processes: the
labour process and the valorization process. The labour process is the way
in which use-value is produced; it is related to concrete labour. Concrete
labour differentiates the various tasks to be performed. It is characterized
by the quality of work and the technical aspect of production by skill and
expertise. The valorization or surplus-value-extracting process is con-
cerned with the production of exchange-value or the process of abstract
labour as a quantitative expenditure of energy or effort. The two pro-
cesses are separable only in the abstract and for the sake of analysis (see
column 1 in Figure 1 .1) .
If we examine the class relations within the production process at a
high level of generality, it may be suggested that those involved in the
surplus-value-extracting process are agents of capital. Their function is to
maintain and create the conditions for maximum surplus-value production
(which may involve various strategies from repression to industrial demo-
cracy). They may be identified as owners, exploiters, and non-producers.
In contrast, those involved in the labour process carry out the function of
labour; they are the non-owners, the exploited and the producers (see
column 4 and Carchedi, 1975a and 1975b).
It is easy to identify, theoretically, the functions of capital and labour
in a capitalist enterprise characterized by the formal subordination of
labour to capital. Following Edwards, 1979, we may refer to an uncompli-
cated organization of production in which the relationship between ex-
ploiter and exploited is direct and unmediated control (see also Chapter 5).
But with the development of capitalism and a growing complexity of
organization of production, the identification of the two functions also
becomes complex. Conditions of real subordination (the development of
modern technology), prevalence of bureaucratic and structural control in
place of simple control and the development of monopoly capitalism
from competitive and individual capitalism are accompanied by a sub-
stantial transformation in both the labour and valorization processes. On
the capital side, the category of ownership of the means of production
gives way to that of possession (Poulantzas, 1975; Bettelheim, 1979). This
refers to control by non-owners (of the means of production) i.e. man-
agers, who determine how capital functions through the managerial
structure. On the labour side, under monopoly capitalism collective labour
emerges to replace workers scattered round individual and competitive
capitalist enterprises. It also refers to the combined social labour which in
its totality performs the total function of labour (i.e. producing total
surplus value) in the whole capitalist economy in industry, in services or
in the office.
The functions of both capital and collective labour are each charac-
terized by technical and social aspects. Any position in the production
process has, on the one hand, a technical aspect and, on the other, a social
aspect of power and authority. This differentiation has a more immediate
relevance to the function ol capital. The functionaries of capital (managers)
11
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Worker* and Revolution in Iran
perform two kinds of work in the production process simultaneously: on
the one hand, they perform a work of control which is designed to ensure
the maximum production of surplus-value; and on the other, they carry
out the work of co-ordination which is a technical necessity in any
complex labour process (Marx, 1977, pp. 382-5). In fact, a hierarchy of
functionaries perform these tasks, from top directors and managers to the
planners, designers and supervisors listed in column 5. As the figure
makes clear, since certain functionaries perform the functions of both
capital and collective labour (planners, supervisors, foremen), they are in
a contradictory class position which is a peculiarity of the 'new middle
class'(Carchedi, 1975a).
If we assumed full control by capital, it would follow that workers
would only do what the functionaries of capital ordered them to, without
any struggle. Reality, however, diverges from this assumption. Workers
do resist the full control of capital in various areas and through different
strategies. To consider this matter, let us this lime start with the right-
hand side of the figure and move to the left, from the concrete to the
general levels. This will help us evaluate the extent of workers' struggles
for control and the effectiveness of these struggles; are they, for instance,
in the sphere of labour supply, of the labour process, of the production
process or of the state?
Column 6 of the figure illustrates a variety of areas which are sites of
struggle between capital and labour in both normal and critical and
revolutionary conditions. The areas of struggle (or the frontiers of con-
trol) have been arranged so that the upper areas indicate areas of wider
control than the lower ones and so that each practice in the column relates
to respective levels of the hierarchy of control (in column 1). For instance,
struggles over wages or a closed shop concern the conditions under which
the labour is supplied; job-demarcation and gang-systems are in the
sphere of the labour process; workers' management, control over plan-
ning, and such like, is in the sphere of resource allocation and planning.
Can the workers of an enterprise gain full control of the production
process through cumulative struggle at the workplace'? Not/«//control.
With the concentration and centrali/ation of capital, individual capitalists
themselves can exert only partial control over their enterprises. If workers'
control were set up in a single enterprise, it would be severely limited by
the capitalist environment and its laws The second point suggested by
column 1 of the figure is that there is a process of determination between
the levels of control. The arrow—» indicates that the top levels determine
all of the lower levels of the hierarchy of control directly or indirectly.
Control over the supply of labour is constrained by the mechanisms of the
labour process; these, in turn, are constrained by the logic of the surplus-
value-extracting process, and the latter is constrained by the accumula-
tion process (planning and resource allocation); all of them in turn are
constrained by the dictates of market relations upheld by state power (see
Baumgartner in Burns, 1979, pp. 185-7).
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These determinations, however, are by no means one-directional.
( lass struggle from below restricts the scope of capital. (The arrows —
point to the limited restrictive effects of the lower levels on the higher
ones.)
Struggles in the sphere of the labour process can impose serious
limitations on accumulation; if, for example, workers in all capitalist
enterprises were to carry out a concerted battle, it would be l ikely to
disrupt the whole of market relations. Though such a concerted action
can hardly materialize in a practical political struggle, the point neverthe-
less illustrates the impact workplace struggles can have as part of the
wider labour struggle to restrict accumulation.
The Historicity of Control: Some Relevant Concepts
So far we have discussed the abstract concept of control. We must now
look at some workers' control in concrete historical settings. If we con-
sidéra model at a level of abstraction in which capitalists exercise full and
unchallenged control over the production process, then any action which
workers take to challenge authority, at whatever level (from struggle over
wages to demands for control over the work process and finance) has to
be seen as a battle for control. This is how Goodrich has proceeded in his
classic work The Frontier of ( Ontrol ( 1975). Such vagueness and ahistorical
abstraction is misleading in several respects. It does not distinguish
struggles in qualitatively distinct spheres. It tends to confuse, for in-
stance, wage battles with struggles for control or the organization of the
labour process. It also fails to distinguish between defensive (reactive)
control — which aims to preserve certain already achieved advantages —
and offensive control — struggles waged to advance the authority of
workers against that of management; and it ignores the distinction between
control as an end and control as a means. Control as an end refers to the
at tempt to win a certain limited control over a particular work area;
control as a means sees workers' control as a stage on the journey to
undermine capitalism. Finally, and most important ly , such an approach
ignores the contradictory strategies of control from below originating
from rank-and-file initiatives and pressures, and control from above
which is introduced by capital in various forms (e.g. British Whitleyism,
(ierman co-determination, the Iranian corporatist shurax, Tan/anian
Mwongozo).
Defensive Control vs Offensive Control
Defensive control is an attempt by the workforce to defend an existing
position threatened by the encroachment of capital. A typical historical
instance was the position of the powerful British craft unions of the 1910s
which struggled against the novel strategies of capital during wartime.
The new strategies aimed to qualitatively transform the organization of
15
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the production process by introducing new technology, by a more exten-
sive division of labour, a simplification of executive jobs, the recruitment
of a mass of less skilled and cheaper labour, and, most important, by
undermining the position of those workers whose skill and knowledge of
production underlay their strong bargaining power. Wartime imperatives
provided an appropriate opportunity for such an offensive by capital
when the rapid expansion of the armaments industry generated growing
demands for labour. These developments fostered the grievances of
skilled workers (Hinton, 1973, p. 14).
At the same time, several factors led to the emergence of the
shop-steward movement. These included the 'especial helplessness of
the trade union leaders' who had 'responded to the declaration of war
with promises of industrial truce' (Goodrich, 1975, p. 7); the intro-
duction of conscription; the rapidly rising cost of living in the war
period; the Munitions Act of 1915-16 and wartime discipline, especially
the militarization of the workplace (Hinton, 1973, p. 34). 'In general
redress could be obtained only through action at workplace level'
(Hyman, 1975b).
Although skilled craft workers supported shop-steward committees
in their efforts to reorganize the work process, their involvement was in
defence of their position as skilled craftsmen. This position was being
threatened by the wartime measures, in particular, dilution (Monds,
1976). 'In the end craft conquered class goals among the rank and file of
the movement, and the anticipated strike against the war in January 1918
collapsed into a sectional struggle in defence of the (novel) craft privilege
of exemption from military conscription'(Hinton, 1973, p. 16).
Apart from this well-known historical case, numerous sporadic
incidents have happened since then that, despite their apparent militancy,
have been merely defensive; various episodes of factory occupations and
work-ins have occurred in response to lock-outs and to save jobs in
periods of economic recession (for example, occupation of the Talbot car
plant in France, in 1985).
The struggle for offensive control is struggle by workers in the
production process waged in order to further the aim of workers' control.
This offensive acts as both a means (confronting the power of capital at
the point of production) and an end (it satisfies certain rights).
The Russian factory committees of February-October 1917 were
set up and developed to express the opposition of the factory workers to
bourgeois management (Smith, 1980, pp. 145-51); so it was in Italy
(Milan and Turin) in 1919-20 when commission! interni led to the factory
occupations (Spiriano, 1975; Williams, 1979). In Allende's Chile 'the
workers, through their political organization, successfully translated their
technical skills in production into social control over management'
(Zimbalist and Petras, 1972, p. 2). In Britain in the 1920s the miners'
statement that 'the organization of industry is right enough as it is, what
we want is to eliminate private ownership', or the demands of the National
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Union of Railwaymen and Miners Federation for 'nationalization and
joint control' point to an offensive tendency (Hyman, 1975b).
A struggle for defensive control can rapidly be transformed into an
offensive one as a result of the direct involvement of the militant
rank-and-file workforce in an unprecedented terrain of struggle. Part of
the experience of the Iranian factory shuras may be such a rapid
metamorphosis.
Control as an End vs Control as a Means
Control as an end refers to restricted attempts by the workforce to get
certain areas of managerial control into their own hands; the struggle is
designed to end as soon as the objective, however limited, is achieved.
This is what Goodrich terms 'control for control's sake' (1975). The
impulse behind these sorts of demands arises from the authoritarian,
alienating and dehumanizing features of the workplace. The union policies
of industrial democracy exemplify these limited perspectives which seem
to characterize the strategies of the social democratic trade unions and
which may well be accommodated within the boundaries of capitalist
domination.
Control as a means seeks to advance towards further definite objec-
tives and to inflict pressure on capital by means of restrictive practices.
The concept of control as a means is a fundamental principle of the
Alternative Economic Strategy in British politics, which envisages it as
the cutting edge of an offensive against capital. An offensive control
strategy both undermines the authority of capital and establishes
alternatives. The rationale of such practices is to limit capital's economic
power of manoeuvre, and hence, by gradual but persistent measures,
place capital in an impasse.1 This view of the possibility of an incremental
weakening of capital is economistic and even in this respect is rather
inadequate when we consider the hierarchy of control (illustrated in
Figure 1.1). It is economistic because it ignores political and ideological
dimensions of struggle against capital; and inadequate, because market
forces and political power impose a severe limitation on such practices.
Control from Below vs Control from Above
By control from below I mean the independent struggle of the workers to
gain more control in the capitalist workplace, contrary to, or irrespective
of, the desire and interests of managers.
Any struggle of this sort may or may not achieve its objective. If it
does, and capital agrees to concede, this means either that capital is able
to concede or that it has no alternative but to give in. As long as the
initiatives of the control struggle are in the hands of the workers, control
is from below. In the case of pre-war craft-control in Britain, control was
demanded and practised from below, with the agreement of capital,
because a) British capitalism was globally dominant; b) the industrial
employers lacked competence and self-confidence; c) a relatively high
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demand for skilled and competent labour strengthened the workers'
position and d) the self-disciplining character of craft-control at that
period was compatible with the profitability of capital (Hyman, 1975b).
But after the war, with intensifying competition on the world market and
Taylorism beginning to dominate the work process, the material basis of
craft-control tended to diminish. In contrast, control from below in the
post-February Russia of 1917, in Chile (1973) or in Iran (1979) materialized
simply because capital was in retreat and workers were on the offensive.
Capital never wants to lose control over work relations, nor does it
want to recognize even a limited control by labour. Some historical
evidence points to the ceding of control to the workers. Yet capital
designedly sustains its control by freely introducing or conceding under
the pressure of the class struggle workers control.
Control from above thus explains the distortion by capital of the
genuine movement (from below) for control by forcefully introducing a
limited version with the intention to 'regain control by sharing it' (Cressey
and Maclnnes, 1980). Such strategies are adopted as a response to the
growth of a genuine movement and the contradictions arising from the
strategy of direct control by capital reflected in alienation of workers,
absenteeism, sabotage, etc.
One expression of capital's response to the revolutionary shop-
steward movement was the introduction of Whitleyisrn in 191ft as an
aspect of its more general strategy for post-war reconstruction. It was the
strategy of J.H. Whitley, chairman of the committee that recommended
creation of permanent joint bodies of employers' representatives and
union officials (Hyman, 1975a, p. x ix ; Coates, 19ft8, p. 228). One of its
ma in targets was to 'head off and contain any independent and aggressive
movement for workers' control' (Hyman, ibid). In Germany, in 1905,
some 220,000 out of 270,(XK) miners went on strike for the reduction of
working hours and to question capitalist control. The state responded by
introducing labour committees in the mines with limited power (Bologna,
1976, p. 27). In Iran, following the emergence of independent workers'
committees (\hura\) after the overthrow of the Shah's regime, the state
i t se l f introduced its own (distorted) version of the Islamic shuras.
C'ontrol from below can also be fostered by the contradictions
inherent in capital: on the one hand it must subsume labour to the means
of production in order to maximize surplus-value and on the other, it
'seeks a purely cooperative relationship in order to abolish the antagon-
ism between the worker and the means of production that its capitalist
form throws up' (Cressey and Maclnnes, 1980, p. 15). Thus the strategies
of 'responsible autonomy' (Friedman, 1977), co-determination, the
Japanese solution, and so forth, are introduced on the one hand to avert
the contradictions of scientific management and direct control, i.e.
generating alienation at a high level, which would result in absenteeism,
high turnover, s tr ike action (see Walker, 1981, p. 53; Palloix, 197ft), and
on the other to generate an ideology of mutual interest, interdependence
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and responsibility through the participation of the workforce in decision-
making, autonomous practices and so on.
Some Factors Influencing Control
Four main factors influence the possibility of workers' control over the
capitalist production process. These may be classified into two broad
categories of capital accumulation and workers' struggles.
Uneven Development of Capitalist Organization of Production
The classic historical development of capitalist work organization may be
characterized by the following stages:
i) craft production, with a high level of control by skilled craftsmen
over the simple process of production;
ii) the manufacturing system, which brought those skilled craftsmen
under one roof where they were still able to exercise a high degree of
control from below;
i i i ) large-scale industry characterized by a more extensive compart-
mentalization which set the ground for the development of Taylorism.
Taylor's system was based upon and extensively fostered the detailed
division of labour, culminating in the complete separation of conception
from execution;
iv) the post-war systems of organization of production, notably
'neo-Fordism' or 'responsible autonomy' which appear to confer a certain
degree of autonomy on the workforce;
v) current computerized systems which extend the alienation of
shop-floor workers to even professional designers and planners (Murray,
undated, p. 13; Cooley, 1981).
The segmental presentation of thse systems does not, of course, imply
that they do not co-exist, rather that, at each stage, one system is dominant.
This historical transformation of the labour process has incrementally
restricted the control of labour and extended that of capital over the
labour process. Workers have responded differently to this process. For
instance in Britain, at the turn of the century, workers formed craft
unions to protect their relatively strong discretion over the matter of
hiring and firing, manning and organization of work.
The development of the contemporary industrializing countries in
the Third World is markedly different. There, the most advanced forms
of work organi/ation tend to co-exist with an historically backward
economy. Fordism is abruptly introduced into economies dominated by
peasant production. In such situations almost all of the workforce of the
new industries are recruited from the countryside and lack any familiarity
with industry, let alone industrial skills and claims for control. A produc-
tion organization is established without the historical precedent of a
control-oriented resistance.2
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The Technical Content of the Labour Process
As we have noted, the labour process refers to the ways in which use-
values are produced with concrete labour. It differentiates various
functions and tasks, has varying levels of division of labour, skill and
expertise and kinds of organization of work. The feasibility of workers'
control is greater in an industrial enterprise with a simpler labour process,
simpler division of labour and with a highly-skilled labour force. These
would not only enable the workforce to sustain their control following a
revolutionary upheaval against the capitalist class, but would act as a
factor of control and a bargaining point in normal conditions since capital
would need and could not easily replace certain workers' expertise.3
The Position of a Given Industry in Competitive Markets
Column 1 of the figure suggests how control over each of the spheres of
production activities is constrained by higher levels of determination, and
ultimately by market forces.
While a strong market position could be a reason for not resisting
the control demands of the workforce, a weak position would impose
serious limiations on such accommodation.*
Effective Workers' Organization before the Introduction of New
Technology, and the Unity of Workers
The necessity of organized opposition to the employers' strategies to
introduce ever more subordinating work organization is self-evident.
Resistance by craft workers in Britain led to the shop-steward movement
during the First World War. At the same time in the USA employment of
an unorganized immigrant workforce facilitated the new strategy of
capitalist control.5
That section of the working class which, owing to the particular
objective power the i r skil ls give them, is able to advance and even lead a
movement for control, does not necessarily work for the liberation of the
rest of the workforce. The sectarian mentality of the British craftsmen led
eventually to 'the collapse of the shop-steward movement' (Hinton, 1973,
Chapter 10). Because of occupational differences within the working
class, a conscious unity is a prerequisite of workers' control.
Notes
1. This argument seems to be similar to that put forward by Banaji in his
( 'ommunist Platform, No. !.
2. The radical transformation of work organization in American industries, such
as the introduction of Taylorism, was facilitated by the massive numbers of immi-
grant labourers. Some six million of them entered the USA from Europe between
1<XX) and 1906 (Bologna, 1976, pp. 76-7). See also Montgomery, 1979, pp. 32-47.
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3. The highly specialized German tool-makers in the 1910s possessed quite a
high degree of power. They were the ones who forced the employers in the Busch
Company to introduce the 8-hour day for the first time in 1906 and the free Saturday
in 1910. They were also in the forefront of the workers' council movement (Bologna,
1976, p. 68).
4. For the historical facts see Hyman and Elger, 1981, pp. 115-49.
5. Unions like the NGA in Britain fight to retain traditional control over work
organization, while the AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labour) has implicitly
accepted such encroachment by capital (Davis, 1982).
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The economy in the inter-war period was one in which state capitalism
and the oil industry predominated. During the 1930s Reza Shah sought to
rebuild I ran in the image of the West by means of secularism, anti-
t r ibal ism, nationalism, educational development and state capitalism
(Abrahamian, 1982, p. 140). The state played a multiple role in the
development of' wage-labour relations. It laid the infrastructure for
economic, especially industrial , development by the construction of
t ransna t iona l railways and roads and by moderni/ing the state bureau-
cracy. The state itself init iated direct industrial investment. By the end of
the 1930s it had established 64 factories and was allocating about 20% of
its budget to indust r ia l development (Bharier, 1971, pp. 176, 178). The
third role of the state was to be a 'class-creating force', the agents of this
process being top-ranking state personnel and big landowners and
merchants who formed an economically close-knit group. The Shah
remained in control though he sometimes came into bitter conflict with
the rul ing class (Abrahamian, 1982, pp. 149-52).
This phase of industrial development began in the early 1930s as the
Great Depression drastically reduced the price of capital goods. The state
encouraged industrialization by imposing high tariffs and fiscal policies.
It also established state-owned industries. The number of modern indus-
t r i a l plants (excluding oil ins ta l la t ions) increased from 20 in 1925 to 346 in
1941 (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 146). The wage-labour sector expanded with
the oil industry; many of the small workshops (shoemaking, carpentry
and' tai loring) merged, each employing over th i r ty workers. Workers in
the oil industry, modern factories, fisheries, railways, coalfields, docks
and construction formed a small working class of over 170,000. Con-
centrated nearby in a few urban centres, this working class was less than
4% of the total labour force. It was surrounded by an ocean of rural
workers ( 1 1 . 3 5 mi l l ion ) whose life and labour were regulated by pre-
capitalist relations.
22
Industrial Development und //«• Working ( 7«.s\
The Fost-War Period
The post-war period until the 1953 coup, which was organized by the CIA
and toppled the nationalist government of Dr Mosadegh, was character-
i/ed by confusion and uncertainty. Reza Shah had been forced to abdicate,
being replaced by his son Muhammed Reza Shah. The war had weakened
the state and various forms of political, ethnic and working-class struggles
flourished. The state was not only inactive in the industrial arena, but
government plants were bankrupted by mismanagement and competition
from the foreign products which had flooded into the country at the end
of the war (Bharier, 1971, p. 183). But later in this period there was a
considerable expansion of private industry. A shortage of foreign ex-
change raised the domestic price of imported goods. Private investment
was further encouraged by tariff concessions for importers of machinery.
Between 1948 and 1952 nearly 1(),(K)() factories of all si/.es were estab-
lished; in the following four years nearly double this number were set up
(Bharier, 1971, p. 184).
After the overthrow of Mosadegh, owing to his independent political
stance, the state played a major role in integrating Iran into the world
economy. It was from this period on that industrial growth gathered
momentum. Three strategies of industrial development were followed:
the encouragement of foreign capital investment, import substitution and
state capitalism.
Before the 1950s foreign investment outside the oil sector was
minute. In the period following the coup it developed rapidly, mostly in
the form of investment in subsidiaries of multinationals, in partnership
with the state or with indigenous private capital. By the end of the 1960s
there were 90 foreign firms in Iran, and by 1974 the number had reached
1X3 (Halliday, 1978a, p. 153). Nevertheless, overall foreign direct capital
investment remained a small proportion of capital investment (3.8% in
the 1973-8 Development Plan).
The strategy of industrial expansion was carried out in a series of
5-year development plans. Putting over $9.5 billion into the economy, the
third (1962-8) and fourth (1968-73) plans helped GNP to grow at the
annual rate of 8% in 1962-70, 14% in 1972-3 and 30'; in 1973-4
(Abrahamian, 1982, pp. 427-8). Between 1963-78, the share of manu-
facturing in GNP increased from 11 to 17%, and the annual industrial
growth rose from 5 to 20%. In the same period the value of total industrial
output rose almost twelvefold, with an average rate of growth of 72% per
annum (Table 3.1 ). The table shows that the highest rate of growth was in
the water and power and construction sectors, with an average annual
rate of growth of 104.2% and 78.2% respectively. This growth was due to
the rapid construction of hydroelectric dams, power stations, ports and
later nuclear power stations, as well as roads, railways, schools, hospitals,
public and private housing, offices and factories.
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Table 3.1
Industrial Output Between 1963 and 1978 ( I ,000 million rials)
Annual
Industrial sectors 1962-3 1967-8 1972-3 1977'-8rate of growth
Manufactur ing & mining 41.5 72.5 224.8 468.2 68.5
Construction 14.1 24.9 91.4 179.5 78.2
Water & power 2.2 8.9 17.2 36.6 104.2
Total 57.8 106.3 333.4 684.3 72.2
Source: Based on Bank Markazi Iran, and Katouzian (1981, p. 276).
The role of the state in promoting commodity relations was deter-
mining both economically and politically. In economic terms the state
bui l t up the infrastructure of capital development — which the weak
bourgeoisie would have been unable to do. Between 1963 and 1977, dams
were bui l t in a number of provinces and helped to increase electrical
output from 0.5 billion to 15.5 billion Kw hours. New port facilities were
developed, roads and railways were constructed, and the mass media
mushroomed. The state was involved in direct as well as infrastructural
investment. Thanks to its oil revenue it was responsible in 1975 for some
60% of all industrial investment; through its fiscal policies it encouraged
private domestic investment and provided funds for industry through
various institutions and specialized banks
The political role of the state was no less significant. It swept away
the old production relations that had hampered the expansion of com-
modity relations. Encouraged by the US, the state in 1962 introduced a
series of reform programmes, the most important of which was the Land
Reform. The implementation of the Land Reform ended pre-capitalist
land tenure and transformed 'feudal' relations. Unequal distribution of
land in the rural areas entailed the formation of a rural bourgeoisie, middle
and poor peasant land holders, and a rural proletariat. Commodity rela-
tions were expanded in the countryside, as well as between peasants and
the urban population.
The Shah's régime was undoubtedly dictatorial. But the repressive
nature of the state and the tensions between it and the bourgeoisie in both
economic and political spheres by no means hindered the process of
capitalist expansion. An observer commented that 'private industry was
encouraged and capitalist forms developed in their hundreds during the
1950s and 1960s, precisely due to the growing role of the state in the
overall management of the economy' (Nima, 1983, p. 14).
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The Growth and Size of the Working Class
The number of industrial workers naturally grew as industry expanded.
In 1962-3 the share of industrial labour in the total workforce was 20.6%.
By 1977-8 the proportion had reached 33.2%, with an annual rate of
growth of 9.3%. The service sector also experienced a substantial rate of
expansion — 11.3% per year during 1962-77. In 1977, the share of the
service sector in the total GNP amounted to 34.6% (see Table 3.2).
Table 3.2
Sectoral Distribution of Total Labour Force 1963-78 (thousands)
1962-3 1967-8 1972-3 1977-8
Sector No. Total (%) No. Total <%) No. Total <%) No. Total (%)
Agriculture 3,672 55.1 3,861 49.0 3,600 40.9 3,200 32.2
Industry 1,372 20.6 1,947 24.7 2,550 29.0 3,300 33.2
Services 1,584 23.X 2,020 25.7 2,600 29.5 3,379 34.0
Oil 36 0.5 46 0.6 50 0.6 60 0.6
Total 6.664 100.0 7,874 100.0 8,800 100.0 9,939 100.0
Source: Katouzian, 1981, p. 259.
In 1977 about 54% of the total economically active population
(EAP) of 8.8 millions were subsisting through wage-labouring. The rest
of the population were divided between four working groups: landed
peasants using family labour (2.3 million, 26% of the EAP), non-
agricultural self-employees (1.1 million, 12.5%), non-agricultural family
workers (0.43 million, 4.9%), and employers.
Most wage-earners were directly involved in industrial activities
(2.38 million), such as manufacturing, mining, construction, utilities,
transport and communications. Over 66,000 workers were engaged in
agricultural production; this included those employed in the mechan-
ized agribusiness enterprises, and the collective agri-industries such as
the farm factories. The third component of the working class was the
service workers, which in the official categorization covered those in
modern commercial, insurance and banking enterprises and the public
service state bureaucracy (including the police and the army). The total
number of employees in this sector in 1978 was 1.65 million, a consider-
able number of whom were 'white-collar' workers. Subtracting some
400,000 military personnel from the category of service employment,
since they were not involved in economic activities, it follows then that
some 1.25 million employees were engaged in service, of whom 68%
were in the state sector as teachers, clerical workers, health workers or
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civil servants; and the rest of the 213,(XX) were employed in the private
sector.
If we take a broad economic definition of the working class as
including all productive and unproductive wage-labourers who in the
processes of production, distribution and exchange collectively contri-
bute to the creation and the realization of surplus-value, then we can
roughly estimate that the total number of working-class people in Iran
would probably exceed four million; well over 50% of the EAP. The
figure points to a relatively large Iranian working class in comparison with
other Third World countries (see appendix).
Table 3.3
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Source: Sltitutiail Year Hook, 197V 80. Teheran: Plan and Budget
Organization.
The Industrial Labour Market
One characteristic of the capitalist indus t r i a l labour market is i t s
segmentation into primary and secondary markets. The primary sector is
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the modern, capital-intensive and monopoly sector with skilled, relatively
privileged and stable workers with high wages and job security. The
pr imary sector may evolve within itself an internal labour market from
which employees are reproduced and recruited. On the other hand, the
secondary labour market is composed of the small-scale, traditional and
competitive industrial units, services with low wages and insecure and
unstable employment.1
The primary sector in Iranian industry consists of oil, state-owned
enterprises, multinational firms, joint ventures and other large-scale
u n i t s of which there were 923, including 162 multinationals, in 1973
(Daftary and Borghaii, 1976, pp. 28-9). The integration of the Iranian
economy into the world market brought it into contact with modern
technological development, whose operations in a backward economy
gave the primary sector a distinct character of its own.
The Primary Labour Market
The strategy of import substitution involved the production of a mass of
non-durable and durable consumer goods with a protectionist state policy;
it also involved production through periphery Fordism, that is, labour-
intensive assembly lines. On the other hand, large-scale heavy industry
was producing capital goods such as basic metals which by nature required
an expanded and scattered work process (as distinguished from an
assembly l i n e ) and thus a certain degree of craft-work.
Two trends emerged: on the one hand, import substitution and state
protection, together with the existence of a relatively small market for
these products, placed some industries in a monopoly position. This
potentially enabled them to pay higher wages and provide better condi-
tions. On the other hand, the rapid pace of industrialization produced a
high demand for skilled labour. The ILO planners estimated that some
250,(MM) skilled workers were needed in the manufacturing sector between
1973-7 to be engaged almost entirely in the modern plants (ILO, 1973,
P- 74).*
The shortage of skilled labour in industry coincided with a political
repression which hindered the organization of the workforce into in-
dependent unions. Strike action was assumed to be an act of violence
against the state. The actual ban on any union organization seems to be
quite reasonable from the state's viewpoint, in a country like Iran, since
trade union action is very likely to assume a political character (see
Chapter 5). Lacking an organizational medium for bargaining, ski l led
labourers resorted to individual resistance which led to a high labour
turnover. My own sampling of the workers of modern factories in Teheran
showed that (on average) workers changed their jobs 2.6 times during
t h e i r industr ia l work, and 15% of them 4-5 times In selected multi-
national companies, the rates of turnover of skilled workers were regis-
tered as 25%, IS ' ; and 15% respectively for textiles, chemicals and
transport equipment (Daftary and Morghaii, 1976, p. 62).
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The Internal Labour Market and Wage Differentials
The need for skilled and stable labour on the one hand, and the monopoly
position of industries in the primary sector on the other, laid the founda-
tion for the development of an internal labour market in this sector. The
average wage in this sector was undoubtedly higher than that in the
small-scale units in the secondary sector. Yet the internal labour market
generated a wider wage-differential within itself than that between the
primary and secondary sectors.
In the internal labour market, capital makes the wage-differentiations
according to skill and education (which are scarce) and length of service
(owing to a need for a stable workforce). Wage-differentiation on these
grounds was introduced in 1970, under the policy of job classification,
Tabaghebandi-e Mashaghel. This policy laid down regulations concern-
ing job qualifications and skills, job evaluation, wage-levels, promotion
and on-the-job training (Institute of Labour and Social Security, 1976,
pp. 102-10). Skilled labour was to be supplied from within a firm or
industry by fixed promotion and seniority rules. As a necessary component
of the scheme new fringe benefits and bonuses had to be introduced. Such
allowances for housing, marriage, childbirth and child benefit are non-
existent in the secondary sector.
Table 3.4



























'Rate of exchange in 1981 was $1 = Rls 79.5.
Source: provided by the respective companies.
From the 1973 oil boom until the eve of the Revolution (1973-8),
the formal wages of industr ial workers rose by an average 30% each
year. But wages among the working class were highly unequal and
differentiated according to sector. There were significant divisions
between a) old and new workers, b) skilled and unskil led, c) per-
manent ly employed and contract workers and d) male and female
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workers. Table 3.4 shows the wage-differentials among the manual
workers in two firms.
The disparity between manual workers and white-collar and the
highly skilled technicians still tends to be much higher than between
manual workers. For instance, in Arj factory in 1981, the white-collar
workers were earning on average twice as much as the manual workforce
(see Table 7.4).
Inter-Industry Wage Differentiations in the Primary Sector
According to the Job Classification Scheme, length of industrial work
(experience) and skill were the main factors in determining wage policy in
the primary sector. Yet the strategic position of an industry and its
particular labour process are additional factors determining wages. At
least four distinct types of industries may be identified; despite their
positions as large-scale employers of stable workforces, they adopt dif-
ferent patterns of pay.
a) Industries with a strategic and monopoly position such as the oil
industry, employ workers who, for some observers, are a labour aristo-
cracy. Paying the highest average wages in the industrial sector, the oil
industry has developed a fully-fledged internal market with an enormous
wage disparity within itself (Table 3.5).
b) Industries such as the tobacco industry, with long services involv-
ing heavy and unpleasant labouring pay high wages with much lower
differentials.
c) In industries characterized by a Fordist labour process the ex-
tensive division of labour provides various simplified jobs which can be
performed by a cheap semi-skilled workforce who usually get on-the-job
training. The automobile industry in Iran is an example. While the
average wages in this sector are higher than in the secondary sector, the
differentials within it are also high. In 1973, skilled workers earned 3.5
times as much as the unskilled, foremen 2.4 times as much as skilled
workers and highly-skilled technicians 5.6 times as much as foremen. This
pattern, in general, continued after the 1979 Revolution. This wage
pattern is a contradiction of the labour aristocracy thesis which views
modern sector workers as a homogeneous privileged workforce without
internal divisions.
d) Some large-scale firms in the textile industry are characterized
by Taylorism. The work process requires a fairly homogenous skilled
workforce to perform quite simple, repetitive tasks.3 The wages here are
the lowest in the primary sector, but their differentiation is relatively
small; women, children and migrant peasant workers are the main
employees.
The Secondary Sector
This sector falls into three sub-sectors. One is rnpde up of small-scale
un i t s (with fewer than ten workers) of either traditional or modern origin.
29
Table 3.5






















































































*The table has been compiled on the basis of wage differentials in all industries (large- and small-scale) in the urban areas. Almost all
industries (except textile) are in the large-scale category. Yet. the Central Bank Bulletin. Vol. 12, No. 69. supports this intra-industry
wage disparity. The disparity within the textile industry remains an estimate.
**Rate of exchange, 1972-3,$! = Rls 76.66.
fLF = Labour Force.
$This high proportion of skilled workers in the textile industry seems to be misleading. The figure is probably the result of an
inaccurate definition of skill by the official surveyors.
Source: Ministry of Labour, Nataveg-i Amargiri-e Niroy-e Ensani 35 (Statistics of Labour Force), pp. 208-9.
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Using simpler technology, the units produce consumer goods (such
as sweets, printing, baking or footwear), do small-scale processing
(cement, wood-sawing), or provide transport (buses, taxis, trucks),
services, commerce or construction. The second sub-sector is the petty-
entrepreneurial, in which the owner may or may not employ his family
and one or more apprentices. This sector employs over 1.5 million, some
17% of the total EAR (see Table 3.6). The most common trades here are
tailoring, carpentry, goldsmithing and repair. The final sub-sector of
wage-employees is domestic servants.
The secondary sector originates historically from existing petty-
commodity production and has been reproduced as a consequence of the
capitalist accumulation in a broader scale.
Table 3.ft































*In all sectors except agriculture and hunting.
Source: Based on Statistical Year Hook, 1979-80, Teheran, Plan and
Budget Organization.
The figures indicate that the secondary sector grew at a higher rate than
the primary sector (12.1% and 9.3% respectively in 1963-77). This was
for various reasons. The monopoly sector was not developed enough to
suppress all branches of traditional production and indeed small-scale
uni ts produced some of the raw materials or intermediate goods required
by the large-scale ones. Some units, like repair shops, were a direct
outcome of the requirements of the modern sector. For certain commodi-
ties such as carpets and works of art, the exchange-value of which depends
almost entirely on the concrete living labour-time expended. Moreover,
some small-scale units employed machines and modern Taylorite (not
craft) methods of work. This tendency, combined with low wages, enabled
them to compete against the modern industry.
Enterprises in this sector are highly competitive and, in comparison
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with the enterprises in the primary sector, have a low level of productivity.
They pay low wages, offer few benefits, and have poor conditions of work
and little job security, the consequences of an effort to reduce costs. The
secondary sector is usually regarded by the (mostly migrant) workers as
the first place to find a job. In the case of the Teheran marginals,
however, research suggests a very limited occupational mobility, espe-
cially into the primary sector (Kazemi, 1980, pp. 56-8). But the majority
of this class, notably the non-squatting migrants, were fully employed
wage-earners and about 48% were working in the private sector (ibid.,
p. 56).
The dispersed conditions of work made it increasingly difficult for
the workers in this sector to organize. Above all, the small size of the
workshops and the simple control patterns within them fostered a pater-
nalistic relationship between the workers and the employers, which was a
serious obstacle to the development of a labour organization.
The Rural Origin of the Working Class
The working class in Iran has strong rural ties. This is especially true of
the workforce in the newly-established industries; labour in older indus-
tries such as oil, textile, sugar and tobacco is, on the other hand, mainly
second generation from an urban background. Two patterns of labour
migration from countryside to town may be identified, roughly corres-
ponding to the periods before and after land reform.
The first may be described as a migratory pattern of formal sub-
ordination. This refers to migrations which are not directly caused by
capitalist development, but by such push factors in the rural areas as
natural disasters, famine and drought. Yet, for the migration to occur at
all, there have to be some developing urban centres to absorb the migrants
Such conditions usually begin to develop in the early stages of the transi-
tion to capitalist relations, during the period of formal subordination. In
Iran, the period from the 1930s up to the late 1950s may be characterized
in this way. From the second half of the 1930s migration from the
countryside to the cities was around 25,000 a year. The figure jumped to
130,000 for the subsequent period of 1941-56. By 1964, 48.8% of the
population of Teheran (1,115,286) were immigrants, of whom 60% were
searching for a job or a better job; the rest were dependants (Ministry of
Labour, 1965, pp. 1601, 1608).
The second post-land-reform population movement may be charac-
terized as a migratory pattern of real subordination. It refers to a major
urban migration movement which was substantially caused by the devel-
opment of capitalist relations (in both places of origin and destination)
which drew the mass of rural labour into its network. By the 1970s, the
land reform programme had accomplished its task of altering the socio-
economic structure of the countryside, integrating it into the capitalist
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Table 3.7
Annual (Compound) Rates of Population Growth





































market. It transformed the class structure of rural ares. A rural bourgeoisie
and proletariat were created; land became a commodity, production
tended to be carried out not for subsistence but for sale, exchange
relations between town and country and in the rural areas expanded. The
pre-capitalist organizations of production were transformed into indi-
vidual petty production and a few agribusinesses. As a result of the land
reform, some 73% of the peasants received land of less than 6 hectares
and about 35% received virtually nothing or less than one hectare
(Hooglund, 1982, p. 91). This unequal allocation of land, together with
the privatization of farming water, the rising need of the peasant family
for cash (because of its integration into the market) and the forceful
expropriations of peasant land for agribusinesses started a massive urban
migration, and proletarianization of migrant peasants.
As a result, urban migration continued to rise during the 1960s and
1970s as industriali/ation proceeded. During the period 1966-76, over
300,000 rural people were pouring into the cities every year (Table 3.7)
together with another 10,000 foreign migrants. The major urban centres
were transformed. The rural areas lost many more of their people in this
period than in the previous one. In 1972, immigrants were 13.8% of the
urban population, some four million. Industrial centres like Teheran
attracted the highest proportion of immigrants. With an annual rate of
growth of 5.3% between 1976 and 1980, it had 13.4% of the total
population in 1976-7.
Notes
1. lam aware that the terms 'primary' and 'secondary' labour markets, which are
used as equivalent to 'formal' and 'informal' sectors, are merely descriptive terms.
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2. The debates on shortage of skilled labour were reflected in a great deal of
literature: see ILO ( 1973), Bartseh ( 1971) and Elkan (1977). The shortage was such
that the government imported some 15,(XX) skilled workers from, among other
places, South Korea, the Philippines and Pakistan.
3. Generally the workers in textile manufacturing (not craft) are quite rightly
characterized by unskilled labour. The 'paradox' in Iranian textile industry is due to
the official, formal definition of'skill ' as a capacity to perform one particular task, no
matter how much knowledge the task requires.
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4. Proletarianization
The term 'proletarianization' generally refers to the process of the
emergence and development of a class whose subsistence depends on the
sale of its labour power (manual and intellectual). An examination of
proletarianization is also an analysis of the economic aspect of working-
class formation.
An analysis of the emergence of the working class should also
include a study of its cultural/ideological and political domensions. In this
chapter I shall discuss the problems inherent in the socio-cultural position
of the Teheran factory workers. The political struggle of the working class
wil l be outlined when we deal with the struggle for the formation of the
xhitras in Chapters 7-9.
The Determinants of Proletarianization
In examining the proletarianization of the labouring classes in capitalist
production, writers have expressed rather different views. Studying the
proletarianization of the factory workers of Petrograd from the beginning
of the First World War until 1917, S.A. Smith (1980) has used three
criteria to distinguish two strata of Russian workers: worker-peasants and
cadre-workers (proletarianized wage-labourers). The criteria are a) the
scale of the worker's landownership in the countryside and whether or
not s/he is engaged in both agricultural and industrial production, as a
seasonal labourer; b) the length of residence in the city, the degree of
urbanism and detachment from rural culture; and c) the extent to which
s/he comes from prior generations of working-class families (pp. 22-6).
A general application of these criteria to identify a proletarianized
working class is problematic. At least two meanings can be attributed to
the concept of proletarianized worker. On the one hand the term refers to
a change in consciousness by urbanized, class-conscious workers with a
long period of industrial work and a high degree of organization. On the
other hand, it also refers to a change in the objective conditions of
labourers who, a) have lost control over the means and conditions of
production which they had previously exercised, b) have nothing but
35
Workers and Revolution in Iran
their labour power to sell in the capitalist free market, and c) are freed
from their pre-capitalist ties (change in objective conditions). Smith's
criteria confuse these two conceptually distinct changes.
The criteria, however, are useful in examining the initial stages of a
class in the making and class formation in present-day Third World
countries where the dominant feature of working-class development is
worker consciousness. This changed consciousness means that 'workers'
identities and societal imagery based on their places in systems of work
relations . . . override the identities of kinship, ethnicity, or other non-
work roles and affiliations . . . Workers may express it by acting col-
lectively or as individuals' (Simpson and Simpson, 1981, p. ix).
As for working-class formation, Hobsbawm, examining the devel-
opment of the English working class in the late 19th Century, held that
the working class could be said to have been formed only when its
members began to feel the identity of their interests in all economic,
political and cultural spheres, and to act accordingly in their daily lives.
He demonstrated historically that the English workers assumed their
class character only in the second half of the 19th Century.2 Such an
approach, however, would lead to denying the existence of a working
class in many backward capitalist countries, as well as in the most ad-
vanced capitalist society, the USA. American labour lacks political
organization; only a minor part of it (16% of workers in private industry)
is organized in trade unions (Davis, 1982, p. 45).3 As Cohen et al rightly
argue ( 1974, p. 14), the essential issue is not so much whether there is a
proletariat in countries like Iran or Nigeria; the incorporation of those
countries in global capitalism has inevitably created one. The essential
issue is rather how a proletariat is formed in a complex of religious,
l inguistic, ethnic differentiations; how divided it is, and how, despite the
divisions, it reveals a class identity and political consciousness.
Rural Origins
With regard to Smith's criterion of land ownership in the countryside, we
may argue that the Teheran factory workers, especially in comparison
with other Third World workers, are entirely proletarianized. Rural
origin and migration are marked peculiarities of the Iranian working
class. In Teheran our sample revealed that 94% of the workers had been
born in places other than Teheran ; 7% of these were from the suburbs of
the capi ta l . This trend is supported, to a large extent, by the data from
single factories. Of the 9(X) workers in Metal Works factory for instance,
only 13% were from Teheran and 3.6% from its suburban areas. As
Table 4.1 indicates, over 80%) of the workers in this factory were peasants
or sons of peasants who had migrated to Teheran because of landlessness,
shortage of land or insufficient income. They had mostly migrated af ter
land reform, when commodity relations were spreading rapidly in the
countryside. In comparison with the Petrograd workers of 1917, and
workers in the rest of today's Third World (except probably in some Latin
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American nations), Teheran factory workers have to a large extent
broken their economic ties with the village.
Table 4.1
The Causes of Migration According to Workers
The causes expressed %
Loss of land
(Khusnasfiins, agricultural and other rural labourers) 39.1
Shortage of land (less than 5 hectares per family) 29.1
Scarcity of water, drought leading to low income,
oppression 15.0
Migration with family 5.8
Low income despite sufficient land 2.5
Workers born in towns and unspecified 8.3
Total 100.0 (N= 150)
Iranian pre-capitalist relations in the countryside, unlike European
feudalism, lacked legal barriers preventing the free movement of the
peasants. This facilitated rural-rural and rural-urban migration even
before land reform. But the post-land-reform migratory process was
quantitatively and qualitatively different. The new wave of capitalist
development and industrialization from the 1960s onward had a profound
influence on the proletarianization process in that it 'liberated' free
labour (see Chapter 3).
Our survey revealed that some 90% of the workers lacked any form
of ownership in the villages. The rest owned a small plot (less than two
hectares) or a tiny orchard which had been let to other villagers. Only 7
out of 88 entirely propertyless workers said that their relatives, parents or
brothers possessed a small plot (up to three hectares). This lack of
workers' economic interest in the village militated against the develop-
ment of seasonal factory labour. In this respect, the African countries
provide a rather different picture. In West Africa, for example, some
three-quarters of a sample of industrial workers in the late 1960s and early
1970s claimed some sort of land ownership in the countryside (Simpson
and Simpson, 1981, p. 3). But the Teheran factory workers are not
representative of the whole working class. The construction workers, for
instance, provide a good example of seasonal labour. Nonetheless, wage-
relations are now the predominant characteristic of the entire Iranian
social economy.4
Length of Industrial Service and Urbanization
A long residence in the town would tend to undermine any inclination to
return to the village. Some workers even stressed that they had forgotten
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how to do farm work. If the length of service in wage-work is regarded as
a positive indication of proletarianization, Teheran factory workers score
highly. Over 35% of them had been wage-labouring for over 15 years,
and fewer than 10% for less than 5 years. Yet the factories under in-
vestigation were mainly the product of the industrialization process of the
1960s.
The importance of length of service in wage-work as a factor of
proletarianization is disputed. As Smith reports, Soviet historians have
argued that it takes at least five years tor a new wage-labourer to develop
into a fully-fledged proletarian (Smith, 1980, p. 32). While Lenin, on the
one hand, described workers as'those who, as a result of the conditions of
thei r lives, have gained a proletarian mentali ty ' , he also argued that such
a menta l i ty required at least ten years of work in large industry to develop
(1973b, pp. 254-6). Although the length of industrial service may be
signif icant , proletarian mental i ty does not depend on it. There may be
workers who carry out both industrial work and agricultural production,
and who reside virtually in the countryside. This is a qui te frequent
tendency (in our sample 4%). Other factors must be considered in order
to find out the extent to which workers have lost negative rural mentalities
(those which tend to restrain the migrants from acquiring new values) and
gained an industrial consciousness.
Table 4.2
Length of Indus t r ia l Service Among Teheran Factory Workers
l. My sample 2. Factory (A) 3. Factory (B)
Length of service
1 5 years and over
Between I O & 15 years
Between 5 & 10 years



















\ 53 Sƒ 3-J-->
100.0
N = 750
Factory (A) established in 1966; Factory (B) established 1960.
Sources: Column 1, my own sample; Columns 2 and 3 provided by the
factory managements.
As we have said, some 80% of Teheran workers are of rural origin.
Yet nearly half of them have been urban residents for 5-20 years; and on
the whole, fewer than 10% of them had experienced urban life for less
than five years. Not surprisingly, only 4% of the workers lived in the
villages around Teheran. But a relatively long stay in the city does not
necessarily imply urbanism — the acquisition and practice of urban-
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industrial values. It is therefore neeessary to examine the cultural/
ideological relationship between the workers and rural life.
Rural Links
We shall concentrate here on the degree of severance of the cultural/
ideological ties between the worker and his village, without making any
value judgement about the cultures and the ideologies. (This issue will be
examined later when we deal with the factors preventing proletarianiza-
t i o n . )
Quite a large majority, 75% of the respondents, had relatives and
friends in a village, though these l inks were mainly remote. A quarter of
l IK- sample denied any l ink with a village, whether moral — the obligation
to friends or relatives — or economic — the remittance of, or receiving,
money, goods or presents in any form. This group of workers included
those of urban origin, and those who lacked any reason for continuing
l i n k s wi th the village. While, as we learnt earlier, around 85% of the
sample lacked any form of property in the villages, a limited proportion,
of 25%), said they did not have any form of l ink. The difference between
these two figures points to the part played by familial and moral/cultural
elements in linking workers to the village world.
Yet the rural link of the Teheran workers seems much less significant
than that of African workers or Is tanbul shanty-town dwellers.5
Table 4.3
The Rural Link of Teheran Factory Workers (1981)
Forms of linkage %
Totally rural resident 3.3
Regular visit (once a month) 8.0
Irregular visit (3-4 times a year) 14.0
Rare visit ( 1-2 a year for holidays or cultural visits)* 39.3
Without any links 24.0
Other 10.0
Total 100.0
Number of workers = 150
"Cultural visits are those made on such occasions as deaths, marriages, etc.
Table 4.3 shows that an insignificant proportion (10%) retained strong
ties with a village. Leaving aside the workers who lived in villages, those
with ties were those who were economically unable to have their families
living in the town or single persons who supported their parents, brothers
or sisters. This group had to remit a considerable amount of their income
to the village. Irregular communications characteri/ed those workers
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who visited friends or relatives or paid visits on occasions like marriages
and deaths and those whose connection was for practical reasons, such as
to inspect belongings which they had left behind.
Yet the financial remittances of the workers were meagre: only 12%
sent a part of their income to the village, and 16% sometimes, some
presents. In addition, predictably, financial assistance from the country-
side to the workers was even more insignificant. The fewer the workers'
links to the village, the more tenuous the kinship identity.
The migration pattern is useful in examining workers' connections
with the village before 1980. Some workers, when leaving the village,
brought their families; others emigrated by themselves. Individual
migration is followed by an inevitable persistence of rural l inks; whereas
the migration of the entire family leads to a gradual breaking off of the
relationship. Some 45% of the migrant workers brought their entire
family with them, even though in most cases they had to endure the risk of
possible unemployment or insecure jobs. The rest had initially migrated
on thei r own and after a while (1-10 years) had their families join them or
were single. The interesting thing about this group was their tendency to
marry urban girls in the city (though the pattern of marriage in the village
has not withered away). This points to the gradual reproduction of urban
social relations among the immigrant workers. The domination of male
household heads of these families meant that children were brought in
l ine wi th the father 's wishes in cases where the wife was brought from the
native village.
Family Background
One of the most important determinants of proletarianization is the
family background of the worker. A working-class family tends to trans-
fer its proletarian experience and mentality to the next generation. This
mediation becomes more significant in conditions where non-family cul-
tural and neighbourhood organizations are almost non-existent.
The survey revealed that the socio/cultural background of a large
majority of the Teheran factory workers was non-proletarian. Only 7%
of workers' fathers had engaged in industrial labour, though over a
quarter were involved in wage-labouring in one way or another: in
construction, railways and inferior jobs in the government ministries.
The rest were independent workers (14%) and peasants (both landed and
landless, over 55%) (Table 4.4). From this perspective, we may conclude
that the working class in modern manufacturing industry, unlike that in
oil and textiles, is stil l historically young.
The children of the workers (the second generation) in our sample
were not numerous enough to enable us to examine class mobility
accurately. Nonetheless, the occupations of this small number were
evidence of working-class reproduction: of 23 workers' children, 20 were
factory workers, one a taxi-driver, one an army sergeant and one a




Occupations of the Fathers of the Teheran Workers (1981)
Occupations























"Including: Mulla, barber, carpenter, shepherd, petty-trader.
Source: Vielle, 1980, p. 75, for 1961 figures; my own sample for 1981.
1981 presented in Table 4.4 attests to the accelerating growth of the class.
A sample survey of 1,189 households in Teheran in 1981 indicated that
the rate of reproduction of the two generations in the working-class
(skilled and semi-skilled) families, was much higher than that in the upper
or middle classes, i.e. over 240% (Table 4.5).
Table 4.5
Class Mobility in Two Generations, Teheran, 1981
Father's Childrens'


































Source: Tabrizi, 1981, p. 48.
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Resistance and Metamorphosis
So far we have examined the indices of the process of proletarianization
among Teheran factory workers. This is only one aspect of the question.
The other is resistance to the process. If we do not assess the contra-
dictions and tensions within this process of transformation and if we do
not acknowledge its complexities, a study of proletarianization will he
incomplete.
We have so far pointed out the predominantly peasant origin of the
Teheran industrial workers. On the other hand, we mentioned that one
aspect of the metamorphosis of a rural migrant to a fully-fledged prole-
tar ian was not only physical migration, hut the acquisition of an urban
industrial mentality. We shall deal with two issues: first, the characteristics
of the cultural/ideological load which a migrant carries with him and
secondly, the process of its metamorphosis in the town. The meta-
morphosis proceeds by a dialectical interaction between the inherited
cultural/ideological load and the cultural/ideological forms which eman-
ate from the mode of life in the new environment, and from the new
position of the migrant in industry.
The Legacy of Rural Culture
Our study showed that workers of Turkish origin (from Azerbaijan, and
other areas) and Shomali workers (that is, those from the northern
provinces of Gi Ian and Mazandaran) were the main ethnic components of
the workforce in Teheran factories. Data on the whole workforce of a few
factories demonstrate the same pattern (Table 4.6).
Although only a small number of factory managers could provide
accurate sociological data on the workers' origins, almost all of them
expressed their surprise at the high concentration of Turkish-speaking6
and Shomali workers.7
The managers could not conceal their dissatisfaction at such a
composition. To what extent class identity has been able to transcend
these ethnic/cultural groupings is a matter of debate.8 But the reason
behind managements' displeasure is the persistence of a rural cultural
form of kinship or ethnic solidarity, which together with proletarian
mili tancy — the product of the wage-labourer's position in the production
process — acts against management authority. This form of traditional
solidarity, however, may also have narrow sectarian and disunifying
characteristics. Workers from the same village may unite against their
boss; but t h i s does not imply uni ty with other workers against the same
boss.
Stratification inside the factories can be attributed to the particular
mode of labour recruitment. Several factors caused the labour force to be
recruited directly at the factory gates, and/or introduced by fellow-
villagers. Among these were the rapidity ol industrialization and the need
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Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total no. of workforce 150 720 2,600 900 293
Sources: The first column are figures from my own sample; data on the
factor ies was provided by factory managers, and the last column is from
Vielle, 1980, p. 75.
-owners for whom cheap labour and a rapid rate of return were preferable
to the careful selection of competent labour with a higher productivity
potential . In any factory, ethnic/cultural groups from the same village
were formed. In our survey, it was revealed that some one-third of all
workers had been recruited by friends and relatives; and less than 15% of
workers, mostly skilled, through newspaper advertisements. Over half
the workers were simply hired at the factory gates. For this group in-
formation on the availability of jobs would probably have been provided
by friends or acquaintances.
We now should consider the cultures of our migrant workers ( Azeri,
Shomali and Yazdi) and how and to what extent these cultures have
resisted or been undermined by the dominant urban culture. None of
these questions can be answered accurately in the abstract without a
specific empirical investigation. It is important that we should not make
canonical statements such as that workers with a rural culture are con-
servative and full of petty-bourgeois values, though of course this may
well be the case.
Two things may be relevant here. First, the above approach assumes
'peasantry' as a homogeneous socio-economic category which possesses
fixed and inscribed ideological characteristics, e.g. adherence to property
ownership, individualism, narrow-mindedness, a belief in the immutable
nature of things. The category of peasantry is not homogeneous or neatly
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stratified. Ideological/cultural differentiation can be amplified by regional
variations. A lack of clear understanding of workers' culture could lead to
a misconception of their socio-political behaviour. All traditions and
cultural symbols possess historical character. As Stuart Hall rightly
argues, it is false to 'value tradition for its own sake, and treating it in an
ahistorical manner, analyse popular cultural forms as if they contained
within themselves, from their moment of origin, some fixed and un-
changing meaning or value' (Hall, in Samuel, 1481, p. 237). What is
significant is, first, the very act of metamorphosis, and secondly, the
mode and form of this process. Is a given traditional form reactionary? In
itself, this is an irrelevant question. The answer can only be historically
conditioned: where? when? under what conditions? and what is its im-
plication? An interesting study on the Petrograd working class of 1917
revealed that nearly 20% of the workers in the gigantic steel mill, Putilov,
with a 30,(KM) workforce, and the headquarters of the Petrograd Soviet,
were in fact peasant-workers; that is, wage-labourers who, while working
in the factory, were also involved in agricultural work in their villages.
Towards the end of the war, as the demand for labour in the armament
industry rose, this tendency became even more marked (Smith, 1980, pp.
35-9). This is in addition to the fact that a large majority of the workforce
were from rural backgrounds. In another instance, in the inter-war period
in Britain when the car was becoming a general consumer commodity, a
large part of the Coventry automobile industry was absorbed from the
most backward agricultural and mining areas of South Wales. These
immigrant workers retained their original culture and formed one of the
most militant sections of the working class in the industry (Zeitlin, 1980,
p. 10).
These examples do not imply that rural culture plays a positive role
in the development of workers' mili tancy. Their objective is simply to
dispute the false generalization that peasant culture is always conservative.
The organized militancy of the workers of Petrograd was facilitated
because they brought with them the village tradition of astorcy (the
election of the headman of the village or a council or elders) into the
factories. This tradition inside the factory was turned initially into the
tradition of election of workers' delegates, and later in the revolutionary
period of 1917, into the formation of the fabzavkomy, factory commit-
tees. Secondly, they were militant because their resentment against the
system derived not only from their position in the industry as wage-
labourers but also from their position as peasants or peasants' sons within
oppressive relations in the village (Siriani, 1982, p. 32). In Britain the
South Welsh immigrant workers to Coventry brought with them a strong
tradition of trade unionism from mining areas into the factories of
Coventry.
Cultural form and symbols can be class-pervasive. Classes speak the
same language, hold the same religion, and share other aspects of a
common culture. Each class attempts to transform not only the content,
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but even the appearance of the symbols or traditions according to their
own interests. In this sense, culture becomes an arena of class struggle. In
this process the ruling classes advocate their dominant culture, while the
subordinate classes strive (consciously or spontaneously) to transmute
them in accordance with their own aspirations. In the case of the Russian
ustorcy we could observe how it was carried from one class (peasants) to
another (factory workers); from one historical situation to another; and
how in this process it was itself transformed.
The Cultural Loads of the Teheran Factory Workers
(ieneral [''futures The social organization of Iranian villages has
historically been based upon a kinship system and kinship relations. Two
of the most significant attributes of kinship relations, as far as our dis-
cussion is concerned, are patriarchy and conflict. One of the principles
and social implications of patriarchy is the idea that the status of an
individual male is judged by his age. This idea paves the way for a culture
of subordination, respect for elders and legitimation of their authority.
The translation of this particular ideological/cultural form into the factory
and society at large would, from the workers' viewpoint, raise questions
about the legitimacy of labour and political leadership. The elderly
workers would cast doubt on the legitimacy of a young radical leader; an
old conservative union leader might be acceptable (the case of Ama/on
factory, spring 1981).
The dialectic of co-operation and conflict is a characteristic feature
of rural social relations in Iran: co-operation, closeness and solidarity
within the kinship structures, and conflict, confrontation and competition
for power between them.9 According to Paul Vieille's survey (Teheran,
19X0) 67 of 199 workers of rural origin in Teheran factories in 1962
remembered bloody confrontations in their villages. The same survey
reports that the conflicts were on such issues as the allocation of irrigation
water, land, harvesting, the landowner's policy of divide-and-rule, and
cultural differences (pp. 14-17). The transfer of this particular cultural
characteristic to the factory floor may lead to the creation of traditional
solidarity among particular groups of workers against the management
(the case of ITN) but to cultural divisions between the workforce as a
whole (eg. P.R. Plant).
Particular Characteristics We shall be concerned here with two workers'
groupings — Shomalis and Yazdis, and with the degree of militancy
among them.
Almost all our observations in various factories suggest a high
degree of militancy among Shomali workers who were mostly rebellious,
enlightened, usually the vanguard in protest actions, and sensitive to the
issue of democracy. They were militant not only in their own region
(Gilan and Mazandaran) but also in some other industrial centres where
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they were concentrated. My study of the whole labour movement in the
year immediately following the revolution confirms that, in terms of the
nature of demands and the forms of struggle, Shomali factory workers
were the most radical. The long strike of the Chuka wood industry in
Asalem in spring and summer 1979 for workers' control and other de-
mands is an example (see also Table 4.7). A clear distinction should be
made between these, and, for instance, Yazdiese with their conservative
views and susceptibility to paternalism.
We would suggest that the radicalism of Shomali workers arises
from the socio-economic and historical peculiarities of the Caspian Sea
coastal region. Because of its fertile land and sufficient rain, the Caspian
Sea coastal area was one of the first regions where large-scale agriculture
and production for the market developed. This implied, on the one hand,
loss of land and smallholding, and a gradual process of proletarianization;
and on the other, more rapid development of commodity production and
wage-labour relations.
Table 4.7
Regional Variations in the Participation of Units in Radical Protests in
the Five Months Following the Revolution
No. of'units Percentage of
No. of units making radical units making
Region which protest protests radical protests
Shomal 63 35 55.5
Teheran 90 31 34.4
Azerbaijan (Tabriz) 35 14 40.0
Ghazvm 9 5 55.5
Khuzistan (oil fields) 26 12 46.1
Other areas* 64 13 20.3
total 287 IW 38.3
"Including: Isfahan, Shira/, Arak, Kurdistan and (ionbad.
Note: Radical demands are specified in Chapter 7, Table 7.1.
.Source: Compiled on the basis of Labour Reports in papers Kar and
Paykar.
The hasty expansion of tourism from the 1960s onwards had a
dramatic cu l tu ra l effect on the region. It expanded small-scale trade and
involved villages in the economy of the town. This in turn meant the
establ ishment of strong l inks between the rural areas and the towns,
de-isolation and a consequent urbanization, in a socio-cultural sense, of
rural life. This pattern is not found in other regions of the country. This
background may explain why the people of this region are more flexible
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and open to new cultural forms and ideas. In Gilan there is a long
tradition of anti-clericalism evidenced in alcohol drinking in market-towns
(Ka/emi and Abrahamian, 1977).
The region has a tradition of militancy, shown by the anti-imperialist
and anti-dictatorial struggles of the late 1910s embodied in the Jangali
Movement which, together with Communists established the embryonic
Soviet Republic of Gilan in 1919; the Seyahkal Movement, a left-wing
guerrilla group which started a new wave of armed struggle against the
Shah's regime in the 1960s. These events are an important part of the
people's written and oral history. This cultural/ideological load was carried
by the migrants into the factories of Teheran (as well as into the industrial
uni ts of the region i tse l f ) .
In contrast, the Yazdi workers came from areas on the margin of the
central desert where in dusty and isolated villages the traditional values
and superstitions still persisted. In the P.R. Plant the conservative and
tradit ional sectarianism of this group of workers became an obstacle in
the way of workers' struggle.
Acquisition of New Cultural Traits?
In a cultural metamorphosis, the dialectic of abandonment and acquisi-
tion occurs in a unified process. We shall now look at the process of the
acquisition of urbanist norms and values. The term urbanism implies that
the social division of labour in urban life undermines self-sufficient and
indiv idual i s t ic mentalities; that the spectrum of people, occupations and
ideas with which s/he comes into contact opens up the closed world of the
peasant migrant; an unequivocal demonstration of social contradictions
and inequalities; an awareness of the concentration of power in the hands
of a few vs the powerlcssncssol'tnany; and lastly that the direct or indirect
involvement of the migrant in these conditions, wi l l shatter hi> concep-
tion of the eternity and naturalness of the world. The argument that the
urban migrant may in certain conditions develop new forms of rural
culture in urban centres, and that the urban life may produce new kinds of
individualism, may well be valid in some circumstances. But Teheran
factory workers do not exhibit this tendency. According to our survey,
beside the fact that all of the workers had radios, some 80% possessed
television sets; and two-thirds of them had obtained them before the
Revolution when the main addressee of the programmes was the new
middle class.
Yet aspirations, ethnic identities and traditional values may be
preserved and practised alongside new beliefs. This, however, is not
simply because of psychological/cultural reasons, i.e. survival of tradi-
tions and values for the sake of traditions and values. It is rather 'a direct
response to the exigencies of survival in the competitive urban economy
where economic opportunities are scarce' (Robert, 1978, p. 141). In a
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society which lacks any form of social security familial and kinship ties
tend to become stronger; and family/kinship institutions play the roles of
the agencies of economic, social and moral security. Cohen's study of
African societies has discovered that among the African workers, tribal
cultural forms reappear as a reaction to industrial discipline ( 1981, p. 198).
Religious Workers?
This leads us to examine the conception of the religious character of the
Iranian working class. In our view, the application of this vague concept,
without clear definition, to Teheran industrial workers, would reflect a
misconception of workers' social behaviour and their particular mode of
conceptualization. By being religious we mean having a belief in a meta-
physical force which is assumed to determine the relations between men
on the earth. Given this conception, we would not regard Teheran
industrial workers as religious per se; rather, we would suggest that for
them religion is a cultural form whose content changes with historical
situations. This should not be taken to imply that they are aethcist or
faithless, but their religion is determined by the relations between men,
not the other way round. The reaction of the workers in the Azmayesh
factory to Khomeini's famous statement that 'we have not made revolu-
tion for cheap melons, we have made it for Islam' was
they say we have not made revolution for economic betterment! What have
we made it for, then? They say, for Islam! What does Islam mean then? We
made it for the betterment of the conditions of our lives
In an historical situation when a secular modern political language
has not yet become popular, the language, the terms and the symbols of
the predominant popular culture, religion, have become political. Political
behaviour is clothed in religious language and slogans and even in sermons.
Religion (as popular culture) is no longer simply an instrument of class
domination, but rather a subject of class struggle.
In the early stages of capitalist expansion in England, where a new
proletariat was emerging, religion, as a cultural form, was transformed to
serve as a socio-political expression of the working class. Thus Primitive
Methodism and the Labour Church with radical political connotations
emerged in the working-class districts, especially of mining areas, in
opposition to the conservative Church of Wesley. In France, where the
dominant (Catholic) Church was a strongly conservative force, the labour
movement remained independent of religion. Here, instead, the great
image of the Jacobin Republic, or personified republic was invoked
(Hobsbawm, 1964, pp. 375-6). The relevance of the point is much more
obvious in today's world. Religion as the arena of class struggle is seen
most unequivocally with the emergence of 'liberation theology' in Latin
America, in particular in revolutionary Nicaragua: we see the Church of
the Poor vs the Church of the Rich.
The Teheran workers have not yet developed a labour religion or a
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coherent radical religion. At the same time, they lack secular traditions to
express their immediate aspirations (mass trade unions, workers' parties
or socio-cultural associations). As a consequence, the working class has
tended to change the content of established religion, and has had to
borrow certain elements of the dominant cultural forms which do not
historically belong to it.
This dialectic of change by means of 'traditions' is quite similar to
the one by which E.P. Thompson described plebeian culture of 18th-
Century England: 'the plebeian culture is rebellious, but rebellious in
defence of culture' (1970: p. 154).
This incapacity of the workers to develop their own cultural expres-
sion points to their weakness. It is here — in this limbo of being religious
and not being religious, in the struggle against dominating religion by
religious language — that obscurities, ambiguities, mistakes and deceits
can easily take root. These are the characteristics of a class in the forma-
tive transition.
Limitations on the Development of a Class Culture
One of the most important variables influencing the development of a
class culture is the expansion of communication through the organization
of political, welfare, cultural or artistic activities, pamphleteering papers,
local meetings, associations and self-help activities. The working class in
Iran, including the Teheran factory workers, lack such facilities. Accord-
ing to my survey and a few others (Ershad, 1978; Javadi Najjar, 1974),
over one-third of the workers (37%) are totally illiterate, some one-
quarter have little ability to read and write, and only one-third (another
37%) are literate. Of 120 workers, only 15 had read as far as high-school
courses, of whom 6 had graduated. In such circumstances, the possibili-
ties of acquiring modern and detailed knowledge become very limited.
This limitation is aggravated by political repression (an attribute of both
the pre- and post-revolutionary regimes). The presence of television sets
in the houses of 80% of the workers only served to reinforce established
culture. Out of forty literate workers, 40% stated that they read news-
papers 'at times', and only 17% 'regularly'. The latter group tended to be
of urban origin, skilled and with relatively higher education.
Class struggle — i.e. the struggles that the workers wage as a result
of their positions as workers in the social organization of production —
precedes class formation in the sense of the maturity of the working class
to achieve identity and hegemony. In Europe independent out-of-work
organizations, societies and gatherings among the working class have
been manifestations of the process of class formation. They grew rapidly
when the capitalist state was in the initial stage of its formation. In
England, for instance, independent working-class associations and activi-
ties developed extensively after 1780: the workers constructed schools,
literary societies, sports clubs, cultural clubs and political associations;
published papers and books, and formed self-help organizations which all
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together constituted the expression of class formation and class struggle
(Thompson, 1979, pp. 781-820). But the advanced form of the capitalist
s t i l te which was the product of an accelerating rate of capital accumula-
tion following two world wars was characterized by more intervention of
the state in the economy, and the development of the welfare state in the
form of social security policies, free education and health care. This
expansion in the functions of the capitalist state erodes the material basis
of t rad i t iona l independent working-class activities (.loues and Novak in
Corrigan, 1980). The new state could present itself as supra-class and
exert ideological domination over the working class, particularly in periods
of economic boom. In the Third World, on the other hand, material
circumstances requiring self-help activities still prevail.10
In Iran there is some evidence of working-class self-help activities in
part icular districts.11 But the scale is l imited and the potential meagre,
despite the evident need. For Teheran industrial workers, free time is
hardly ever spent in gatherings for discussion and chat about work and
daily life. My survey, along with other studies (Ershad, 1978; Javadi
Najjar , 1974), points to the fact that most industrial workers (according
to my survey. 80' '< ) spent their leisure time almost exclusively at home in
isolation. Another survey dealing with Arak industr ial workers in 1978
indicated that over 90% were interested in home-oriented leisure (Ershad,
1978, p. 217).
This implies that the workplace is almost the only place of collectiv-
ity. In Teheran, there is almost no equivalent of the labour clubs, Sunday
Schools or traditional pubs of the early English working class. The
Xhahveh khanes (coffee shops) in Teheran are not, contrary to popular
view, gathering places of industrial workers. Only 2 out of 120 industrial
workers stated that their free time was spent at the#/u//nr/i khuiw. These
are used on the one hand as residences for migrant construction workers
in the ini t ia l stages of their arrival at the city and on the other, in the
ba/aar areas, as the place where the workers in traditional workshops and
trade enterprises spend their lunch-time break.
Since the workers lack any secular independent ins t i tu t ions of their
own through which to express their culture and class feeling, they have
hail to borrow ins t i tu t iona l devices from the dominant cultural form,
religion. The mosque and//<'v-«/.s1 1 have become i n s t i t u t i o n s of leisure. In
my sample survey, those (20%) who stated that they had leisure time
were oriented more than anywhere else toward mosques and hey-uls.
Another survey in 1974 reached the same conclusion. It found out that of
le isure- t ime pursuits such as going to bars, cabarets, theatre, sports
centres, parks, ghdhvch khunc, licv-at and emamzadch ( shr ines of pil-
grims), mosque attendance with 21.4% ol posi t ive responses was the
most popular form of leisure (Javadi Najjar , 1974, p. 69). Research in the
town of Arak showed that 40% of workers spent t he i r tree t ime in the
mosques (hrshad, 1978, p. 305). It is worth mentioning that in the above-
l i s t of leisure pursuits , mosque and hcv-at were t he only places which were
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free. Just as the mosque could he converted to he a puhlic place for
leisure, the holy cities (like Qum and Mashad) could he places for
holidays. Of those workers who could afford to take holidays, 83% hail
been to Mashad at least once, and 49% had heen exclusively to the cities
of Qum and Mashad.
This reflects the contradictory position of the workers toward Islam.
They both are and are not religious. They may be religious in the sense
tha t the point of reference of their socio-cultural activities is religious-
oriented. On the other hand, they are not religious because they are
prepared to change the implications and distort the meaning of their
religion to fit with their own socio-economic and political ends.
Notes
1. The present study is based on a sample survey of 120 male workers in large
factories in Teheran, conducted through the formal questionnaires and informal
interviews during July-August 1980. Each interview lasted 30-40 minutes. We
were able to in terv iew the same workers and a f u r t h e r 30 on specific issues, such as
migration, length of indus t r ia l service, etc.
2. Professor Hobsbawm's lecture at Birkbeck College (History Society),
London University, Summer 1982.
3. In another lecture, he implicitly rejected this view. See Hobsbawm, 1973,
p. 15.
4. A survey of 210 peasant fami l ies in I s fahan showed tha t over 50'r of the
income of families came from wage-working in industry.
5. This figure for the Istanbul shanty-town dwellers is 22% (male) and 38' i
( female ) (Karpat, 1979, p. 170); and in West Africa such links are widespread
(Sandbrook and Cohen, 1975, p. 3).
6. As the table points out , A/.eri Turkish workers were the largest single ethnic
group before land reform.
7. I t is interest ing to note tha t there was almost no sign of other main ethnic
minorities: Arabs. Baluchis. Turkmans and Kurds In a sample of 150, there was
only one Kurd and one Turkman.
H. Our observations suggest a strong tendency to overcome such divisions It
may be worth pointing out the prevalence of ethnic jokes against the Shomalisaiul
A/en l u r k s , two main groups of Teheran industrial workers during the Shah's
time.
9. As a villager, I myself have observed the conflicts and b i t te r and bloody
confrontations between kinship groups in villages, l-or a comprehensive list of
divisions in rural (and urban) Iran, see Abrahamian, 1974, pp. 3-31.
10 !• or an account of such act ivi t ies in Latin America, see de Chungara, 1978.
1 1 . A casual semi-regular religious sermon The / i rv-</ /s are often orgam/ed on
the basis of common ethnic or geographical origin of the members. They promote




The objective of this chapter is to analyse the peculiarities of labour
relations in the pre-revolutionary factories. The pre-revolutionary forms
of labour relations were the product of the particular form of capitalist
development in Iran and the particularities of the Iranian society. With-
out going into detail, suffice it to suggest here that Iranian society on the
eve of the Revolution could be characterized as a backward capitalist
society integrated into world capitalism. Pre-capitalist institutions,
ideology and rationale were, in varying degrees, still functioning. Another
major characteristic was political dictatorship which interacted with the
whole structure of society.
We can identify three forms of oppressive labour relations in Iranian
factories, which are characteristic of all such societies. They manifest
themselves in administrative, political and physical forms. We shall
examine these in turn.
Administrative Domination: Management System
Marx argued that in the capitalist production process, management is
necessary, firstly, because any production process in any mode of pro-
duction requires co-ordination to harmoni/e the combined labour of
individual labourers; and secondly, because capitalist production rela-
tions are intrinsically antagonistic since the ultimate objective of capital is
a successful rate of accumulation. This second function of management,
necessary in all modes of production characterized by antagonism between
labourers and controllers of the means and conditions of production is
also termed control.1 This is the function which rests, at the point of
production, upon the social division of labour among various agents In
capitalism, the function of control, a form of discipline, designed to
fur ther the extraction of surplus-value, dominates the function of co-
ordination. The form of the labour process is thus subordinate to the
requirements of the accumulation process which itself is determined by
the overall movement of market relations as well as politics. Thus dis
cipline characterizes any capitalist workplace in any society. It assumes,
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however, different forms in different capitalist social formations,
depending on a variety of historical and socio-political factors. This
section aims to explore the bases of the oppressive forms in the pre-
revolutionary Iranian factories.
Uneven development of social forces and relations of production in
different economic sectors in societies where industrialization is quite
recent is a common phenomenon. Iran is no exception. The uneven
development of industry in Iran has led to uneven forms of organization
of production and work processes, as well as uneven forms of control and
co-ordination. In the Iranian factories, on the eve of the Revolution,
three forms of management could be identified: semi-craft management,
traditional management and modern or scientific management.
Semi-Craft Management
In the term semi-craft management, I am not referring to the organiza-
tion of production in a craft system per se, in which artisans and skilled
craftsmen exert a high degree of control over the organization of the
labour process, even though they may be wage-labourers. Semi-craft
management refers to the decentralized mode of organization of produc-
tion in small-scale, technically backward and organizationally simple
units of production in which the worker-capitalist relations assume the
appearance of the patron-client relation of the classic craft system. Such
uni ts are found in a large number of small-scale industrial enterprises
(with less than ten employees) accounting numerically for more than 98%
of the industr ial units and employing about 36% of the total manufactur-
ing employees. These enterprises are involved in the production of
consumer goods (sweets, printing, baking, footwear), in processing
(cement, wood) and petty-entrepreneurial workshops.
The control system is semi-craft because not all of the units in this
category are characterized by the craft system proper, in the sense of the
formal subordination of labour to capital in the production process (as in
the traditional cottage industries of carpet and textiles and in almost all
self-employed industrial establishments which employ family labour).
Uneven development produces a tendency in these small establishments
to employ relatively modern machines — such as turning-machines,
sewing-, melting- and printing-machines — which perform a considerable
number of the tasks previously performed by labour. These transform the
craft-based organization of production into a Taylorite system (see Chap-
ter 3). However, in the case of Iran, the main and common characteristics
of these semi-craft enterprises have remained rather unaltered: a simple
division of labour, a decentralized organization of production, and a
relatively high degree of labouring ski l l . A still commoner feature is the
personalization of the capital-labour relation. The owner is at the same
time the manager, designer, seller of the product and buyer of raw
material; he is master. He keeps a skilled, experienced, trustworthy and
usual ly bullying hand as a foreman who exerts a great deal of control in
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disc ip l ine , in hi r ing and firing, in determining overtime rates, bonuses
and pay-rises.
The continual presence of the patron in the workshop, combined
wi th the simple organization of production and of labour relations, and
the fragmentation of the workforce, laid the base for direct control over
the workforce. There was no mediatory element in the form of a
managerial hierarchy, nor any organ of s t ructura l control between the
owner and the labourers. 'I'he direct relationship would generate on the
one hand, a feeling of close, paternalistic and even family relationship
between the labourers so that they identified their interests more with
their master than wi th their fellow workers in the next workshop. On
the other hand, the bare exploitation and physical oppression generated
antagonism.
The owners/managers of these uni ts originated either as bazaar
merchants or as labourers who had, by taking a partner or by saving, got
enough capital together to start a business They were entirely aware of
how to run business by paternalist discipline. There were hardly any signs
of workers' rights such as normal working-hours, accident insurances,
holidays or min imum wages here.2
In these enterprises, the employers' unions in the form of guilds
(u\naf) were more active than the workers' unions. The workers did not
constitute an economic force because of the insignificant position of the
sector (secondary sector) in the whole national economy. In 1976 the
contribution of these enterprises to the total manufacturing value added
was only 22.8% of the total, even though the units numerically accounted
for about 9K% of the total number of manufacturing uni ts .
In Britain in the 1910s, the introduction of new technology and
desk i l i ing threatened the basis of the heavily organized and economically
vital craftsmen in the armaments industry. They could and did resist the
new processes for some years, ( ' raf tsmen in Iran could not and did not
oppose any innovat ion in the manufacturing labour process. The new
forms of work processes were rather abruptly and rapidly imported and
introduced from without; the workforce was not organi/cd and economi-
cally strong enough to resist; and it was affected indirectly, that is, it had
concentrated mainly in the small-scale sectors whose total existence was
jeopardized by the establishment of modern large-scale sectors; among
other areas, the most obvious example may be the shoe industry. Instead
of resistance, the skilled workers of these sectors would be absorbed in
the modern sector for higher wages.
Traditional Management
The pre-capitalist socio-economic background of the domestic industrial
bourgeoisie resulted in the transfer of irrational pre-capitalist methods of
extraction of surplus-labour into the industry. As an observer suggested,
'the owner-managers of these factories were former bazaar merchants
who regard factory operation as merely uninteresting preliminaries to the
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sale of the product in pursuing their traditional interest of quick turnover
at high margins' (Bartsch, 1971b, p. 28).
In the process of class formation, transformation of economic posi-
tions occurs much faster than political and ideological change. Just as we
still await an ideological transformation of the working class in Iran, so we
have yet to see the bourgeoisification of the industrial bourgeoisie. The
private industrialists (who mainly perform a traditional management
role) have in recent years emerged from three distinct socio-economic
backgrounds.
The first stratum is of ex-landowners, who, during land reform,
were offered a certain number of shares in state-owned industries as part
of their compensation. They swelled the group of already existing indus-
trial ists from the same background. The second group were the bazaar
traders. And finally there were the top civil servants who, under the
Shah, and through corruption made sufficient money to put up the initial
capital to engage in industrial production (see also Halliday, 1978a, pp.
151-2). The industrial bourgeoisie tends to proceed by the logic of rapid
turnover and short-term investment, preferring to employ less-skilled
and mostly unski l led peasant labour to lower the cost of production with
l i t t l e attention to long-term profitability. Few elements of modern and
ra t iona l capitalist management such as programmes of work-study, skil l
training, long-term planning (structural strategies of control) are to be
found.
Most of the industries run by traditional management were labour-
intensive, like textiles, leather, clothing, wood, non-metallic products,
and, to a lesser extent, food. In 1976, there were about 4,5(X) units with
10-50 employees each, accounting for 7.8% of the manufacturing work-
force. In such units, direct control was dominant; there was no structural-
hierarchical mediating element between labour and capital. The industrial
relations prevailing in these industries could well be characterized as
'feudal' . For an ex-landowner who had become an owner-director, the
factory was most likely to be viewed as a village and workers as the
subordinate peasants who were to be coerced to work harder. There were
certainly examples of beating, physical punishment , and imprisonment
even in the modern factories.3 In Sepenta, a metal plant, there were
workers who would call the boss arbab (master). This was the term used
by peasants to landowners in the villages.
The supervisors, the boss's hands, exerted an effective and extended
control over the disciplinary process of the workshop, in terms of hiring,
fir ing, wage-increases, promotion, overtime, punishments and penalties.
There was l i t t l e security for the labourers in their relations with their >
supervisors. 'Even a delay in saying a hello to the supervisor or laughing
in the workshop could be an excuse to dismiss the workers' (Sanavandi, \
1974, p. 63). A report about the conditions of women workers in such j
factories in 1974 pointed out that
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owing to the [authority of] foremen, the female workers are rapidly trapped
by fah\haa [sexual abuse]. They have to he subordinate to the foreman,
otherwise they would be fired or transferred. Thefahshââ is so widespread
that the girls deny their working in the factories, since they would be called
"factory girls". (Sanavandi, 1974, p. 63.)
Even though the conservatism of such industrialists was based on pre-
capitalist methods of exploitation, there was also a resistance on the part
of workers to any 'change in the methods to which they have become
accustomed during long years of employment' (Bartsch, 1971b, p. 26).
Modern Rational Management
There was a third type of factory which had been established recently by
private, joint-venture, multinational or state capital, located in the
primary sector. This employed a rational form of management, by which
1 mean methods of organization and production which, while raising the
productivity of labour, at the same time sought the co-operation of the
workforce, attempting to avoid as far as possible naked antagonism
between labour and capital. The strategy thus aimed at, in the words of
Burawoy, 'obscuring and securing surplus-value' (1978, pp. 247-312).
This objective can be achieved only when a structural strategy is
adopted — a strategy which rests on both technical change, disciplining
the workforce by automation and real subordination, and 'relational
change', managerial tactics to regulate the relations between the workers
and the employer. These policies tend to be accompanied by restrictive
practices, workers' participation and experiences of control from above
(see Chapter 10). The strategy of 'obscuring and securing surplus-value'
does not depend simply on the subjective decision of an employer. It
requires ideological commitment on the part of workers, a recognition of
free unionism on the part of capital and capital's capacity for technical
control.
During the old regime in Iran, only some patterns of rational
management were in place: modern techniques of production and
machinery and centralized and hierarchical structures of the management
functions. The hierarchical/technical division of labour corresponds to a
hierarchical/social division of labour according to authority and power.
As well as being controlled through technical change in the work process,
the workers were controlled socially through the hierarchical relations —
through structural control.4
In such modern large-scale enterprises, supervisors assumed
contradictory positions. Their role as agents of capital was to assure an
appropriate extraction of surplus-value from the workers, while being
themselves subjected to a higher control by a higher agent within the
hierarchy. Their actual relations to shop-floor workers appeared to be
contradictory too. An old worker in the Metal Works Plant was describ-
ing his feelings about the supervisor:
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I used to distribute bottles of milk; a worker was to get his bottle of milk. But
we were short of a bottle. Now at that time we had a supervisor called Abbas
Kasaii. I told him we had "a bottle too few and that lad wants his milk". He
[the supervisor] said to him: "What the hell do you want?" I said to him
[supervisor]: "It's his right!" But again the supervisor told him: "You get
out of here", and grabbed his hand and pushed him to the factory gate!
Believe me, I swear to God, by my conscience.
Another line worker in Arasteh, however, expressed his support:
The supervisors wouldn't make any trouble for us, they're OK. It was the
engineers who did bother us much. We are pleased with our supervisors both
under Taughout [the Shah] and now.
The position and the role of the engineers and higher technical staff
were radically different from those of workers. In a relatively simple
managerial hierarchy their positions both technically and socially were at
much higher levels of the managerial bureaucracy. The relationship
between the engineers and the shop-floor workers was tense and anta-
gonistic. After the revolution their social, technical and ideological
positions in the production process played a significant part in the defeat
of the shuras (see Chapter 9). In the Leyland Motor firm a worker
expressed his resentment towards them after the revolution in the follow-
ing way:
Q. Do you think the SA VAK agents were active here during the Shah?
A. They're active even now. The engineers: all of the engineers in this
factory were SA VAK agents . . .
Q. Do you think the workers themselves can perform the tasks of the
engineers?
A. Of course they can, we've got a lad here who can do the job much better
than the engineers . . .
The behaviour of supervisors and engineers was endorsed by law.
Two years before the revolution, when sabotage in the factories assumed
a new momentum, new disciplinary measures were introduced. Cash
fines and dismissals became the penalties for such misdemeanours as
absenteeism for more than three days; disruption of workplace affairs;
smoking in specified areas; sleeping while on duty; causing noises; disrup-
tion in the factory; not respecting the supervisor; refusal of the orders of
entezâmât guards when entering or exiting from the workplace. (Kayhan,2f>
March 1977.)
The pattern of modern rational management existed only in the
large-scale and technically modern factories (probably with more than a
hundred employees). In 1973 there were 340 such units or 5% of the total
number of manufacturing establishments, accounting for some 16% of
manufacturing, and employing 11% of the total industrial workforce in
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1976.5 A significant number of such factories (the chemical sector almost
totally) were owned by the multinationals (in 1973, some 118 units). In
such firms the crucial technical and financial decisions were made by the
foreign managers. A case study in 1973 revealed that, out of 114 manager-
ial positions in 22 multinational firms, only 43 insignificant positions were
filled by Iranians (Daftar, 1980, p. 19) and that almost all of the technical
administration had been taken over by foreign experts.
So, even though the firms were mainly owned, managed and
operated by mult inationals, that is, despite the existence of rational
experienced managers and experts, and of technical possibilities, in-
dus t r ia l relations did not change, but remained sharply antagonistic and
backward. This proposition should not be taken as indicating any illu-
sions about capital's humani ta r ian tendency to produce better industr ial
relations. Nor, on the other hand, does the argument that capital is
exported to underdeveloped countries to achieve higher profitability
through harsher exploitat ion. The productivity of labour in the home
countries was much higher than that in Iran.6 The point, however, is
that technical change does bring about a (reformist) medium for real
subordinat ion. But its scope is too l imited to provide industrial peace
for capital in the developing countries. Industr ial peace is dependent on
the political form of the state, and the organization of the working class
i t s e l f .
Table 5.1
The S k i l l Composition of Workforce in Selected Modern Factories in
Teheran, 1980
Workers %
Un- Semi- Tech' 1 y












































































Source: Based on data directly obtained.
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What were the possibilities of and limitations on workers' organiza-
tion and resistance in the face of technical change? As we have mentioned
earl ier , the British shop-steward movement of the 1910s emerged as the
consequence of workers' resistance to the introduction of new techniques
in the production process which would result in the deskilling of highly-
skilled craftsmen so that women and the less skilled could be recruited
(Hinton, 1973). The emergence of factory committees in Germany was
led by the most skilled section of the tool-makers in 1918 (Bologna,
1976). Such forms of organization could hardly take shape in Third World
countries such as Iran where a high proportion of the workforce came
directly from the countryside and were devoid of any experience of
industrial work and organization. Since more than 80% of Teheran
modern factory-workers were of rural origin, only an insignificant pro-
portion had any kind of industrial skills. They had no s k i l l s to defend
against a modern factory system imported from abroad hurriedly in a
short period. A Luddist response could not be expected. Indeed, the
factory system and its routine job and pay were at least initially a desir-
able alternative to the misery of the village life.
But the awareness of the workers was growing. An industrial peace
such as the Shah would have liked to achieve would require appropriate
labour organizations such as workers' unions. Elut the political form of
the state was incompatible with the operation ot these organizations. The
lack of a reformist mediation between labour and capital and the residues




The coup of 1953 decisively crushed the existing unions and ended twelve
years of worker unionization.7 The government then started creating
state-run unions whose permitted activities were outlined in the 1959
Labour law (Articles 26-9).
The unions were entitled to conclude collective contracts; to pur-
chase, sell and acquire movable and immovable properties, provided
they were not for commercial purposes; to defend the trade rights and
interests of their members; to establish co-operative societies to meet the
requirements of their members, and to establish and create unemploy-
ment funds for the purpose of giving aid and assistance to unemployed
workers (Article 27). But the law prohibited them from engaging in
political activities and did not recognize the right to strike.8
The Labour law was one of the strategies of the post-coup state to
exert control over all aspects of poli t ical and social life. The best possible
condition for the rule of the bourgeoisie, for successful capital accumula-
t i o n , is the exercise of hegemony in the (Jramscian sense, to promote a
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spurious consensus of the whole community, in particular the working
class. The post-coup state in Iran was unable to achieve such a rule,
despite the implementation of a number of reform measures such as the
White Revolution launched in 1963. The latter was a package of major
reform programmes, including land-reform, women's franchise, literacy
campaigns and profit-sharing schemes. A strategy of capitalist develop-
ment required the co-operation of the workforce, their reasonable
behaviour and their commitment to a higher productivity level. Thus it
was necessary for the state to prevent spontaneous and wild-cat protests
and independent workers' organization.
I The second role of the unions was ideological. They were to act as
mediators and transmit an ideology based upon nationalism, selling the
1 idea of a community founded upon the co-operation of all its members
\ (workers, bosses, state agents) in a society with a unique history and
incomparable culture, embodied in the persistent and beloved relation-
ship between the community and its Shah. The term proletariat was
denounced by the state ideologues as being no longer appropriate to the
Iranian workers; it was only the Western working class which had launched
a 'class war'. Similarly, the boss was no longer a 'karfarma [employer,
capitalist] which is reminiscent of class privileges', but a 'kàrâmâ which is
appropriate to the hearty cooperation of all groups in the new system of
production . . . in the era of [White] Revolution'.9 This was a form of
corporatist ideology of class collaborationism in the sense that it lacked a
reformist agreement between the representatives of each part within the
institutions of an arbitrating state.
The third function of the unions was to mobilize the workforce for
particular purposes, such as pro-regime demonstrations. In 1971 there
were reported to be 397 such unions. The number grew to 1,023 by 1978.
In 1976 the state amalgamated a number of unions and established the
Organization of Iranian Workers, which along with the employers'
organization joined the Rastâkhiz Party, Iran's single party after the Shah
abolished all other existing political parties. According to the official
figures in 1976, the Organization consisted of 845 syndicates and 20 trade
unions with three million workers (Kavousi, 1978, p. 117).
Whether or not the state succeeded in achieving its objectives in
setting up such unions is debatable. Some have argued that the state-run
unions performed very real functions 'in securing the political and
ideological positions of the regime' (Halliday, 1978a, pp. 202-3). But
such conclusions are dubious. The fourth function of the syndicates,
physical repression, points to the fact that other means failed to secure
support for the regime. I shall explain this failure by examining the
repressive measures which the state had to adopt in order to control the
workers' opposition. These measures may be summarized as the mechan-
ism of union elections and policing the factories. Resort to these policies
indicated the failure of the politico-ideological functions of the unions.
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The Mechanism of Union Representation
The state could not and did not allow the unions to function in the way set
down in the Labour Law. In every election the state would ensure that
either its own candidate or the one loyal to its policies was elected.
Depending on the circumstances, the methods of these sorts of elections
would vary.
First, at times, at best, an election would be held in a workplace
where an independent candidate would be elected. However, as a worker
in the Teheran Auto car plant described:
we did have a syndicate, but their tactics were very limited; because they
were never given enough power to confront the boss from the workers'
viewpoint. For this reason [although] they were in fact formally the
workers' representatives, they were in reality the boss's representatives.
Q. Do you think that the representatives consciously refused to work in the
workers' interests, or that they were not able to?
- Well, it depends who you're talking about. There were some who
would be bought off pretty quickly; but some were unwittingly on the
bosses' side; they even thought they were actually working for the
workers' interests . . . On the whole nothing has been done for the
workers through the syndicates.
Similar situations were described in such plants as Arasteh and Behshar.
The workers would make a tremendous effort to take part in these
syndicates, but act in them independently in support of their own class
interests. They would utilize any means, official or unofficial, to turn the
syndicates, as far as possible, into an independent instrument of class
struggle. This was one of the contradictions of the state-run syndicates.
The second possibility was that the workers would take part whole-
heartedly in the syndicate elections and get elected; but they then had to
work according to the official lines, otherwise they would immediately be
dismissed (as in Iran Cars), beaten, framed and arrested (as in Amazon).
In the Iran Cars plant in Teheran, a militant worker, Samet, had stood for
the leadership of the factory syndicate. Since SA VAK was sure that he
would win the election, he was barred from entering the factory on the
election day in two successive years. For this reason, in the third year, a
day before the election, he hid himself at the top of the factory water-
reservoir for the night. The next day he was inside the factory, took part
in the election and won. Immediately after his victory, however, he was
fired. A syndicate member who had held the post for thirteen years and
who was a SA VAK agent had reported the case. Various other similar
cases were reported after the revolution when documents came to light.
The third method was simply fraud by state agents in producing the
results of the polls; this happened, for instance, in the Iran National car
factory.
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Policing the Factories
The task of policing the factories was performed by the infiltration of
secret police agents and the direct operation of SA VAK agents inside the
plants as the officers of the Entezâmât or Security Bureau. The insecure
position of the state in the mil i tant plants would force the authorities to
get their agents elected as leaders of syndicates, in which case they were
either recruited employees or direct agents. These syndicate members
were the main element of state control wi th in the working class. They
played an essential part in mobilizing forces for pro-regime rallies and
demonstrations. At the same time, together with privileged employees
and foremen, they would set up pressure groups who would enforce
political discipline over the factory workers.
The workers would participate in syndicates which were seen
to offer the possibility of independence; otherwise they were not under
any i l lus ions about the state-run unions. In the winter of 1973 a sur-
pr is ing secret survey conducted by one of the government organizations
revealed that only 22.3% of the factory workers were syndicate
members, and one-third of them either thought that the syndicate
was of no use or else had no idea of its positive functions (Pakdaman,
1980).
The second form of policing was a direct presence of secret police
agents, under the guise of such factory institutions as Hefâzat, Entezàmât
(Security Bureau), which were the de jack» branches of SA VAK inside
the factories. Each plant had a few direct informers
In this factory, the former syndicate members (some of whom were members
of RaMtikhi? Party as well) were also active in security affairs. In the earlier
periods when we had the agents of [the Bureau of] Inspection and Informa-
tion, the members of the Heßzat of the factory (who in fact were the
syndicate activists) would report to the inspectors who would take action as
they saw f i t . [And the workers'] moves and statements would he reported
through syndicate activists, Hefâzat and Inspectors to the SA VAK which
would make its decision accordingly (Pars Metal plant worker).
[•intzûmât and Hefâzat were run almost totally by army colonels and
officers who were directly linked to SAVAK. They had been set up to
protect factories from physical damage result ing from theft or workers'
strikes and uprisings. The presence of army colonels in the factories and
the hierarchical structure of management had made the factories l ike
barracks. One worker said,
During the Shah, Iran National [car plant] was ;i barrack, a garrison . . .
there was even a sort of house of detention (bûzdâ<ihif>âh); tha t is [if you did
wrong] you had to work in the firm's kitchen (a line worker).
Another worker who became a shura leader after the Revolution
had this to say:
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The head of l-Miczamat was a retired employee of the Railway Company.
who was very keen to be called Colonel (he was an agent at the same time).
The internal manager was a retired army colonel; he used to threaten the
lads, used to heat them; he would carry a baton around with him. I always
had confrontations with them. One day, they [the gang] attacked me and
heat me up good and proper; one of them broke his arm. A number of lads
came up and said they supported me; and they asked me to get together
everyone on my side and fight back. I refused. There were other workers
who wanted to mediate between us to reach a compromise. 1 didn't accept
t h is either: I wanted to get each of them to confront the manager, one by one
. . . The management did not dismiss me, because it was a pretty big event.
They were afraid of it causing problems for them. After a while, I received a
letter from the director saying that I didn't have any responsibilities there. I
went to the Central Office where they said "we aren't f i r ing you, but you
must stay in the Sales Department". I was told I didn't have to work, just
draw my salary . . .
After the revolution I was elected as a shura member . . . I was, for a time,
in charge of identifying the SA VAK agents. . . Following the investigation,
five employees were found to be agents: the head of Hefîizut. the leader of
the syndicate, two foremen, and one administrat ive employee.
In my field research I had access to information available in the
plants which I visited. Of the 1 1 factories which provided data, 10 claimed
to have found out the identities of the informers; and in almost all, an
army colonel or officer had been active in securing law and order at the
factories (see Table 5.2).
The relat ive autonomy of the Entezâmât officers from the managers
may reflect the relative autonomy of the dictatorial state from the bour-
geois class (though the whole system was an operation to reproduce the
latter's broad interests). As Halliday recognizes, both the mode of con-
trol and of inducement to the workers were at times against the interests
of the manager and/or owner. In particular, the agents had to be paid by
the factory (Halliday, 1978a, p. 205). In contrast with the high salary of
l'.nti'z.amat officers, minor informers would get an insignificant amount.
Available documents indicate that salaries ranged from 1,5(X) Rls to 3 , (KH)
RIs per month in 1973 when the average monthly wage of skilled factory
workers was 3,840 Rls (Pakdaman, 1980, p. 23).10
The tasks of agents varied according to their position. The white-
collar employees would, for instance, monitor correspondence, mail
and telephone conversations. The shop-floor agents, on the other hand,
would monitor suspicious activities and statements of any kind by the
workers. The reports from informers'documents are of the k ind, 'Mr So
and So usually reads books'; 'there are rumours that the Rouzbeh's (a
leader of Tudeh Party, executed by the old regime) statue has been
erected in I ta ly . I heard this from Mr So and So'; 'there are rumours that
when the name of Khomeini is called, the workers do salavât [a
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Table 5.2



































































(M) = multinational companies
(?) SA VAK agents did exist in the firms, but we are unaware of their
number and positions.
demonstration of support]'; 'it is said that Mr X is leftist'. The impact of
surveillance would be reinforced by the deliberate tactic of rumour-
spreading about the supposed strength and tight control of SA VAK; this
was designed to undermine the trust of fellow workers for each other -
the trust which is fundamental to organized underground activity.
This at least partly explains the guerrilla-type tendency of socialist
organizations before the revolution, firstly in their assumption that 'the
workers presume the power of their enemy to be absolute', and secondly
that 'their [workers'] own inability to emancipate themselves [is also]
absolute'.11 The presumptions attributed to the workers were those of the
leaders of the movement themselves. (Though, undoubtedly, some sec-
tions of the workers might have had similar ideas. ) However, the desperate
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introduction of new measures, the policy of stick and carrot, shows the
inability of the state to impose the necessary political control. The workers
did go on strike. Some estimates mention 20-30 strikes per year after 1973
(Halliday, 1978a,). Leaving the figures aside, the failure of the state
strategies to secure the regime and to deactivate the working class by its
secret police necessitated the use of military force to counter collective
labour action. There are numerous examples of troops encircling the
striking plants: Tabriz Tool Making Plant, Tractor Sazi in Tabriz, Pars
Metal and Renault are examples in the 1970s.
Conditions of Work: Physical Oppression
As Chapter 3 illustrated, the pace of Iranian industrialization and
modernization in the 1960s and 1970s was indeed remarkable. Iranian
society underwent an economic and social transformation. But behind
this rapid industrial expansion and the fences of modern, multinational
factories lay an unobserved oppression. Industrial workers in Iran have
had to bear the misery of both traditional work hazards and modern
industrial diseases. In all cases the same law applied: 'saving in labour
conditions at the expense of the labourers' (Marx, 1977, p. 88).
A set of laws had already laid down regulations on health, safety,
and workers' compensations. The laws were supposed to force the
employers to provide an 'adequate supply of drinkng water'; to'maintain
on sanitary lines' the work-sites, corridors and warehouses; to dispose of
sewage and other factory refuse; to provide showers for the workers in
poisonous and dusty works, to provide lockers and clean eating places.
The Labour Law itself, through the High Safety Council, was also to
inspect new tools and the plans of the newly-established workshops,
requiring them to be in accordance with the Safety Regulations. Article
50 allowed for the closure of unsafe working places on the recommenda-
tion of the Labour Inspector to the Public Investigation and with the
consent of the Ministry of Labour.
So much for the safety laws on paper. Suspecting that the practice
varied from the law, a student of the labour movement in the pre-
revolutionary period wondered, in practice, how many times such a
closure had been carried out, particularly against a multinational
company; the actual number of labour inspectors and their qualifications;
whether there were any written record of the reports of the Inspectorate,
if so, where they were kept and who had access to them; the number of
workshops which lacked basic facilities like toilets and washrooms; and
the conducting of any investigation of the possible corruption of labour
inspectors by the employers (Jalil, 1977, pp. 47-8). Indeed, there have
been, and still are, enormous discrepancies between the law and reality.12
It is difficult to comprehend what conditions are like, and the
physical oppression of workers, unless you actually go into a workshop
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full of fumes, smoke and noise. Conditions of work under both regimes in
Iran have been appalling. This is the impression that I got when visiting
the modern and multinational firms, not to mention the traditional enter-
prises. I could only experience the immediate horror; I was not in a
position to assess the long-term effects. I could only be told, for instance,
about the accidents, disabilities and illnesses caused by industrial work.
Industrial Accidents
A survey of the Ministry of Labour indicates that the rate of industrial
accidents grew dramatically between 1968 and 1975. The survey points
out that wi thin eight years the compensation paid to workers for disability
increased from $4.8 million in 1968 to $28 million in 1975 (a 589'P
increase). The compensation paid to workers for sickness caused by work
increased from $7.1 million to $36.5 million respectively in 1968 and 1975
(519%). The compensation paid for malfunctioning in any part of the
body increased from $1.2 million in 1968 to $3 million in 1975 (247%)
(Lari jani , 1974).
It would be naive to rely merely on these figures, and more naive
still to assume that the net increase in compensation indicates the regime's
l iberal ism. There have been numerous cases of fraud and corruption
where due compensation has not been paid. A worker at the Teheran
auto plant is one example:
At that time. Souren. a SAVAK agent, had been a syndicate leader tor
thirteen years; and our candidate for the membership of the syndicate
would be fired, or would he prevented from entering the factory gate hy the
guards on election days — at that time, I became ill, I had an ulcer. The
doctor asked me to pay 3 ( X ) , ( X X ) RIs [over 13.(XX)] lor the treatment. I then
had to sell the carpet I had at home, hut I reali/ed that it was not enough I
went to Souren and told him the story, asking tor a loan: "live, six or two
thousand tournant, or whatever you can afford to lend " He said, "I can't
afford i ( ."Then we had a head of SAVAK, a colonel, called MrGhapanchi ,
who asked Souren to pay me some money. But Souren said, 'there's
nothing we can do for you"; then I was kicked out. After a while, when I
thought I had no option, I sold my refrigerator and things like that in order
to get medical treatment.
— Weren't you under the Medical Insurance?
Yes. I was. hut I was s t i l l asked to pay above it.
Another worker of the same firm:
After four months of work here, I got backache, because of heavy work I
spent two months in hospital After that I was expecting to get better, but 1
didn ' t . It took another 3-4 months betöre I was OK When I got back to
work I reali/ed that 1 had been refused payment of 3-4 months' overtime.
They paid me only three thousand IIIHHIUHS on account, which I had already
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spent. Because, during the 4 months [of illness] I had spent 14 thousand
tournons on the doctors and things like that, which I had borrowed from my
neighbours.
— Weren't you under Medical Insurance?
— I was, but I wasn't accepted to be treated under the insurance scheme.
And, when I would take the prescriptions to the chemist, they would say
things like: "we don't have these tablets or those injections". So when I felt
that my life was in danger, I had to get private treatment.
Industrial accidents and injuries have been normal everyday
occurrences. The documents of the Research Centre of Occupational
Health and Safety (RCOHS), a responsible institution which carries out
factory inspections, gives the following picture of the industrial accidents
in the two months of January and February 19X0.
Table 5.3













































Other documents in 1979-80 and the first four months of 19X0 demonstrate
that the Centre recorded an average of twenty industrial accidents each
month in Teheran alone.
The figures are, however, misleading and underestimated. They
point only to accidents which the RCOHS dealt with, those registered in
the Centre. The real rate, as the inspectors themselves confirmed unoffi-
cially, was much higher. The Medical Registration Books in two Medical
Centres of two plants revealed that each month up to 330 injuries requir-
ing ei ther first aid or leave of absence from work occurred in just one
factory.
The figure of the death-toll does not include those indirect and
gradual deaths which are the result of industrial diseases; and considering
the physical conditions of the workplaces, the rate must be very high. On
the whole, it could confidently be est imated that at least two industrial
workers are kil led every day as the consequence of industrial work.13
Chemical Diseases
For an outsider who is vis i t ing the workshops for the first t ime, even
modern ones, the experience is amazing. It is like entering a different
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Table 5.4
Attendance of the Workers at the Factory Medical Centre in one month
• •Causes of attendance P. R. Plant* l.T.N.
Dressing of minor wounds 125 330
Injuries 251 120
Total attendances 686 907
Total workforce 890 735
*During January-February 1981.
** Average of attendance in random days of 1980-81.
Source: My investigations.
world. In a moment you notice that grimy, sweating and curious faces are
staring at you through the dark of smoke and fumes, wondering what you
are doing there with a brief-case. In a few minutes the workers gather
round you. Everybody wants to speak out. You are told many things; and
they are all grievances, complaints made loudly and angrily.
This place is full of dust and poisonous chemicals. We work with industrial
alcohol here, now we have damaged lungs. And we have pains in our
legs. All the moulders have got this pain now. This job is damn heavy,
very heavy. Just take a look at these moulders, nol one of them's
healthy. I've recently had rheumatism, I've got backache.
Q. Don't you go to the doctor '
A. We do, but our pain is such that even though we get injected or use
drugs, il doesn't get better.
O You have been working here on this 12-ton furnace for some nine years;
have you had any disease''
A. Disease" All of us have got diseases, even mental disease ol one kind or
another. We've got no doctor, nobody to take our problems seriously
All of us have got something wrong; our hands, feet and so on are either
burnt or injured. (Metal Works workers).
In the Amazon factory, I could not manage to stay in the painting
shop for more than ten minutes to do interviewing. The air was full of the
dust of chemicals. A few workers were wearing only paper masks. The
result of a sampling by the OCHS in this workshop showed that the
amount of toluene in the atmosphere was 100-5(X) pmm, whereas the
permitted quanti ty was 150 pmm. Commercial toluene contains ben-
zene.14 And this is the effect of such conditions on the paint-workers:
U. What kinds of problems do you have in this shop?
A. Bloody paint; my lungs now pain me. I also have footache; that is
because of moisture, because of so much water. There are numerous
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problems but nobody cares. Even if somebody appears here they
always try to postpone action . . . I have been to hospital. I've got
sciatica and hearing loss. I've had it for two years. [In the hospital] they
said "you've had a defective ear since childhood!" How come two
years ago, before coming here, it was OK? In twenty years of work, in
some other places it was OK? Now, here, they say it's been like this
since childhood!?
In another modern factory in Teheran, I was spontaneously identi-
fied to the medical officer responsible as an official of the Ministry of
Labour. I was thus allowed to check their documents. I was told the
notorious shops were the painting and foam ones. First I talked to the
workers of the foam shop.15
This material makes it hard to breathe; it causes asthma; I've got a
stomach problem at the moment.
We don't feel like having food, I always feel sick. I've been working
here for 16 years . . . You know, when I get home from work, my feet
ache, and I feel generally out of sorts, I can't eat meals; I've lost my
appetite.
Almost all of the workers were protesting. If they had known
the extent of their collective tragedy, their voices would have been
much louder. The data revealed that of 39 workers in the foam shop, 34
were, or had been, under medical supervision, all suffering from lung
disease. The remaining 5 workers had not yet been examined. Of the 34
workers, 5 had red marks by their names. These had already been the
victims of industrial 'gradual deaths'; their names had not been regis-
tered under the category of 'factory victimization', but as natural
deaths.
We have had random access to a number of official reports
concerning health and safety in the industrial workplaces. Table 5.5
provides the summary of the documents. As it points out, only one
factory was reported to be generally normal. But in the Silco plant, for
instance, the amount of silica powder, a substance which the workers
have to inhale, is present in concentrations which are five times larger
than the recommended safety level. In Arak aluminium plant, the
concentration of dangerous substances is such that the inspector warns
'We present the results . . . in order tha t , as soon as possible, a very
urgent hygiene measure be carried out, so that the workers will not be
forced to do work under such conditions.' In many cases the employers,
including those of multinational modern firms, did not provide even
dr ink ing water, hot-water showers, changing rooms, dining halls, ade-
quate heat or sufficient light. An independent research project carried
out in a number of mostly female-oriented factories in Teheran in 1973
gave the following picture. Owing to the lack of any changing room,
Table 5.5
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women have to change their clothes in the workshop screened hy a chador.
or have to put on the uniform over their normal dresses. The workers of
these factories which are provided with some sort of dining halls, have to pay
10-15 Rials; and those without dining halls have to bring lunch with them.
However, since there are not any suitable places to heat the food, the
workers usual ly have to bring bread and cheese . . . In the winter they did
not have any heaters, so the workers had to have their lunch around the
machines. (Sanavandi, 1974, pp. 45-6)
The factory inspectors could offer more accurate and harsher reports,
provided that they were allowed to. Their reports have been censored.
There have been so few industrial safety experts that many minor
cases have v i r tua l ly been ignored, or accounted for as the acceptable facts
of factory life. In 1980-81, there were only 14 personnel employed in
industrial hygiene and safety for some 330,0(K) large- and small-scale
industrial units. Apart from workshop inspection, sti l l fewer investiga-
tions are conducted on the affected workers themselves. I came across
only two reports for the period following the Revolution. The reports
were concerned with the effect of chemicals upon the workers' health:
reports on the concentration of lead in the workers' blood in two factories.
The results, kept secret from the workers themselves, were not surprising:
in one factory, the blood of over 60% of the workers contained lead at a
higher concentration than the safety level; in another, the rate was over
70%. As Kinnersley (1979, pp. 157-8) states, 40 micg/KX)cc has been
considered as the safety level, above which level the poisoning of the
body begins (depending on the personal threshold which varies in dif-
ferent people).
Table 5.6
Samples of Blood Tests of the Industrial Workers
( 'hemical riant (A) August 1980 Chemical Plant (li) August 1WI
Lead I .cad



































The result of any investigation into industrial noise has also been kept
secret. Thus the right of negotiation by the labourers over such work
conditions continues to be out of the question. The overwhelming major-
ity of the factories inspected (Table 5.7) had terrible noise well above the
safety level (see the footnote to the Table). The conditions in the modern,
mult inat ional companies were as bad as the domestic firms. Factories
exist where noise reaches up to 110 dB (the sound of an earth-moving
machine). The effect of an increase in the number of dB over the safety
level is progressive. 'Each increase of 3 dB on the scale represents a
doubling of sound intensity --so 93 decibels is not 'just over 90'
(Kinnersley, 1979, p. 49). An official expert reported after the inspection
of a large car factory Benz Khavar (Mercedes Benz):
In this large industrial unit , owing to the lack of any reasonable planning,
the level of noise in most parts was high, and fundamental problems of
hygiene and safety have not been taken into account: in fact, the exploita-
tion of labour power and higher profit were the only objectives. In most of
the work sites noise is so high that it is impossible to bear even for a few
moments.
Following a hearing test of a sample of workers in that firm the
results revealed that 46% of the workforce suffered from occupational
deafness; 9% from 'poisonous or nervous deafness' (i.e. neural deafness);
3% from conductive hearing loss; 2% from 'pure sensory H(earing)
L(oss)' (i.e. sensory-neural hearing loss), and 4% from miscellaneous
hearing loss. In all, some two-thirds of the workers in that firm had a high
degree of hearing impairment. The above reports seem to underestimate
the actual conditions. The head of the Noise Department of the Centre
(RCOHS), and the only expert in the field, stated to me that 'over 70% of
the workers are suffering from occupational deafness'. 'What is the
solution?' I asked. 'In my view,' he answered, 'all industries must be
demolished and reconstructed again; because all of the plants were [set
up] on the basis of capitalism and exploitation. The issue of workers'
[health] was virtually out of the question.'16
Other Hazards
Investigations into other forms of work hazards have rarely been carried
out. You rarely come across a reference to light, for instance. In three
reports which I did see, the light was found to be substantially inadequate
in each plant, ranging from half to as low as one-fifth of the required level
(in Mazyar, Teheran Auto, KW firms). Employers may argue about the
impossibility of removing chemical hazards or smells; what justification
can they give for insufficient light? A very irritating smell was one of the
hazards which was unquantifiable. It was probably the major sensory
irritant in a chemical or leather workshop. All such working conditions
and physical oppression have been going on for a long time, and are
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cont inuing. The fatal consequences of t h i s long-term exploitation are
only now becoming apparent.
Table 5.7
Measured 1 .evels of Noise in Selected Plants*
Factory















in s/H'dion A verage sound in decibels (dH)
heb 1981 90-97 dB
Feb 1982 95-105
Jan 1980 Above the safety level
Sept 1981 Above the safety level
Oct 1981 Above the safety level
A u g l 9 8 l 85-100
Dec 1981 90-105
Nov 1979 Above the safety level
May 1980 90-110 dB
June 1981 86-102 average 4 shops
May 1981 Far above the safety level
Sept 1980 75-85
The of f ic ia l safety level in most factories is 90 dB. P Kinnersley, however,
suggests the level to be SO dB. for'hearing damage begins here'(P- 50). In Holland
the recommended l i m i t is 80 dB. The safety level is also determined by the balance
of forces of capital and labour; as Kinnersley writes. ' "Safety-levels" tor noise in
industry are a compromise between what 's good tor you and wha t ' s good for
business' (p. 54).
Source: My field research.
The Function of the RC'OHS
The RCOHSwasset up with funds from the ILO. Its real function during
the t ime of the Shah, according to one of the anti-clerical principals, was
' j u s t ;i show, a place for showing porn-films'. In the post-revolutionary
period, its funct ions , even though it may not show porno-films, have not
changed dramatical ly .
In 1963, the Minis t ry of'Labour had a s tu f f of about 35 inspectors, to cheek
on more than I K , ( K X ) workshops and plants The Plan Orgam/ation calculated
that two visits a year to each plant would require at least 160 inspectors in
I9M and 2(X) would be needed by 1W>8 (Department of Labour of the US,
p. 34).
As noted, in 1981, the total personnel of the department of occupational
hygiene and safety were 14 — to check on some 330,(MX) large- and
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small-scale manufacturing units. In this year there was only one single
noise (hea r ing) specialist, and one for chemical hazards.
There were very few doctors in factories; fewer than ten large plants
were said to have medical staff. The reason was not so much the shortage
of doctors per se, as a reluctance on the part of state and employers to pay
them. It is not surprising that the total of annual health examinations does
not exceed 12-15, according to the officials of the Centre.
Tough control was (and indeed is being) imposed upon both the
specialists preparing their reports, and upon the public, in particular the
working class, by denying them access to information. Pressure from
below (the threat of workers' rebellion) on the one hand, and the logic of
economizing on the costs of production, on the other, make the bour-
geoisie and the state tell lies about the health and lives of the labourers
and force their technical experts to do the same.
One of our colleagues in his reports on .1 factory had written: "In this
workshop the concentration of dust is very high, and the atmosphere is
unbearable." Other colleagues recommended him not to use tenus like
"unbearable", because the higher officials do not like them, especially as the
reports may fall into the hands ot ' n a s t y " people (an official in the Centre)
The example points to the political significance of the secrecy of
informat ion. Meanwhile obvious lies were also encouraged for economic
reasons, like keeping the wages of labourers low.
Factory inspectors tend to use terms l ike "hard labour", less because this
phrase in a report would entitle the workers to be paid the "benefit of work
hardship". Of course one must tell the t ru th ; but in this s i tuat ion it is indeed
difficult to pay benefit of work hardship, and such reports could be an
excuse for the workers to put the factories on s t r ike ; that is why it is t aken
into consideration (an o f f i c i a l in the ( e n t r e ) .
Considering the industry-wide bad conditions of work, including
the unpaid hard and dangerous work, it follows that the workers were
defrauded.
The issue, however, is more political than economic: the workers
are denied thei r right to have access to information about their bodies and
environment. Such a denial of rights is sanctioned by the Labour Law
(Article 53).17 The workers must therefore be encouraged to demand
t h a t their workplaces be inspected regularly; and more importantly, to
demand to have access to the results of such examinations.
Not only the labour force, but also any other unauthorized citi/en is
denied the right of access to such information. My request to study the
reports of the inspectorates was rejected outright by the general director
who in i t i a l ly referred me to the above Article of the Labour Law. My
insis tence, however, forced him to tell the t ru th . 'We cannot trust you or
anybody like you to get these secrets; they may, somehow, be passed on
to the workers, in this way putting all the factories of Teheran on strike. '
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Notes
1. See Marx, 1977, p. 382; and 1979, pp. 449-50.
2. Official documents such as the reports of the Institute of Research and
Hygiene of the Industrial Labour Force, Ministry of Labour, emphasize this.
3. For instance in Iran car plants; (my interview with the workers), and in
textile factories (workers interviewed in a TV programme, spring 1980, Teheran).
4. For an historical study of control, see Edwards, 1979.
5. Excluding oil, communications, mining, railways and utilities.
6. 'In 1976 it took 45 hours to assemble a GM Chevrolet in Iran whilst the same
process could be performed in 25 hours in West Germany', in Halliday, 1978a,
p. 158.
7. Some accounts of trade unionism in Iran may be found in: Halliday, 1978;
Abrahamian in Bonine and Keddie, 1981; and Abrahamian, 1982. A detailed
documentary history is provided in Chaqueri, 1978, and Lajevardi, 1985.
8. For a review of the Labour Law, see Jalil, 1977.
9. Resolutions of the 18th National Conference of Labour 26-29 Ordibehesht,
1977, in Kavousi, 1976, p. 164, Article 1.
10. The approximate rate of exchange at the time was $1 =70Rls .
11. A pioneer of the guerrilla movement, Amir Parviz Pouyan (1975) in
Ghotbi, 1978, p. 72.
12. No official (reliable) report has ever been published on the conditions of
industrial work under both regimes. Data do exist, but are kept secretly. The
actual secrecy has been supported by law (Article 53 of the Labour Law). Almost
all analyses below will be carried out on the basis of our field research: unofficial
inspection in a certain number of plants; visiting the hospital for industrial workers;
and access to the official reports of investigations of workplaces, investigations nt
the Research Centre of Occupational Health and Safety (Ministry of Labour); and
the Centre of Medical Documents of Ministry of Public Health.
13. The records of industrial accidents of only one single police station in
Teheran (Azadi Avenue) during 1980 (1359) revealed 32 cases of industrial
accidents of which 29 were death records. The death casualty rate among the
construction workers (including those in factories) was the highest, about 30%.
14. Benzene is a substance in paints, lacquers, varnishes and it is dangerous.
'Inhaling a large dose of benzene will make you unconscious and soon ki l l you;
smaller amounts make you feel ill, confused and disoriented. Prolonged exposure
is l ikely to damage your bone marrow' (Kinnersley, 1979, pp. 166, 343).
15. Foam which is used as a material for insulation and paints consists of a
chemical substance called toluene di-isocyanate (TDI). It is liquid, highly toxic
and highly inflammable; it irritates eyes, nose ami throat ; small concentrations can
cause permanent asthmatic conditions and dermatitis (Kinnersley, 1979, p. 378).
16. In a very noisy factory where it was impossible to record the interviews, I
noticed a worker on a noisy machine talking to himself. When I asked the reason, I
was told by another lad, 'He's gone mad, because of the noise.'
17. 'Labour inspectors have no right, even after leaving their jobs, to divulge
any commercial and technical secrets they may have learnt in the course of their
work' Article 53.
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6. The Industrial Working
Class in the Revolution
The February Revolution of 1979 had widespread popular support. A
section of the bourgeoisie (notably the bazaar merchants), a range of
urban traditional and new petty-bourgeoisie (tradesmen, small producers
and civil servants), the newly proletarianized masses (including the
migrant poor) and the richer working class (including the relatively
well-paid oil workers) all wanted to get rid of the Shah.
The Revolution did not, however, take a classical bourgeois demo-
cratic form, primarily because of the lack of strong peasant participation
to demand the overthrow of feudal socio-economic relations (as happened
in the French Revolution of 1789, almost all European Revolutions
except those of 1848 and 1871 and the Russian Revolution). The increas-
ing rate of the accumulation process, in particular after the land reform of
1962, the rise in the price of oil and an overall penetration of the country-
side by the laws of capital accumulation, had reduced the rationale for a
bourgeois democratic revolution. Instead, as we saw in Chapter 4, a
semi-proletariat had been created with different demands and aspirations.
No account of the role of the working class in the revolutionary
process has so far appeared. What has emerged sporadically is limited to
praising the working class's determinant role in the anti-Pahlavi struggle
rather than offering any critical analysis of its actual involvement and
strategies, or strengths and weaknesses.1
Political Events from 1978 to February 1979
The working class entered the scene of struggle in the second half of
summer 1978. Within the next five or six months up to February, the
strike movement reached its peak, making 'all wheels stand still' (Lenin
on strikes). Various strata of the urban population -- intellectuals,
students, lawyers, teachers, other professionals, small traders, bazaar
merchants, craftsmen, the clergy and the migrant masses — had already
taken part in street demonstrations that had started ten months before.
The contradictions and limitations of capitalist development in
I r an , which were partly determined by global economic trends, revealed
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themselves in a number of ways: the end of economic boom of the
mid-1970s, the revision of the Fifth Development Plan and the start of the
recession in early 1977. In f l a t ion raised the prices of food and housing and
eroded the income of the lower classes (Wal ton , 1980).
This was happening in the context of a peculiar political situation
and state form which made society ripe for a radical transformation. The
contradictions of the Shah's capitalist state revealed themselves in un-
bearable repression, structural corruption and the underdevelopment of
political relations and institutions in relation to the rapid accumulation
and socio-economic change which had developed new social classes
(working class and the new middle class) with respective socio-political
aspirat ions. These political aspirations came into direct conflict with the
dic ta torship . 'I'he combination of economic conditions and political
repression acted as an impetus to push the masses on to the streets.
The Beginnings
We made it clear in Chapter 5 that the working class was oppressed and
struggling at the point of production. A new wave of strikes, which
corresponded to the initial phase of struggle began in the spring of 1978.
In March workers at A/mayesh plant in Teheran went on strike, protest-
ing against a management plan to make three hundred workers redundant.
In the same month , some six hundred gardeners employed by the oil
industry stopped work demanding a pay-rise. In April, 2 , (XK) workers in
the brick-making industry in Tabriz came out, demanding better condi-
tions and welfare. As t ime went on, the number of str ikes increased.
Il is often enough lor one factory to strike, lor strikes to hegin immediately
in a large number of factories. What a great moral influence strikes have,
how they affect workers who see that their comrades have ceased to be
slaves and, it only for the time being, have become people on an equal
toot ing with the rich (Lenin, 1978, pp. 62-3).
Unti l August, the form of demands was economic, though we
should not ignore their associated political content. In the period after
September there was a progressive increase in the numbers striking; the
period also marked a turning point in the nature and the forms of the
demands that were made (see Table 6.1). According to the available
data, in recorded strikes (fewer than the real number) at least some
35,000 workers at di f ferent factories stopped work in September, putting
forward both economic and political demands, organi/ing demonstrations
and releasing resolutions.
About 60% of the demands made in September were economic (for
pay-rises, improved welfare, extra holidays, implementation of job
classification) and the remainder were directly or indirectly political:
about control over the funds and financial affairs , the discrimination
between men and women workers; calling for the dissolution of the
yellow syndicates and the establishment of a new form of workplace
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organization and the dissolution of the Workers' Organi/ation of the
Rastakhiz Party and of the Hef d zat and the expulsion of their agents
(secret police); change or expulsion of management, expulsion of foreign
experts and protest against interference by military forces in workplace
affai rs .
The rebellions in indust r ia l workplaces were a reflection of socio-
political developments in society as a whole. This continued to be so until
the workers began demanding workers' control. In terms of militancy,
the workers were s t i l l lagging behind the other groups. On 5 September (a
religious holiday) millions had taken to the streets, throughout the
country, in a peaceful demonstration; and two days later, on Bloody
Friday in Teheran, the street battles against the army had left hundreds of
dead bodies on the streets.
A few points must be made on the question of militancy. We must
draw a qualitative distinction between the nature and forms of the working-
class struggle and the struggle of the other masses. The working class is
not simply an aggregate of individuals, and the militancy of the class is not
necessarily the same as that of the individuals of that class. 'People act
one way as individual atoms in the social fabric; they often act quite
differently as part of a class collectively' (Draper, 1978h, p. 40). Working-
class militancy and effective struggle do not have to take the form of
bloody street confrontations. Militancy in the factory at the point of
production may be more appropriate as well as effective.
October and After: The Escalation of Strikes
The revolutionary movement which had aimed to overthrow the Pahlavi
regime, and which, following Bloody Friday, had forced the regime to
declare Martial Law, assumed a new momentum in October. When
40,000 oil-workers, 40,(MK) steel-workers, 30,000 railway-workers had put
down their tools within less than three weeks, the dynamism of the
revolutionary process changed radically. Workers in hundreds of plants
and companies were rapidly adding to the strike movement which spread
to many different sectors of the economy: the state sector, industry and
services. Given the military rule, the pace of work stoppages in this
period was indeed surprising: according to recorded reports, on 6 October
alone railway-workers in Zahedan, 40,(KK) steel-workers in Isfahan,
workers in the copper-mines of Sar Cheshmeh and Rafsanjan.at Abadan
Petrochemical, at Isfahan Post and Telegraph Company and all the
branches of the Bank of Shahriar went on strike (Ayandegan, 16 January
1979, 1357/10/26). The day after was the same: all the refineries, the
Royal Air Services, the Iranit factory in Ray, the customs officers in Jolfa,
the Department of Navigation and Port Affairs of Bandar Shahpour,
Tractor Sazi in Tabriz, radio and TV stations in Rezayeh, 80 industrial
u n i t s in Isfahan, a steel-mill in Bafgh, employees of the judiciary through-
out the country and employees of the Finance Department in Maragheh
joined in. The next day it was the turn of Zamyad plant in Teheran,
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General Motors, the Plan and Budget Organization and the railway-
workers in Zahedan (again). The next day (11 October 1978) the largest
daily newspapers went on strike. The Canada Dry factory, the ports and
shipyards in Khorramshahr, the Iran Kaveh plant, the fisheries of Bandar
Pahlavi, Minoo factory, Vian Shre plant, Gher Ghere-i Ziba, «//workers
in Gilan province, 2,000 brick-makers in Tabriz, oil-workers in Abadan
and Ahwaz, in the pipe plant and Machin Sazi in Saveh, 40,000 workers of
Behshar Industrial Group throughout the country, bus-drivers in Rezay
and communication workers in Kermashah joined the strike in rapid
succession (Ayandegan, 20 January 1979). With every day, there were
new strikes. Martial law failed to crack down on the revolutionary move-
ment. On 30 December, Bakhtiar, a remnant of Mosadegh's National
Front, accepted the Shah's offer to form a government. By the time the
Bakhtiar cabinet was formed, almost all the key economic sectors were
idle: oil, communications, transport, public services, banks, customs and
even the actors who dubbed cinema films and TV programmes.
The inactivity of key sectors tended to paralyse social and economic
activities.2 The Bakhtiar cabinet acted the same role in Iran that Mrs
Aquino was to do in The Philippines, but it was too late, and strong
religious leadership had been formed by Khomeini. During Bakhtiar's
period of office, the general strike gained a novel dimension. It spread
from wage-labouring sectors to the independent ones: at this time, almost
all the shops in Teheran and other towns were shut (Ayandegan, 1357/10/
21) .
The Oil Strike
The oil strike was of particular domestic and international significance.
While the regime could tolerate the massive street demonstrations of the
religious festival on Fitre Day, the struggle of the oil-workers was intoler-
able to it. Industries such as oil and communications were the most
strategic economic sectors. It would, however, have been wrong to
concentrate merely on these sectors on the grounds that they would
automatically paralyse the rest of the economy. The organization of
strikes by the oil-workers could continue only in the context of a total
revolutionary movement. And, in turn, such a movement could defeat
the regime only with the support of the oil-workers.
Following a call to strike on 15 October in the Abadan refinery,
troops were called into the workplace, arresting seventy workers and the
leader of the union of the Teheran Oil Refinery Workers. After this, the
workers in Lavan, Bahrakan, Ahwaz, and other oil-fields stopped work.
Negotiations with the Finance Minister, M Ansari, broke down, and on 2
October the following demands were formulated by the strike committee.
1. End martial law;
2. full solidarity and co-operation with striking teachers;
3. unconditional release of all political prisoners;
4. Iranization of the oil industry;
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5. all communications to be in the Persian language;
6. all foreign employees to leave the country;
7. an end to discrimination against women staff employees and workers;
8. the implementation of a law recently passed by both houses of parlia-
ment dealing with the housing of all workers and staff employees;
9. support for the demands of the production workers, including the
dissolution of SAVAK;
10. punishment of corrupt high government officials and ministers;
11. reduced manning schedule for offshore drilling crews.
Following the issue of the demands, the production and export of oil
halted; their resumption was dependent on the fulfilment of the demands.
Production declined from 5,700,000 barrels a day in late October to
1,800,000, and then to nil in November (Kayhan, 6 January 1979). The oil
strike had an international impact which gave the workers a peculiar
social and economic power; 'the social power which', as one writer put it,
'stems from their being organized by capital into an international class'
(Turner, 1980, p. 272). The international impact of the strike was such
that, from the other side of the world, Sweezy and Magdoff wrote,
There have been few spectacles in recent history so inspiring and heart-
warming as that of 70,(XX) oil workers, far and away the best paid and most
privileged segment of the working class, bringing to a complete halt the huge
production and refining complex which is the Iranian Oil Industry, and
doing it not for better pay or special privileges, but in support of the
quintessentially political demand of the whole Iranian people that the Shah
and all he stands for must go (1979, p. 17).
The oil-workers caused a 10% drop in world consumption of oil by
non-OPEC and non-socialist countries. Domestically there was a 42%
drop in industrial production in the second half of 1978 and a drop in the
state's income of 21.4% (from that in the previous year).
One result of the revolutionary crisis was a further economic crisis
whose symptoms had already started to appear in the second half of 1978.
After the insurrection, the crisis showed itself in industrial recession, the
flight of the industrialists, shortages of raw material, the nationalization
of the banks and a number of industries and mass unemployment. The
next chapter will deal with the new working-class movement which the
crisis produced.
The Revolutionary Crisis and the Metamorphosis of Demands
One of the interesting features of the working-class struggle was the
transformation of economic demands into political ones. Like the
development between February and October 1917 in Russia, the demand
transformation among the Iranian working class attested that it is very
hard to separate in practice these two forms of struggle, in particular in a
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critical revolutionary situation. Since the terms are usually misconceived,
let us look at what Marx and Lenin had to say on the issue.
Marx and Lenin on Economic and Political Struggles
Every movement in which the working class comes out as a < /<ns against the
ruling classes and tries to coerce them by pressure from without, is a political
movement. For instance, the attempt in a particular factory or even in a
particular trade to force a shorter working day out of individual capitalists
by strikes etc., is a purely economic movement. On the other hand, the
movement to force through an eight-hour law etc. is a political movement.
And in this way, out of 24 separate economic movements of the workers
there grows up everywhere a political movement, that is to say, a movement
of the class with the object of enforcing its interests in a general form, in a
form possessing general, socially coercive force. While these movements
presuppose a certain degree of previous organization, they are in turn
equally a means of developing this orgam/ation (Marx, Engels and Lenin,
1974, p. 59).
We may conclude from the statement, first, that the concept of class
struggle is equal to political struggle (the struggle for conquest of political
power). The second conclusion is that political struggle stems from, or
rests upon economic struggle (that is, the struggle of the workers of an
ind iv idua l factory against the individual capitalist). Here, thus, there
seems a tendency to treat the three terms — economic struggle, political
struggle and struggle for socialism (or struggle for setting up an alternative
socio-economic structure) — as the expression of one and the same
movement.
This particular piece of Marx's writing refers to the activities of the
First In terna t ional wi thin which and alongside the dif ferent sectarian
political tendencies there also existed a 'real working-class movement'
l ike the Hnglish Chartist movement which was i t s e l f the product of the
long process of the evolution of the Hnglish working class since the
second ha l f of the ISth C'entury. Yet, the post-International develop-
ments, in particular the bourgeois tendency of the leadership wi th in the
English labour movement, would encourage Marx to argue for the
necessity of a political organization of the working class alongside the
trade unions. However, the exact relationship between the two remains
ambiguous (see Draper, iy?Xb, pp. 115—46). These polit ical develop-
ments were occurring at a period when industr ial capitalism was sti l l in
its i n i t i a l stages and lacked the material basis to develop a hegemonic
capitalist state, which it would require explicitly political struggle to
oppose.3
Lenin's definit ion of economic struggle is s imilar to that of Marx:
'when the workers of a single factory or of a single branch of industry
engage in struggle against their employer or employers'. On the other
hand, poli t ical struggle according to him is
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when all the foremost representatives of the entire working class of the
whole country are conscious of themselves as a single working class and
launch a struggle that is directed not against individual employers, but
against the entire class of capitalists and against the government that supports
that class ( I . e n i n , I960, pp. 215-20).
While we can see a resemblance between the views of Marx and
Lenin in the two concepts of economic and political struggles, there are
differences between them as to the transformation from the former to the
latter. Lenin docs not hold a single theory on this issue; Lenin the
practical revolutionary took different stands in different circumstances.
Before he wrote What Is To Be Done? he argued that 'every econ-
omic struggle necessarily becomes a political struggle' ( 196()a, p. 213). In
the years around the turn of the century, a number of Russian Social
Democrats (Economists) concentrated their agitation almost entirely
around the immediate, limited, and basically economic demands of the
working class. As a response, Lenin wrote the polemic of What Is To Be
Done? as part of the internal debate. In this pamphlet he argues,
There is much talk of spontaneity. But the v/w/i/«//wi/.v development of the
working-class movement leads to i ts subordination to bourgeois ideology
. . . for the spontaneous working-class movement is trade unionism . . .and
trade unionism means the ideological enslavement of the workers by the
bourgeoisie (Lenin, 1973a,p. 32).
But the logic of political development during the revolutionary
process of 1905 (and 1917) and the momentum and form of the proletarian
political struggle led Lenin to accept that
The economic struggle, the struggle for immediate and direct improvement
of condit ions, is alone capable of rousing the most backward strata of the
exploited masses, gives them a real education and transforms them —
during a revolutionary period — into an army of political fighters, within the
space of a lew months (Lenin, 1973h, p. 242).
Under the same logic, he praised the rise of the spontaneous strike
movement (1978, pp. 157-61), and urged the party members to work
wi th in the non-party bourgeois workers' organizations (1973b, pp. 169-
76).
The Historicity of Economic and Political Struggles
Before dealing with the concrete case of Iran, I shall make a few theoretical
points concerning the formal and realistic approaches to the issues of
economic and political struggle. In so doing, I shall attempt to present my
understanding of Marx's and Lenin's conception of economic and politi-
cal struggles.
The nature of the demands in any strike movement reflects the
particular stage of its maturi ty. I shall assume that the making of political
83
Workers and Revolution in Iran
demands represents a more advanced stage of a labour movement than
the making of economic demands. The concepts of political-economic
demands and struggles are often defined rather descriptively: economic
demands are those couched in an economic form, such as those concerned
with pay-rises and better working conditions, and political demands in a
political form (change in a law or the right to vote). I would suggest,
however, that we need to go further: the value of any workers' demands
(and organizations) is determined not simply by examining the demands
themselves but by analyzing them in the historical context in which they
are advanced.
In general, an economic struggle may be defined as any struggle in
any form which is waged for limited and immediate goals. According to
this definition, therefore, a purely economic demand, such as for a
pay-rise, may well be part of a political struggle, when it is advanced in
order to oppose the state/capital by inflicting economic pressure in a
situation where the state/capital is unable to fulfil that demand. Similarly,
an advanced and formally political action might be entirely economic and
trade unionist. The opposition mounted by the National Graphical Asso-
ciation (NGA) in Britain against the government law of secondary picket-
ing provides a typical case of this, especially when account is taken of the
subsequent contempt of court decision in November 1983. In spite of its
political form, the objective of the NGA was immediate and limited to
the defence of specific rights. The question of how an economic struggle
becomes elevated to a political struggle is a complex one. Any strike
movement based on economic demands is limited and may fail to realize
its fu l l historical potential. The foundation of Lenin's polemic as to why
economic struggle fails to elevate itself to a political struggle is based
upon the assumptions that a) in normal conditions, it is the dynamism of
capital accumulation that determines the character of socio-political
developments; b) that capital would be able to fulfil any economic
demands made by the working class and thus possesses an unlimited
power of manoeuvre to defuse the political content of any economic-
struggle, and c) that, in this way it institutionalizes and integrates class
conflicts into the fabric of the state.
A basic problem with these assumptions is the way in which they
have been generalized, not solely by Lenin, but also by Leninists. In
reality, in any particular society and at a given moment in its historical
development, the power of capital to manoeuvre is determined by its own
strength and the strength of the opposition. So the power of manoeuvre
of capital in Iran differs from that in, say, Japan. In the Iranian case
before the revolution, two specific periods could be distinguished: before
the revolutionary crisis economic demands were harshly resisted by the
state; but after that period, the state was prepared to negotiate and
concede economic demands. At this period, however, a mere emphasis
on the very same demands would have failed to realize its potential and
they had to be transformed into totally political demands.
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The Iranian Experience
The diagram below, the result of 115 labour reports and resolutions,
demonstrates the trend of economic-political demand transformation, from
May 1978 to January 1979. By January some 85% of the demands, in form
and essence, were political — that is, for going on strike to support strikers
in other factories, for freedom of political prisoners, end to martial law,
abolition of colonial contracts, and the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime.
Figure 6.1




































In October and before, some 55% of the demands were still in an
economic form (pay-rises, welfare and extra holidays). These demands
may be argued to have the aim not solely of obtaining immediate and
limited concessions, but also of inflicting economic pressure to deepen
the crisis. Such a tactic was certainly adopted in the metal plant, as an
activist described:
In '57 ( 1978), we decided to go on strike, as the Imam had recommended. In
fact, we used our year-end bonus as an excuse; you know, we would usually
get our bonus in the second half of the year. So we used that as an excuse.
Martial Law soldiers poured into here. They took some of the workers away
in their cars. The rest of the workers said nothing and got back to work..The
Martial Law people, meanwhile, asked what was our grievance: "Why do
you do such things?" We said, "Nothing's up with us — we just want our
bonuses, management don't respond." We shut down this plant later on
when the situation was getting tense.
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4. Perfect implementation of job classification scheme
5. Delayed wages
Radical demands (indirect political)
6. Control over funds, finance and
profit-sharing scheme
7. End to discrimination between
workers, respect for workers
8. Five days work, 40 hours week
9. Protest against lay-offs, demand for their return
10. Dissolution of yellow syndicate,
formation of new organizations'^
11. Abolition of WO & Hefäzat. expulsion and
trial of those responsible
12. Abolition of penalties and disciplinary measures
Political demands
13. Change in management, stop employing
new managers
14. Expulsion of foreign experts, use of Iranian, end
discrimination between foreign and home workers
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/5. Against the intervention of army in workplace affairs
16. Solidarity with other workers &
protest against arresting workers
17. Freedom of political prisoners, return of the exiled
18. Trial of those responsible for massacre of
revolutionaries
19. End to censorship, freedom of expression and
political parties
20. End to martial law
21. Abolition of colonial contracts, boycotting
foreign goods
22. Dissolution of parliament, SA VAK & Bakhtiar
government
23. Downfall of Pahlavi regime
24. Other*




































May 100% econ. June 100% econ. July 70% econ., 30% pol. Aug. 63.5% econ. Sept. 60% econ.
Oct. 55% econ. Nov. 17.5% econ.; 82.5% pol. Jan. 14.8% econ.: 85.5% pol. Feb. 100% pol.
"This table has been compiled on the basis of 115 labour reports or resolutions.
**No new strike or protest incident was reported, probably indicating all units to be on strike.
tWelfare = including housing allowances: medical services; food, travel and child benefits; loan and conditions of work.
tfWO = Workers' Organization, state-controlled, affiliated to Rastakhiz Party. Hefäzat = Security Bureau, factory secret police
office.
^Others including: 'No one is to be exploited by the rich; workers' participation in the Revolutionary Council (new government)
demanded by 17,000 shipyard workers and associated companies; workers' situation must be prime concern of next government;
new labour law prepared by the workers themselves; and establishment of the rule of the masses.
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A member of the factory committee of the Arj factory also had the
same idea.
We decided to launch a political strike, thai is, to transform the economic-
strike into a political one. We proposed it to our lads who we knew well. . .
But those who ate out of the boss's hand just neutralized it. In fact, they
spread rumours that "they (the strikers) want to stop us getting our wages",
and such like (my interviews).
At the initial stages of the strike movement, the reaction of the state
was to resort to the classical tactic of stick and carrot, reform combined
with repression. In August, for instance, the government had conceded
on certain issues: the payment of unemployment benefit, for the first time
in working-class history; the extension of annual holidays by three days;
full compensation for early retirement. On the other hand, the mounting
strike pressure forced the state in September to resort to disciplinary
measures. On 11 September, new regulations were issued warning workers
'not to leave the workshop without permission; to show proper conduct;
to obey orders; to respect the managers' (Khabar-i Kargar, no. 2). Such
measures could hardly be taken seriously by the workers. The state's
strategy at this point was to stop political demands by making economic
concessions. Thus, in six months, the wages of all workers rose on
average by 25%. Some sectors, such as metal and construction, obtained
a 60% pay-rise (Bank Markazi Iran, 1979, p. 25). The pay-rise was
combined with payment of other benefits such as housing, child benefit
and overtime.
After September, the confrontation between the masses and the
regime reached a point where economic pressure was no longer enough;
the workers did not stop there. Promises by the Labour Minister of the
Bakhtiar government for a radical change in the Labour Law and the
establishment of democratic workers' unions were totally ignored by the
workers. Demands tended progressively to assume a political character.
The employees of a steel complex went on strike initially for better
welfare provisions. On 7 October, they advanced new demands for
housing allowances, an end to strict military regulations and a change of
management. Following the stoppage of work, mil i tary forces occupied
the p lan t , as a result of which the ending of the strike was made condi-
tional on more demands. For a short period, when the soldiers were
occupying the plant, the workers were forced to resume work. Circulating
leaflets, they informed people:
come and see that we are working under the shadow ot tanks, eannon, rifles
and bayonets . . . entering the factory premises is like stepping into a
concentration camp . . . it is by the force of rifles and bayonets that we are
made to work (in Khabar-i Kargar, no. 2).
Eventually, making certain political demands, the whole steel
industry downed tools on 13 January.
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As long as the regime still had some sort of power of manoeuvre, the
only response to political strikes was the use of military force. After
political demands had been made by the oil-workers, when negotiations
wi th the government failed, 1,7(X) delegates from various workplaces
staged a mass meeting in the Abadan refinery in front of military forces,
deciding to stay all the night in the Administration Department. Tanks
and armoured vehicles took position. As the delegates refused to leave
there, a bloody confrontation ensued in which two were killed and eleven
wounded (Le Monde, 16 November 1978). Similar military actions were
carried out in Tractor Sazi, Machin Sazi and Pars Metal plants as they
started anti-regime strikes.
Internal Political Struggle
The domain of political struggle is not limited merely to those actions
carried out against the laws and values of a capitalist order at a societal
level ; it also characterizes certain types of action and demands which are
advanced at the point of production. These are what I would call internal
political struggles and they form a part of the demands made by the
Iranian factory workers in the revolutionary period.
To clarify the issue, I shall look at an abstract workplace per se,
without an historical and politico-economic context. Marx argued that
'all directly social or communal labour on a large scale' requires a 'directing
authority ' to co-ordinate the movements of the individuals. But under
capitalist production the co-ordination assumes a particular form. For it
has to operate in accordance with the vital requirement of capitalist
production, the maximum extraction of surplus-value. In these
circumstances,
the control exercised by the capitalist is not a special function arising from
the notion of social labour process, and peculiar to that process, but it is at
the same time a function of exploitation of social labour process, and is
consequently conditioned by the unavoidable antagonism between the ex-
ploiter and the raw material of his exploitation (Marx, 1979, pp. 449-50).
One must now examine how the function of control (distinct from
the function of co-ordination) must be exercised, so that — despite the
workers' opposition within the antagonistic production process — the
maximization of profit, the driving force of capitalist production, is
guaranteed.
Marx argues that capital has to transform the social relations within
the production process, in accordance with the logic of surplus-value
extraction, thus establishing a 'despotic direction' (Marx, 1979, p. 450).
As the production process becomes more complex, and the labour force
becomes more and more concentrated, despotism takes novel forms.
New strata of wage-earners occupy new positions and perform the func-
89
Workers and Revolution m Iran
t ions of social control (foremen, supervisors, heads of department and so
on). The establishment of a social division of labour (distinct from, but
parallel to, the technical division of labour) lays down the basis for the
structuring of control: hierarchy and relations of power at the point of
production appear to be the natural and normal structure of the work-
place; so that the laws, value and rights of the agents are defined and
legitimized. In the more advanced form of labour processes, power and
author i ty tend to be objectified by the diktat of automation. There is a
tendency towards a reduction in human medium power; it is replaced by a
reified control, especially when the deskilling of supervisors and middle-
men and Taylori/ation of intellectual work' tend to prevail (Cooley in
Levidow, 1981).
The production process thus comprises two kinds of technical and
social (authori ty) relations. Similarly it is the arena of two forms of
struggles; economic struggle in the sense of 'effort bargain, that is, the
more monetary reward for labour expended or reward for effort'
(Burawoy, 1982); and political struggle in the sense of struggle against the
established laws, rights and power relations at the point of production.
Struggles for control over funds and investments; the abolition of
disciplinary measures, and the abolition of the yellow syndicates should
all be assessed as political struggles. They question established values and
laws, and in a word, class relations
Moving from the abstract to the concrete level, we hold that if the
internal struggles (at the point of production) are waged not as mediation
for a broader class struggle but for their own sake, for immediate ends,
they still remain at the level of a 'trade union struggle' in the Leninis t
sense. In the specific sense of Iran, I would suggest that these radical
demands had political connotations since they were advanced in order to
put pressure upon the vulnerable position of the Shah's state.
Spontaneous or Conscious Struggle?
One of the most important aspects of any revolutionary struggle is the
question of whether it is spontaneous or conscious. Let us clarify these
two concepts. For Lenin, the fact that an action is spontaneous does not
imply that it is unp lanned , without leadership and mechanical. Rather,
it signifies a low level of struggle, 'a class struggle in embryo', waged by
the workers who can recognize the irreconcilable antagonism between
themselves and their employers, but not that between themselves and
'the whole of the modern poli t ical and social system': awareness of the
la t t e r is character is t ic only of social democratic consciousness (Lenin,
1973, p. 36). In t h i s sense, a conscious struggle is one which is led by a
conscious element, that is, a social democratic party. In a Leninist sense
the s t r ike movement in Iran was cer ta inly a spontaneous movement.
However , such a simple characterization cannot help us to perceive the
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real at tr ibutes, complexity and variety of the working-class organization
of struggle.
Organization
My study of the strike movement suggests that any collective action was
carefully thought out, planned and put into practice. The strike leaders
would decide what form of action to take, what kinds of demands to put
forward and what tactics to adopt to foil secret police counter-measures.
In the early months of the revolutionary upsurge, decisions had to he
made in the secret cells which had spontaneously blossomed over the
years. The plans would be conveyed to the mass of the workers through
trusted connections or through spreading rumours, getting the message
across through everybody and, at the same time, nobody. A leader of Arj
plant strike explained:
Before the Revolution, we were [members of] the syndicate. We would
demonstrate inside, and at times would do so out of the factory. In order
to plan effectively, and co-ordinate, the syndicate decided to set up a
committee for the co-ordination of demonstrations . . . the committee,
of course, was secret. We would inform the other workshops, asking
them to join in demonstrations . This syndicate intended to bring all
workers of this area out on to the streets . . . [Anyway] we set it up, in
order to prevent others from interfering [in our affairs], and from
probably changing the direction of our activities.
Q. How would the s t r ikes get started?
A. The plans would be made secretly, of course.
Q. Were there any workers who would carry out underground activities in
the factory'.'
A. Of course, undoubtedly. One would inform another; he would inform
the next, and so on. In this way the strike would get started.
In Caterpillar plant, another strike leader described his experience:
We were a group of workers and employees who knew each other well
through our part icipat ion in various revolutionary activities for at least 7-8
years; and because we were of similar mind about the social problems. In
earlier times, we were rather suspicious of each other. For instance, I was
suspicious of this friend of mine, Mr Kamali. because ot something which
happened to him: [he was arrested] and got just two months! C'onsidering
the way things were at tha t time, we thought he should have been given
more than two months I and another comrade decided to test him, to see
whether or not he was a SA VAK a g e n t . . . Mr Kamali thought of me in the
same way. However, we did get to know each other. We made contact in
this way: I gave him a book by Mr Khomeini. With tha t beard and every-
thing, 1 thought he might be religious. Anyway, we were to get closer . . .
We managed to form a secret nucleus . . . this nucleus would engage in all
sorts of political activity here, as far as it could. I would also always intervene
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in the other workplaces If necessary, it would organize in other factories
. . . or it would distribute workers' literatures countrywide (in A Ghothi,
1979, pp. 94, 105).
When the revolutionary crisis became more acute, spontaneous
committees tended to surface. The crucial decisions would be taken in
organized mass meetings and elections would be held to set up the
committees. Where a radical syndicate existed, it would revive its activi-
ties to organize strikes and other forms of protest.
The committees often assumed total responsibility for the work-
place. In the oil industry, for instance, a committee was responsible for
the day-to-day operation of the whole industry. It enjoyed a great deal of
power to manoeuvre, and had such a flexibili ty that it could often neutral-
ize the counter-measures of the military to crush the strike. It would
summon delegates from the different parts of the industry for a meeting
to release instructions within 'the half hour, before the troops could come
and drive us away'.4
Leadership
Who were the organizers of the strikes? Did they belong to any particular
political or religious organization? An accurate examination of the issue
requires detailed empirical research which has not yet been conducted by
anyone. Yet it could be argued in general that one of themain features of
the strike movement was that its grass-roots organizational leadership
was within the workplace, and not from outside organizations such as
political parties, unions or religious i n s t i t u t i o n s
Our study of the socio-political conditions in the pre-revolutionary
factories (Chapter 5) showed that any organic connection between the
workers and the political opposition was unl ikely. In terms of their broad
ideological and political backgrounds, the leaders of strikes may be
divided into three categories. First, there were those who seemed to be
influenced specifically by left-wing ideas (a few leaders in the Caterpillar
plant, the oil industry, or the industries in the Caspian Sea area). The
second group, who came from religious circles, would convey the instruc-
t ions of the religious leaders through distributing their leaflets; a number
of activists in the Leyland Motor and the Iran-Transformer plants fell in
th i s category. And thirdly, there were the secular activists with trade
unionis t tendencies, such as the s t r ike leaders of the Zagross factory in
Teheran. Thus, whatever forms of struggle were waged, and whatever
forms of consciousness were developed, almost all originated on the
factory floors. Outside influences were felt in the later stages of the
revolutionary process: the ac t iv i t ies among the working class of left-wing
groups, students and, later, the mullas, became widespread only during
the Bakht iar government, when the condition for open political agitation
were realized.
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Independent Actions
Unt i l the uprising most workplaces were shut down and there was no
opportunity to observe the abil i ty or otherwise of the workers to run the
production process. It would have to be tested afterwards. Yet the oil and
railway workers who were recommended to resume work by the Commit-
tee for Coordination and Investigation of Strikes (CCIS), Khomeini's
special committee to investigate the strikes, demonstrated that ability
despite the expulsion, in the oil industry, of some eight hundred foreign
experts (Nore and Turner, 1980, p. 280).
The political involvement of the workers within a few months of the
revolutionary upsurge, their engagement in discussions, plannings,
organization and confrontations with the army pushed the most back-
ward sections of the working class into the struggle. They advanced the
internal struggles within workplaces not simply for immediate ends but to
alter the exist ing political order. The working class gained a political
consciousness and a sense of anti-imperialism. It was not, however, a
socialist consciousness in the sense of struggle against a bourgeois state
per se, with the prospects, however vague they may be, of an alternative
socio-economic order. While the workers indeed controlled all revolu-
tionary activities within the workplaces, they did not and could not exert
their leadership upon the mass movement as a whole. This leadership was
with someone else: Khomeini and the clergy associated with him. The
revolutionary bourgeoisie could move only under the shadow of the
latter.
Despite its inabil i ty to exert a hegemony over the whole mass
movement, the working class in its fight against the Shah's regime was
independent, that is, its decisions on how to advance its struggle were not
led or controlled by any external force. Where the imposition of order by
an external authority occurred, conflicts and tensions were inevitable.
The Railway Strike Committee refused a number of times to resume
work and carry fuel for the 'consumption of the people' as the CCIS,
Khomeini's representatives, requested. The workers had already rebuffed
the same request made by the Shah's regime, arguing that it was 'a plot to
use the trains for transporting military goods and equipments' (Kayhan, 8
and 10 January 1979). They agreed to the request coming from the
Committee only when the authenticity of the request had been demon-
strated. In another development the Customs workers declared that they
would be prepared to release only vital goods: food, medicines, medical-
stuffs, papers, typewriters, heaters, and so on. They also made it clear
t h a t they would refuse to release the goods belonging to embassies of the
USA, Britain and Israel. Meanwhile the workers rebuffed the Ayatollah
Shariatmadari 's request to permit the import of food on the grounds that
the state would misuse the opportunity to import armaments under the
guise of food. The Oil Strike Committee accepted the request of the CCIS
to resume production for domestic consumption only after long debate,
negotiations and assurances.
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The Strike Committee of the oil industry possessed a high degree of
independence and authority, and seemed to Khomeini and his allies a
parallel organ of power. Differences of interests and conflicts came to the
surface before the insurrection and before the Shah had departed. The
confrontation culminated when, some three weeks before the insurrec-
tion, the leader of the oil strikers resigned as a gesture of protest against
'the dogmatic reactionary clergy', and against 'the new form of repression
under the guise of religion'. His immediate concern, according to his
open letter 'to the masses of Iran', related to the 'existing repression . . .
and arbitrary interferences by the Especial Envoy (of Khomeini) in the
duties and responsibilities of the Committee of the Strikers' representa-
tives'.5 Bitter confrontations occurred immediately after the insurrection
when the strike leaders were arrested by the new regime, and charged as
counter-revolutionaries.
The Weaknesses
The fact that the oil strikers' leader protested in such a manner should be
viewed as an indication of his awareness of t he nature of the ancien régime
as well as the prospects for the revolutionary one. However, the very fact
that he did resign exemplified the general handicap of the whole working-
class movement.
The Lack of a Co-ordinating Organ
In Russia, in 1917, wi th in only three days of the rebellion of working-class
women on 23 February, the Soviet of Petrograd was formed and became
the organ of a later revolutionary upsurge unti l October. In October the
Central Council of Factory Committees was founded. This Committee
had the task of co-ordinating all the factory committees which sprang up
immediately after the abdication of the Tsar.
In Iran, although the de facto strike committees mushroomed within
the workplaces after the Shah's departure, no effective initiatives were
taken by the workers to unify and co-ordinate the committees; no central
strike fund was established. Two days after the Shah's departure, in
January, Ayatollah Taleghani, a liberal, popular clergyman, and not the
workers, instructed that each industry, group and organi/ation should set
up a strong central organ for organizational purposes; so that 'each
organization should have only one single central nucleus to carry out the
task of decision-making'; and that 'a unified nucleus and organization
must be set up to encompass [industrial and commercial] trades, workers
and administrative organizations' (Ayandegan, 17 January 1979).
Despite these initiatives, no further practical steps were taken to
co-ordinate strike committees by industry or trade. This failure by the
working class needs explanation.
The factory system in Iran, because of the geographical dispersion
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and administrative independence of each unit , would, in practice, make it
difficult to unite all the strike committees. A close consideration of the
strike movement shows a correlation between successful and militant
committees and the high concentration of the workforce in a single
industrial uni t . To organize 70,(XK) oil-workers is much easier than organ-
izing 20,000 workers in 200 factories, say, in Teheran alone. Organization
and co-ordination of strikes in oil, steel, railway and telecommunications
were more coherent, and the demands of the workforce more radical.
For, in addition to their strategic position in the economy, and relatively
high concentration of labour in these sectors, the organization and com-
position of the labour process objectively contributed to the unity of the
workers.
There is no evidence to demonstrate any organized labour struggle,
in the form of strike committees, in small-scale workshops. While the
employees did take part in the struggle, they did it not as a unified class
force, but as an oppressed mass. The reason for that must be sought in,
i) the particular form of the organization of production and limited
concentration of labour; ii) the direct control on the part of the employer,
iii) the paternalistic relationship between labour and capital, and iv) the
administrative independence of each of these small units.6
The existence of workers' unions could act as a positive force to
widen workers' interests beyond the limited sphere of factory to that of
industry or trade. Moreover, workers' unions would have acted as organ-
izations to co-ordinate the dispersed strike committees. Iranian workers,
however, lacked any trade or industrial unions. The most important
limitation, however, was the absence of an effective political force
committed to organizing the working class for the strategic objective of
socialist construction.
No regional, nor, of course, national co-ordination committee was
formed. This vacuum encouraged the alternative power bloc, the
Khomeini group, to take the initiative. Their immediate move was the
creation on 20 January of the CCIS composed of three religious liberals:
Bazargan, Y Sahabi, Moinfar, and two clergymen: Bahonar and
Rafsanjani. The main tasks of the Committee were declared tobe to 'call
off those strikes which jeopardize the work of the main industries in-
volved in the production of people's urgent needs, and those threatening
the country's survival'. The CCIS succeeded, by 30 January, some three
weeks before the insurrection, in persuading 118 production units, and a
few public services, to resume work. The operation of these industries
and services was argued by the CCIS to be essential for the success of the
revolution. We are unaware of the reaction of the workers in these units
to the request of the CCIS; yet, we know that the tendency of the workers
in such critical sectors as oil, railways and telecommunications was to
maintain their control over their own movement.
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The Rudiments of Soviets?
The absence of a unified co-ordinating body in the labour movement
made any prospect of forming an independent workers' council or soviet
doubtful. Such proletarian organizations would have connected the
dynamism of the struggle at the workplace to the day-to-day require-
ments and demands of the mass movement outside the points of produc-
tion. The revolutionary crisis had furnished the material basis for such
organizations; and their organizational and functional forms were present
in embryo. Strike committees and experts of the Isfahan steel-mill
negotiated with the railway-workers, requesting the latter to carry the
coal they required from Kirman, to keep the plant boilers warm. A
similar agreement was reached between the oil-workers and the railway-
workers to carry the fuel necessary for domestic consumption when all
other production was at a standstill. These kinds of proletarian co-
operation were a rather rudimentary form of working-class social
administration.
On the other hand, during the later weeks, popular organs in the
form of district and city councils started blossoming. In December and
February people took control of a number of cities and towns, in particular
in the northern Azeri and Caspian Sea provinces, including Zanjan,
Orumieh, Salmas, Ardabil, Maragheh and Ajabsheer. In a number of
northern areas people formed shurus (councils) in order to administer
their day-to-day affairs. In the towns of Sari and Amol a solidarity council
was formed. It was composed of representatives of 27 industrial groups
and trades, including teachers, traders and state employees (Ayandeghan,
16 January 1979). Within cities such as Teheran, various forms of neigh-
bourhood councils were spontaneously set up, and aimed to fulf i l the
basic needs of the people, including the 'supply of foodstuffs and con-
sumable goods; the just distr ibution of fuel and petrol; the administration
of law and order; refuse collection, public hygiene and the like.' The
councils were also committed to cultural and political activities: the
identification and expression of sympathy with the families of revolutionary
victims; production, duplication and distribution of political leaflets and
tracts; dispute settlement between the people of the locality; the co-
ordination of demonstrations and other forms of political struggle (Kayhan,
10 January 1979).
However, there is no evidence to suggest an organizational link
between the working classes and the neighbourhood popular shuras.
Perhaps the more notable of the popular organizations were the political
organs within the armed forces; in the Air Force one took shape under the
name of Shuray-e Homafaran (Council of Air Force Servicemen). How-
ever, any organizational l ink between the latter and the district or strike
committees was almost non-existent. In this situation the emergence of a
mass organization of alternative power could hardly be expected. Yet a
peculiar form of workers' organization did emerge after the insurrection.
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These organizations, factory shuras, persisted and fought a difficult battle
for survival, as we shall see in the next chapter.
Notes
1. The existing literature suffers from misunderstanding and inadequate
sources. See, for instance, Abrahamian in Bonine and Keddie, 1981 and Zabih,
1982. A detailed, though short, account of the oil-workers' strike by Terisa
Turner, based on an interview with one of the strike leaders, is an exception; see
Turner in Nore and Turner, 1980.
2. Kayhan newspaper reported on 6 January 1979 that
the shortage of fuel (resulting from strike in oil industry) has made the Ministry of
Agriculture idle. The Municipality is already closed as the refuse collectors are unable to
move. All the offices of the Department of Registration have been closed down, owing
to the lack of fuel and petrol.
3. For the development of revisionism and reformism in the European labour
movement, see Richards, 1979.
4. An account by an oil-worker in Nore and Turner, 1980, p. 300.
5. At the end of his statement he warned, 'Those who think that we have
reached the end of the road, and that victory is at hand, have not "recognized the
nature of American Imperialism"; they do not know the great strategic and
economic interests of Imperialism in Iran; and that the enemy has just been
wounded but not eliminated. Imperialism still controls the whole axes of power,
the axes which require just a little amendment to be functional again' (the
statement of M J Khatami, published by Ayandegan, 2 February 1979).
6. It is interesting to note that in Petrograd in 1917 about 68% of total
enterprises had more than 1,000 workers each (Smith, 1980, p. 16).
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The protest of the intelligentsia surfaces in the
form of open letters to the Court.
The protest of shanty-town dwellers against
slum clearance; 50,(XX) demonstrate.
Violent confrontation between theology
students and police in holy city of Qum. It was
over a slanderous article about Khomeini who
was in exile in Iraq.
Mass demonstration and riot in Tabriz, the
capital of Azerbaijan.
Spread of mass demonstrations in other urban
areas.
The first wave of industrial strikes.
Labour Law was revised: payment of un-
employment benefits; extension of annual
holidays by 3 days; early retirement with full
payment.
Mass demonstrations continue in Teheran.
Martial Law is declared in Teheran and 11
other major cities
Black Friday: hundreds of protestors are killed
in Teheran.
Strike at Teheran Oil refinery.
Publication of a Labour Disciplinary Act.
Spread of strikes to other oil refineries and
factories.
Shah appoints a military government; General
Azhari's cabinet is formed.
Millions of people demonstrate against the
Shah's regime. Soldiers in many areas join the
marches.
The cabinet of General Azhari collapses as
Bakhtiar agrees to form a new civilian govern-
ment. This is followed by a general strike which
brings the whole economy to a halt.
Shah leaves the country; the Iran Workers'
Organization affiliated to the Rastäkhiz Party
is abolished.
Formation of the Committee for Co-ordination
and Investigation of Strikes; members include
Bazargan, Y. Sahabi, A. Moinfar, J. Bahonar
and Rafsanjani.
Bazargan calls upon the workers of the oil
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industry, the customs and ports to step up
production and services.
30 January 1979: On the recommendation of the Committee, 118
production units start work.
I February 1979: Khomeini returns to Iran from Paris.
5 February 1979: Khomeini appoints Bazargan as Prime Minis-
ter of his provisional government.
9 February 1979: The Javidan Guard (Imperial Guard) attacks
the barracks of the mutinous airforce techni-
cians in Teheran.
10—11 February 1979: Two days of insurrection.
I I February 1979: The Shah's regime is overthrown; Bakhtiar
escapes; jubilant armed youths take over
control of the streets. The victory of the Islamic
Revolution is declared.





The shuras, or factory committees (or councils) were a particular form of
workers' organization that emerged in Iranian industry following the
overthrow of the Shah's dictatorship in 1979. They were shop-floor
organizations whose elected executive committee represented all the
employees of a factory (blue- and white-collar) and/or an industrial
group, irrespective of their trade, skill or sex. Their major concern was to
achieve workers' control.
The shura's concern for offensive control was what differentiated
the shuras from a shop-steward movement. But the shuras also differed
from syndicalism, which fought a political battle to change the social
structure through industrial activities. The shuras lacked a clear political
objective. Unl ike the factory committees of the Russian Revolution of
1917, the shuras were not influenced by the outside left political ten-
dencies and did not act as a vehicle for social change. They restricted
themselves to demanding workers' control and the transformation of
power relations in the industrial arena.
Four Periods of Struggle
The dynamics of political development after the Revolution were rapid,
unexpected, complex and contradictory. In this study we shall divide the
post-revolutionary workers' struggle into four periods. Each period is
characterized by different positions of, and relationships between, labour,
capital and the state.
The First Period
This covers the period between the February 1979 insurrection and the
first wave of political pressurization in August 1979; it was characterized
by control from below. The significance of these few months lies in a) the
continuation of the revolutionary struggle by the working class after the
revolution, waging a struggle independent from, and at times directly
against, the leaders of the revolution; b) the crisis of legitimacy of capital-
ist relations; c) the instabil i ty of the new state; and thus, d) the creation
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of an objective situation for workers'control, through the organization of
the shuni\
In the months leading up to the insurrection workers had shut down
almost all industrial establishments. While these two to three months of
strikes had had a tremendous political effect on the workers, they still did
not have any experience of self-organization at work. After the flight of
the owners and senior managers, there was a power vacuum in most of the
factories. On the other hand, the workers developed a strong sense of
possession of the factory, and hence a feeling of commitment to and
responsibility for it as part of the people's wealth. During this period,
workers managed and ran the factories themselves. The Bazargan gov-
ernment expressed early and direct opposition to the shuras, claiming
that the triumph of the revolution had eliminated their tasks. Towards the
end of this period Bazargan reintroduced the one-man management
system with liberal professional managers.
This period ends with the first wave of extensive repression in
August 1979, coming mainly from the ruling clergy: left-wing organiza-
tions were attacked and their headquarters ransacked; the government
banned progressive newspapers, monopolized the official media, and
launched extensive military attacks on Kurdistan. These events were
followed by increasing attacks on the labour movement and the purging
of antagonistic shuras and individual workers.
The Second Period
September 1979 to June-July 1981 was marked in labour relations by a) a
systematic return of management from above; b) the consequent gradual
demise of the shuras as effective organs of workers' control; and c) a
necessary shift from offensive to defensive struggle.
The Bazargan government appointed liberal managers to pursue
further the strategy of one-man management. This was strongly opposed
by the workers. Immediately after the hostage crisis erupted, the struggle
in the factories escalated. These struggles, together with the post-Bazargan
government's (Rajaii 's cabinet) intention to implement an Islamic
corporatism, led to the ratification of the constitution of the Islamic
shuras. Meanwhile, the inter-state conflicts between the liberals and
pro-Khomeini clergy increased. Thus this period saw the gradual estab-
lishment of the Islamic Association (IA) (Anjaman-i Eslami) in the
factories under the ruling clergy organized in the Islamic Republican
Party (IRP). The Associations were the vehicle for the consolidation of
the clergy's power in the workplaces in opposition to both liberal managers
and the independent shuras. Towards the end of this period, the maktabi
(the Islamic) management, as a part of the same strategy to consolidate
the power of the clergy, gradually replaced the liberal management as the
conflicts between different wings of the government intensified (Bayat,
1983). Liberal managements were losing ground in the workplaces, and
hence an alternative management based on force and ideology (religion)
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gradually became dominant. The Islamic Management, with the co-
operation of strengthened lAs, started a harsh campaign against the in-
dependent shuras. At a political level, the conflict was between the Islamic
fundamentalists and President Bani' Sadr and the liberals and was around
the issue of maktabism (emphasis on ideological values) versus specialism.
The liquidation of the independent shuras was stepped up after the
second wave of suppression during the closure of the universities. Among
the shuras closed were those of the Tool-making Factory, Lift-Track,
Pompiran and Kompidro in Tabriz; the Union of Workers' Shuras:of Gilan
(with 3(K),(KK) workers); the Union of Workers' Shuras of Western Teheran;
those of the oil industry in Ahwaz and the railway-workers. Khane-i Kargar
(Labour House), previously a free headquarters for workers' assemblies,
became the centre of pro-IRP shuras and Islamic Associations.
The Third Period
This lasted from the June Days of 1981, following the dismissal of President
Bani' Sadr and the mass execution of the opposition forces until mid-
1982. The clergy, those followers of the political form of valayat-t faghih
organized in the IRP, now gained total state power and campaigned
against all the opposition, from the liberals to the far left. The period was
characterized by a) the domination of both the maktabi management and
the Islamic Associations as the real power-holders in the factories;
b) militarization of the factories and attacks on the real and formal wages
of the workers; and c) an official ban on the formation of even the
pro-government shuras for the time being.
The Fourth Period
This coincided with the emergence of the rift between the two major
factions of the ruling clergy known as Imam's line — the followers of
Khomeini's project of Valayat-ifaghih (Islamic rule); and Hojjatieh, more
fundamentalist and non-pragmatic elements. In the sphere of industrial
relations it is characterized by the mounting conflict between the manage-
ments (including the Islamic ones) and the powerful Islamic Associations.
From the viewpoint of the far-sighted and rational elements of IRP, the
historical mission of the lAs to undermine both the liberal managements
and the independent shuras, had been completed. They (the lAs) were
then encouraged to limit their activities to only cultural and social issues —
to retreat from their position of power in the workplaces, and from interfer-
ing in management authority — a matter that I As could hardly accept.1
A Brief Outline of the Workers' Struggles After the Revolution
The Period of Control from Below
Immediately after Khomeini's order to return to work on 15 February
1979, and despite his threats, anew wave of workers'struggles sprang up.
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This industrial unrest was fuelled by the radical transformation in the
workers' consciousness that had occurred in the course of the Revolution,
and the particular situation after the insurrection.
In the very first month after the Provisional Government (PG)came
to power in February, at least some 50,000 workers went on strikes,
demonstrations, sit-ins, or launched other forms of struggle. In the five
months following, it was the same story. The workers' demands could be
divided into two broad categories of economic and radical demands. The
economic demands were mainly for the payment of delayed wages and
against lock-outs and lay-offs. Capital tended to move from the pro-
ductive into the trade sector, where it could be secure from the danger of
wild confiscation, and the 'interferences of irresponsible officials'. Most
of the bankrupted and locked-out units were owned by private capital.
The Provisional Government provided some Rls 85 billion credit for
industry in 1979 in an attempt to salvage it from the crisis. Private capital
used only Rls 25 billion. Against such a background, the PG was forced to
nationalize and to supervise at least some 483 production units. The same
objective economic conditions which forced the workers to defend their
already existing rights and advantages were the basis for an offensive
battle. The workers questioned the fundamental rights of capital, which
was in disarray.
In the economic battle, direct and indirect demands for a pay-rise
were the major issue. Together they formed over 40% of the total
economic demands (see Table 7.1). The wage battles were despite a
wage-increase, during the revolutionary process, of 25%. According to
j official figures, the index of the per capita wage and benefits in 1979
I showed a 53% rise in comparison with the same period in the previous
'year (Bank Markazi, 1979). The minimum wage-level grew from Rls 215
per day for unskilled labourers to Rls 567 in that year. The wage battle did
not stop; the rising rate of inflation undermined real wages. The struggle
culminated in April when the workers demanded the year-end bonus.
Lack of workers' unions led to a considerable variation in pay-rises
as each unit struggled individually. The industries which had a relatively
large workforce, such as the oil industry and the factory-workers of the
province of Gilan (in the Caspian Sea area) who for some time were
organized under the co-ordination of the Factory Shuras of the Gilan
Province, were exceptions. Differentials in pay continued after the
revolution: between the manual workers of a single factory, between the
manual and the intellectual workforce, and between different factories m
the same industry.
The fight against wage differentiation was one of the major struggles
in which the shuras in this period were engaged. In the absence of a union
of factory shuras, it was hard to fight for and succeed in harrowing the
inter-factory wage variations. The gap provided one material ground for
the division of the working class (see, for instance, the pay differential in
two factories of Fanoos and Metal Works, Table 3.6).
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Table 7. l
The Trend of Demand-Making, February 1979 to February 1980
Economic Demands
1 Delayed wages
2 Against lock-outs, lay-offs, return to work
3 Formation of genuine unions
4 Pay-rise, overtime bonus, against wage-cuts
5 Implementation of profit sharing scheme
6 Repayment of taxes and fines
7 Permanent employment
8 Eight-hour day




1 Dissolution of Hefâzat, Especial Force, expulsion of
counter-revolutionaries, trial of SA VAK agents
and capitalists







































































































































3 Persecution, expulsion of managers, foremen, bosses
appointed before or after
Revn. ; appointment of new management
4 Control over production or distribution; management
of the units; right to intervene in all affairs of units
5 Control over contracts; over distribution of
Especial Benefit
6 Control over hire and fire
7 Nationalization or confiscation of capital
8 Against censorship, mistreatment, discrimination
& sacking militant workers
9 Against conciliationist shuras
10 Right to assemble & strike
1 1 New labour law
12 Forty-hour week
Total Radical Demands
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"Including housing allowances, child benefits, consuming co-operatives, job classification, other bonuses, extra holidays, etc.
1. February-March 1979 5. June-July 1979 9. October-November 1979
2. March-April 1979 6. July-August 1979 10. November-December 1979
3. April-May 1979 7. August-September 1979 11. December 1979-January 1980
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The Emergence of the Shuras
Serious attempts were made to narrow the gap in pay for manual
and intellectual work through, on the one hand, increasing the formal
wages of the low-paid by the shuras and, on the other hand, decreasing
the income of highly-paid employees in both the shuras and by the
government. Despite these efforts, highly-skilled experts still enjoyed
relatively high salaries (see Table 7.2).
Narrowing the pay gap between manual and intellectual labour
provides a material basis for immediate solidarity between the two as
against the employers (be they private or state). This tendency could be
unequivocally observed in such plants as Metal Works and Fanoos plants.
In the PR Plant the gap remained, as did the political rift, between the
two strata.
Table 7.2 indicates the extent of wage parity between the manual
labourers and white-collar workers. Although equal pay can be the
source of an immediate feeling of common identity, cultural and ideo-
logical divisions do not necessarily wither away. I would suggest that the
shuras could and did play a significant role as a medium of strategic
solidarity and identity.
Period of Management from Above
The general radical labour struggle ceased in the subsequent periods.
This general downturn was manifested in various ways.
Quantitatively, there was a decline in industrial incidents. More
specifically, labour unrest dropped from 287 incidents within the first five
months following the insurrection to 58 during the subsequent seven
months (see notes on Table 7.1). The downturn continued in the third
period at a rather higher rate. The number of industrial incidents (strikes,
sit-ins) fell from 366 in 1979-80 to 180 in 1980-81, and to 89 during 1981-2
(see Table 7.3). Three reasons were behind this trend. Firstly, some of
the demands concerning wage-increases, return to work and the expulsion
of elements of the previous regime had been fulfilled. Secondly, as soon
as the new state consolidated itself, a national campaign of intimidation
and harassment began after the invasion of Kurdistan. This policy forced
labour into a defensive and cautious position. And thirdly, with the
gradual re-implementation of the government strategy of management
from above, the contradictions of workers' control began to appear.
The overall crisis transformed offensive struggles and demands into
defensive ones, and the radical demands turned to immediate economic
ones — mostly in response to the regime's new offensives against labour.
Whereas previously the shura had been in control of the workplace, it
now had to be under the control of a management supported by the
Revolutionary Council. Simply speaking, the struggles in the second
period for Special Profit, for instance, meant that the shura was no longer
in control of the financial office, calculating the profit and allocating it
among the rank and file. All this, however, does not imply a total collapse
of the labour movement. Despite the decline in labour militancy, the
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defensive struggles continued in response to the accelerating rate of
repressive measures which the state adopted against labour which cul-
minated in the inception of war with Iraq and following the June Days of
1981.
Table 7.3



















































* Including various forms of strikes, sit-ins and occupations of the plants (see Table
10.2).
Sources: Labour reports in various issues of Kar, Paykar, Dawlat va l.n^lu'lab and
Rah-i Kargar Nos. 8 and 14, 1984, 1985.
At least three major waves of workers' struggle have to be men-
tioned in these two periods. The first was at the time of the Embassy
seizure, when the workers, capitalizing on the anti-imperialist rhetoric of
the state, launched a new offensive against state managers, demanding
more authority over workplace affairs and expropriation of joint-venture
enterprises. The second wave spread in the winter of 1980-81 as a
widespread reaction against the state's policy of abolishing the profit-
sharing scheme. The policy went ahead in spite of resistance. And the
third wave surfaced again as a defensive response to further state offen-
sives to cut back the significant perks of the car-industry workers. Here
too resistance was useless. But militancy continued in various covert
forms which forced industry into a crisis of productivity in 1982 and 1983.
The details of these battles and their impact on the industrial crisis are
presented in Chapter 10.
Active workers' struggles revived once more in 1984-85 when 200
industrial incidents were reported to have occurred over pay-rises, de-
layed wages, overtime pay and benefits. Of these incidents 90 were illegal
strikes, and in 65% of all cases workers won their cases. Involved in major
strikes were Shahrood Coal Mines, Haft Tappeh Sugar Plantation,
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Tobacco Industry, and the Canada Dry plant; but the most important
strike was that of 27,()(X) construction workers of the Esfahan steel mill
who were out for 15 days. On 10 December 1984 the strikers forced the
government to retreat from its plan to lay-off or replace the construction
workers (Rah-i Kurgar, 1985).
The Emergence of the Shuras
The factory committees were organizational forms of working-class re-
action to the inabil i ty of capitalism to fulfil the workers' demands at a
t ime of crisis. In a revolutionary situation, where there is an absence of
normal control on the part of the state, the labour-capital relationship
becomes highly tense: the accumulation rate of capital is undermined and
its control becomes shaky, while labour, in terms of ideology and mili-
tancy, becomes unprecedentedly radical.
Three days after the insurrection of 14 February 1979, Khomeini
ordered all workers to return to work. For him and for the engineers of
the new society, the historical task of strikes had been ended; a return to
work was crucial to consolidate the new order. The resistance of the
oil-workers would force Khomeini to resort to threats.
Any disobedience from, and sabotage of the implementation of the plans of
the Provisional Government would he regarded as opposition against the
genuine Islamic Revolution. The provocateurs and agents will be intro-
duced to people as counter-revolutionary elements, so that the nation itself
will decide about them, as they did about the counter-revolutionary regime
of the Shah (Ettelâât, 15 March 1979).
Any attempt to reproduce the old order could lead only to the
escalation of a new crisis. The workers did return to work: the CCIS
succeeded in convincing strikers in at least 118 production units to resume
operations. On their return, however, the workers faced three problems.
Firstly, construction or contract works and the like had already been
paralysed during the escalation of the strike movement. The owners had
made losses, given up the business and fled the country. The capitalists
had not left behind anything worth appropriation by the workers. The
workers in these sectors formed a considerable proportion of the post-
revolutionary unemployed. The second type was a group of industries
whose owners and managers, after taking large loans from the banks, had
fled the country. For the workers that meant re-operating, running and
controlling the plants. But for the Provisional Government it meant the
burden of nationalizing such industries, along with the bankrupted banks
and insurance companies. At least 483 production units were nationalized
under the umbrella of the state-controlled Organization of Nationalized
Industries of Iran (ONII ) (Bank Markazi Iran, 1981). The third group of
problems were in basically small-scale profitable and private industries of
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indigenous capital whose owners remained in the country, declaring their
support for the Revolution.2 Some of these industries became the battle-
ground for capital-labour confrontations when the workers returned. As
we shall see, the shuras emerged in both groups of industries — those with
and without owners or top managers. Many accounts see the shuras as a
means of f i l l i ng the vacuum in the absence of management, or of saving
jobs. What is missing in this approach is consideration of two essential
issues: the inabi l i ty of capitalist rationale to meet quite normal demands
of the labourers in a revolutionary situation; and the ideological trans-
formation among the workers.
To illustrate the first issue, it is interesting to note that in some units
workers' control was demanded and later implemented primarily through
a demand for the payment of delayed wages. (Though we should admit
that, in such cases, workers' control was initially adopted as a solution to
an immediate problem, not as control for itself.) For the workers who
returned to work after months of stoppage, the most immediate necessity
would have been the payment of wages for those months. The manager
would argue, 'You have not produced anything during the strike period,
what should I pay you for?' The worker would respond, 'That is true; we
did not produce; we didn't, precisely because we wanted to overthrow the
regime. We have been subsisting on loans; we went under the risk of
arrest and even death; is this the reward?' Direct action became the only
solution. The workers were forced to transcend the established boundaries
and move into the hitherto undisputed domain of capitalist control:
opening financial books, blockading products, controlling financial depart-
ments, taking owners or managers as hostages and occupying and running
the factories.
In the first phase of the post-revolutionary labour movement, the
phase of control from below, these were the basic forms of direct action.
Resort to the forced re-opening of and occupying of plants, the taking of
hostages and such actions would not occur in normal circumstances. In
the third group of industries (those operating with their owners), the
shuras emerged not, of course, because of the absence of an organ of
management, but because of its very presence. Hence, the direct role of
ideological mediation, the primary organizational form of which emerged
as the Inqu i ry Committees of the factories.
Ideology
The very idea of the shuras came from the direct and immediate experi-
ence of the workers themselves. The working class is able, through its
direct action and experience, to advance its struggle and question the
fundamental principles of capitalist domination and legality. It is able to
encroach in practice on areas of control which normally are considered to
be the undisputed territory of capital. However, experience is one thing
and conceptual understanding another. The role of the activists is to
generali/e from experience and demonstrate fur ther possible steps.
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In the Iranian case, we cannot deny the role, however limited,
played by the left-wing organizations, in terms of agitation for, and direct
involvement in, the formation of the shuras. However, we must assert
that almost no political organization had any clear understanding of the
.S / / / /AV/S ' significance, degree of control or functions. The chaotic demo-
cracy gained allowed revolutionaries and students to enter the factories,
especially those located in Teheran. But we should not overestimate their
role.
The working class lacked any historical traditional experience of
such organizations as.v/iwra.y. In Russia, before February 1917, the factory-
workers had two distinct historical experiences of organization: the first
was the experience of the Factory Committees and the Soviets of the 1905
revolution (Trotsky, 1973); and the second, as the historians would
emphasize, was thestarosty, the tradition of representation in the Russian
villages from which most of the factory-workers in 1917 originated (Smith,
1980, pp. 141-2; Goodey, 1974).3 Such experience was missing from the
history of the Iranian workers. The experience of 'council societies'
(anjomanhay-e shuraii), which emerged in some northern cities and among
the urban people during the Constitutional Revolution in 1905-1907,
were too far away to be remembered by the present generation of
industrial labour.
After the insurrection of 1979, a sense of hatred for the past
developed; the workers had defeated the past, so they tended to express
their dislike for whatever belonged to it: they were feeling that now was
the time to rebuild their society, their country, their factory according to
their own ideas.
Nowadays you don't need to tell a worker to go and work. He works
himself; why? The reason why he didn't work [under the Shah] was because
he was under the boss's thumb. He couldn't speak out. Now, he'll say, "the
work is my own, I ' l l work" (Melli Shoe workers, in Ghotbi, 1980).
After the revolution, the workers noticed that the country belonged to
them, and so they should work harder (Metal Works worker, 1981).
The second important idea which developed rapidly was a sense of
possession with regard to their own work. The landed peasantry would
not and did not attain such a form of consciousness, for they already had
control over their production process. For the workers in the morning of
the Revolution, the country was owned by them. Hence the development
of a strong sense of responsibility and care, commitment, sincerity and
sacrifice. The following is an example of how such a sense was expressed
in the words of an angry worker in the Pars Metal factory in Teheran.
We have formed and appointed this shura with overall responsibility for the
factory, for the investigation of work and problems. We formed this shura
for the sake of our revolution . . . but we see that the Board of Directors
which we have here by no means agrees with our shura. That is, they say we
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can't go along with this shura . . . This factory is weak-willed. Since
the revolution, we have done everything we can to keep the factory on
its feet. But we have failed. Look, now what are the tasks of an
engineer? An engineer must stay at the factory and work. Why has
this engineer gone to stay at the boss's office? Who will pay for it? Isn't
he going to ask for a salary? Isn't he going to get henefits? Our factory
is a parent factory . . . This factory can stand on its feet. We produce
so much! They [the management] say: "We have to take a loan from
the government!" Where does our product go then? Where do the
sales of this factory go, that they have to get credit from the govern-
ment? What they get from the government belongs to this country's
wealth, /am, here, under this burden, and then they go and get a loan
from the government? This wealth belongs to the whole people, to
everyone. Why should / benefit, although / am working. And then,
where does the result of my labour go?4
Two examples will illustrate the process of shura formation. The
workers' shuras of the Pars Metal factory emerged primarily not asshurax
with a definite form, but as organs of discontent founded on the ambiguous
ideology of possession and anti-authoritarianism. In the course of a
struggle which passed through the stage of the formation of an Inquiry
Committee to arbitrate on the misconduct of management and organs of
the secret police, the workers conceptually articulated their activities in a
shura constitution.
The struggle at the Eirfo factory was initially for the following
demands:
1. wage payment without delay;
2. payment of year-end bonus of the profit-sharing scheme;
3. payment of child benefit;
4. permanent employment of the casual workers for a fair wage;
5. appointment of a manager independent from the shareholders;
6. supply of raw material; and
7. dissolution of the conciliationist shura, and the formation of a
genuine one.
The workers pressed for the demands. In response the employer
attempted to dismantle the de facto shura. In the course of confrontation,
which led to hostage-taking by the workers of a few managers, and to the
intervention of Pasdaran (the Islamic Revolutionary Guards), the
demands were reformulated:
1. payment of the year-end bonus by the end of the month;
2. supply of raw material in ten days;
3. the director to work in the plant eight hours a day for at least one
year;
4. the director to be accountable to the shura in financial and
accountancy affairs;
5. the director to function under nezarut (supervision) of the shura;
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6. the signature of the shura to he on documents of the sale of
products.
The workers achieved their demands. In the five months following
the Revolution, the workers in at least thirty factories followed a similar
course.
The forms the shuras took varied according to the level of workers'
consciousness, the ownership and management of the enterprise (absence
or presence of the actual owner); and the degree of the opposition of the
owner or director. The firms with an absent owner/director (who had fled
the country or who was in hiding) formed the earliest and the most
successful shuras. In the firms with owner/directors present, the shuras
tended to be set up later, assuming a loose structure and rather legalist
trade unionist attitudes.
The Legal Status of the Shuras
We shall consider two topics here: the law of the shuras prepared by the
Revolutionary Council, and its relation to the real world of the revolu-
tion. We shall then go on to deal with the detailed practices of the shuras.
The Law of the Shuras
The most comprehensive document on the shuras appeared in August
1980 when the Supreme Council of Labour, of the Ministry of Labour,
laid down the Resolutions of the Islamic Shuras. This followed the
Regulations for the formation of Islamic Shuras in June 1980.
The Resolutions covered four major areas. The first was procedures
for practical shura formation. This opened the way for control by the
Ministry of Labour over the whole process of building the shura, the
appointment of its constituent body (Heyat-i Nezaraf), preparing
(authorizing) the constitution and evaluating and recognizing (or other-
wise) the qualifications of the candidates. The second section dealt with
the units which were not enti t led to shura operation. The third section
authori/ed the mode of operation, tasks and responsibilities and the final
section dealt with the way in which the members of the constituent body
(Heyat-i Nezârat) were to be elected.
Compared with the Regulations released earlier by the Revolution-
ary Council, the Resolutions are more restrictive. The rights and respon-
sibilities of the shuras, according to the Resolutions, can be divided into
four categories.
a) Most of the Articles are concerned with co-operation with the
management (Article 1, section 3); settlement of disputes with good
fai th ; raising productivity; uti l izing personal initiatives; decreasing costs
(Articles h, d, j, b); co-operation with management in execution of plans
in due periods; assistance in resolving problems; 'co-operation in order to
decrease the economic and technical dependencies' (Article y).
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b) Trade union rights exist to protect the material and the spiritual
interests of all employees and collective bargaining; to supervise all
welfare affairs ( t ravel l ing costs, food, sport, co-operatives, loans, housing
and hygiene); to raise the technical knowledge of the employees and to
form educational classes in literacy, technology, Islamic ideology and
mil i ta ry techniques (Articles I, t , h).
c) There should be consultation to evaluate and suggest useful
proposals concerning planning; to consult with management over pro-
ducing the in ternal (disciplinary) regulations of the units , including those
on hiring and firing, leave of absence, absenteeism, illness and disciplinary
procedures (Article 30).
d) Article 22 of the Regulations points out that, in units with less
than two thousand employees, one member of the shura, and in those
with over two thousand, two members of the shura, may be appointed in
the management, provided that the members of the Board of Directors
number five or more. The two shura members could act either as the
members of the Board of Directors, or as the connecting members (ozve-i
râbit). In the latter case, their roles would be limited to consultation. The
whole Article obviously affected an extremely small number of the units
bearing in mind a further constraint: the LawoftbeSAuno subjects J/tura
formation in the large-scale state-controlled industries (oil, steel and
copper, etc.) to the ratification of the Cabinet (Article 14).
These are the main tenets of the Regulations. The Regulations were
not only a subject of struggle between the workers and the state, but
w i t h i n the state apparatus itself. Thus the hard-line Labour Minister,
Tavakkoli, temporarily suspended the total project of.shura formation in
February 19X1. In December 19X2 the new Islamic Labour Law was
introduced, which in practice made the whole notion of shura entirely
redundant. The whole Law was based upon the Quranic notion of rent
(idjareh = h i r ing) and individual bargaining (see Chapter 9). The Islamic
Labour Law was opposed and rejected both by workers and the populist
factions of the ruling clergy. Debate on preparing an alternative Labour
Law continued through 19X2-X5; and owing to the factional conflicts
wi th in the government, the final draft of a new Labour Law is yet to be
approved.
There are some formal similarities between the official Islamic
.shura and the strategy of co-determination. The Law intended to create
the same relationship between capital and labour as co-determination:
' the spir i t of co-operation and solidarity between the employees and the
management', and the 'regulation of class relations' (Schaur, 1973,
p. 224). Historically speaking, the official law of Is lamic shura.i reflected
an intense class struggle, as did the strategy of co-determination in
Germany, and Whitleyism in Britain during 1919-21 (Hyman in Goodrich,
1975) and all the strategies of control from above. The strategy is well
expressed by Perry Anderson.
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It is a rule in a capitalist society that any institution or reform created for or
by the working class can by that very token be converted into a weapon
against it — and it is a further rule that the dominant class exerts a constant
pressure towards this end . . . The working class is only concretely free
when it can fight against the system which exploits and oppresses it. It is only
in its collective insti tutions that it can do so: its unity is its strength, and
hence its freedom. But precisely this unity requires disciplined organization,
it becomes the natural objective of capitalism to appropriate it for the
stabilization of the system (Anderson in Nichols and Beynon, 1977,
pp. 345-6).
The Iranian experience differs from this in at least two respects; in
the historical l imitations of Iranian capitalism and the absence of a strong
trade union movement.
The Law of the Shurax and Balance of Forces
In reality the Law of the Shuras was recognized by neither management
nor workers. The extent and degree of workers' shuras depended solely
on the balance of forces between workers, management and the state.
The laws the government laid down specifically about the shuras were not
their only words on the matter. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic,
prepared in 1979, mentioned the formation of shuras 'composed of
representatives of workers, peasants, other employees, and the managers'
in the productive, industrial and agricultural units (Article 104). 'Deci-
sions taken by the shuras must not be against Islamic principles and the
country's laws' (Article 105).
The Provisional Government rightly realized the danger of recog-
nizing the shuras in any form. It did not hesitate to oppose them as
disruptive, and advocated instead the formation of workers' and em-
ployers' syndicates.5 It had already formed a special force (Nirouy-e
Vigheh) to dismantle the genuine shuras by politico-military means. It
was one-and-a-half years later, in June 1980, when the Revolutionary
Council, after the collapse of the Provisional Government in the US
Embassy seizure, recognized the formation of Islamic shuras composed
of all the employees of an enterprise, in order to create 'a spirit of
co-operation and solidarity between all of the employees and the man-
agement'. The law also encouraged shuras to raise the 'cu l tura l , political,
economic and occupational knowledge of the employees; to preside over
the affairs of the enterprise and the better conduct of work; and to put
forward constructive proposals, etc.
The source of legitimacy of the shuras was not, of course, the laws,
but the dynamics of class struggle and the balance of forces in society
which was reflected in the workplaces. Recognition of the law does not
only imply the regulation of relations between two or more parties, but
also regulation of the conditions of subordination of one party. A revolu-
tionary situation is the negation of such regulation; it brings a fluidity and
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anarchy and changes in the balance of forces; the law is no longer law.
Neither the state nor the industrialists nor the workers recognized and
practised the laws. The law became a point of issue in the ongoing class
struggle; it could not manage to damp it down. When labour had the
upper hand over management, it would go far beyond the legal and
conventional constraints; and where management had the ability to sup-
press the workers' resistance, then it would do whatever was possible to
prevent a representative shura forming, even if the shura wished to act
within the legal procedures. The Law of Shuras failed to co-opt and
integrate the working class into the system. The necessary social basis for
such integration was lacking. The ad hoc government's recognition of the
shuras only fuelled the offensive power of the labour side and led to a
further escalation of class struggle.6
The Shuras and the Frontier of Control
The degree, extent and scope of workers' control cannot be revealed by a
mere exposition of their forms. Any analysis must be located in the
context of an investigation of the balance of forces between capital and
labour. The balance of the latter is regulated by the position of a given
industry in the competitive market; the nature of the labour process; and
the stage of capitalist development in terms of development of organiza-
t ions of the labour process; the organization of the workforce and the
organization of employers (see Chapter 2).
We have some difficulties in our data. Table 7.4 indicates a spectrum
of radical demands in the five months after the Revolution, the period of
control from below. The table demonstrates only the forms of various
issues that the workers were most concerned with — those which were
still in the form of demands; and which might or might not be realized. In
the rest of the uni ts , the workers were either already practising such
rights, or alternatively did not see them as serious matters at all. The
latter was probably true of the small-scale workshops
In this section, we shall explain the actual experience of control
practices and the strong desire and ability of the workers to determine the"
production process for themselves. (Though we must point out that we
are acquainted with a rather small number of workplaces which exercised
a high degree of control). Whatever the numbers, the significance remains:
if ;t single factory can be run by workers' control, why not all?
The functions performed by the churns can be classified into five
major areas: 1) trade union struggles; 2) struggle against authoritarian
relations at workplaces; 3) control over conditions of employment;




Areas of Workers' Struggle in the First Five Months
A Radical Demands
1 Dissolution of Hefàzat. expulsion of counter-revolutionaries.
trial of SA VAK agents & capitalists
2 Struggle for formation or recognition of shuras
3 Persecution of managers, foremen, bosses appointed before
or after Revn ; appointment of new management
4 Control over production or distribution; management of the
units, right to intervene in all units' affairs
5 Control over contracts; over distribution of Special Benefit
6 Control over hiring & firing
7 Nationalization or confiscation of capitals
8 Against censorship, mistreatment, discrimination, sacking
of militant workers
9 Against conciliations! shuras
10 Right to assemble & strike
1 1 New Labour Law
12 Forty-hour week
B. Economic Demands





































































































Some important points must be made about the significance of the precision of the sources of all Tables compiled on the basis of labour reports from Left papers
a) Demands/actions in the Tables are only those registered and reported through the papers Hence the number of industnal events is probably underestimated
b) For a few weeks after the first extensive attacks on Left organizations (August 1979) Left papers stopped publishing When illegal publication resumed, the scale of the
labour reports in them declined
c) Table 7 4 omits practices such as sabotage, or go-slows ; these were the mam forms of struggle in the second and third periods but no official registration of 'industrial
disputes' took place at this time.
d) On the basis of the reports, any estimation of the numbers of workers involved/man-days lost is impossible
e ) The papers Kar and Pay kar had a rather vague and imprecise conception ofshura and syndicates The possibility of confusing the two and some degree of exaggeration
cannot be discounted
Workers and Revolution in Iran
Trade Union Struggle
The lack of any viable experience of independent trade union activities and
an entirely negative view of the workers towards factory-based syndicates
provided no reason for workers to organize themselves around the prin-
ciples of trade unionism per se. The shuras, a number of which were formed
as a channel for trade union-type demands, would inevitably act as direct,
democratically-elected representatives of the workers at the workplace
level, as opposed to the management. In this role the shura would negotiate
over such issues as pay-rises, bonuses, profit-sharing benefit, job security,
holidays, insurances, job classification and conditions of work.
Struggle Against Authoritarian Relations at Workplaces
If Iran remains like this, it will fall. Because there haven't been any purges
here. The manager is here still, still there are charlatans, knife fighters,
thieves, bullies. In short, they are all s t i l l around. Only the Muhammad
Reza [Shah] and a few people around him, like his brothers and sisters have
gone. The rest are still here. Why otherwise should we work in a temperature
of X(l degrees l ike this, and when the pay's due, we get fed up and tired out
with all the shouting etc (Ghothi, 1980, p. 7).
Authoritarian relations are a predominant characteristic of a factory
system based on the capitalist division of labour. In Iran, the despotic
attitudes of the traditional management was an additional dimension to
industr ial relations. Thus the Councils tended to struggle against these
relations by attempting to change them. The workers' General Assemblies
put on trial and sacked the elements responsible for maintaining such
relations: directors, foremen, SA VAK agents, etc.
In the Arj factory,
after the revolution, the management began to implement the same patterns
of exploitation and oppression. But our lads had become conscious enough
not to tolerate such a burden. As a result the lads threw the gentlemen out
with a sudden rush. They threw them out, locked the warehouses and
stopped delivering the products (my interview).
In the Yamaha Motor Cycle company in Ghazvin the shura initially
dismissed two production and administrative managers and later seven
others. The workers did not stop here. A number of them, with ihc.ihura
members, travelled to Teheran:
They went to central office, taking the director and major shareholder from
their desks and threw them out of the office. The workers stayed there for
three days to protect the available documents from access by the employers
of the office.
At the same time they asked the Revolutionary Council, Revolutionary
Tribunal and Minis t ry of Industry to investigate the cases and to recognize
the dismissal of the eleven managers.
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In some factories, the workers used the intelligence of the Depart-
ment of National Documents (DND) to identify those connected in any
way to the previous regime. In the Tehran Auto Company, 'we formed a
Committee of Inquiry including a shura member, despatching them to the
DND, to investigate the list of all employees. There was one SAVAK
agent' (my interview). The same kind of inquiry in the Iran Cars company
resulted in the identification of eleven agents. These forms of struggle did
not only arise because the subjects were authoritarian and oppressive
elements of the ancien régime, but because from the workers' viewpoint,
their very function and position were seen to be unacceptable. Emphasis
upon their pro-Shah character was conceived to be the best way of getting
rid of them.
On many occasions the government would reinstate those elements.
And in turn, the workers would continue their efforts to throw them out.
In the Akrosaz factory in Ahwas, the workers, through strike action,
forced the City of Ahwas' tribunal to sack two managers (in production
and administration) who were accused of having links with SAVAK and
of corruption. The tribunal had previously discharged them. Workers'
pressure led to a change in the verdict.
Lacking any organization and, above all, credibility, the industrialists
could not do much against such practices. The Provisional Government
had to act on their behalf. Towards the end of May the government
introduced the law of Special Force. This was to prevent the strike
committees and shuras from intervening 'in the affairs of the manage-
ment and of the appointments' (Appendix of Labour Law). The govern-
ment's concern rose when the workers did not only sack old managers but
also new ones whom the Revolutionary State had appointed. On the
other hand, over a year later the state reluctantly had to introduce its own
organization of Purifying Bodies (Heyat-i Paksazi). The law was intro-
duced by the second cabinet with a social background and view different
from those of Bazargan, that is, the Islamic government of M.A. Rajaii,
committed to Khomeini's project of setting up an Islamic society. The law
declared its objective to be 'the purification of production units from the
conspiracies of the agents of the West, the East and the overthrown
Pahlavi regime' (ibid.). The real aims, however, were twofold: a) in the
first place it wanted to prevent the self-initiated actions of the rank and
file workers and radical shuras, which were far more serious about purges
than the government; b) secondly, the government aimed to purge,
alongside the SAVAK agents, the militant workers, 'those responsible
for retarding the plans, for go-slows, and for sabotages in production'
(ibid.).
Control over Conditions of Production
When we speak of control by employees over conditions of employment,
we are reminded of the practices of strong unions in Britain which make
sure that none but their members are employed. Probably the most
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extreme example is the present closed-shop system where the unions'
strict employment regulations prevail. Where such conditions are lack-
ing, there cannot logically be such forms of control. In the Iranian
experience such unionization has been absent. However, there have been
a great many demands and direct action to control the conditions of
employment. In the shura constitution of the Philips factory-workers in
Teheran, a special Committee of Inspection was set up for Administrative
Affairs, to preside over and investigate administration and personnel
affairs, including hiring and firing (Article 2B). The Financial and Ad-
ministrative Committee of the Arj factory considered its objective to be
'to preside over the financial situation and conditions of employment of
the company' (the shura constitution, Article 2). Such control was desir-
able for two reasons. The shuras wanted the re-appointing by employers
or the state of dismissed employees. The shuras were also keen to avoid
the employment of people on the basis of personal connections (favourit-
ism). The more important motivation, though, was political; the shura
was an expression of the 'sovereignty of people over their own destiny' in
the workplaces (shura constitution of Leyland Factory Workers). This
explains much direct control action that goes beyond the immediate
utilitarian concerns of the workers.
Control over conditions of dismissal (firing) is undoubtedly of more
significance to workers than control over hiring. It is a general principle of
a trade union 'that no one should have more work than he needs until all
have as much as they need' (Goodrich, 1975, p. 73). This is an attempt to
reduce unemployment. The basis of such attempts is a tradition of strong
trade unionism, which in the Iranian experience was out of the question.
The right to sack had a twofold relevance for Iranian factory-workers:
the right to sack, and the right to prevent being sacked. The immediate
reason for the practice of the first right had been the desire to dismiss the
remnants of the previous regime or foreign experts in the factories. In the
Eadem Motor Company, in March 1979, the factory shura decided,
according to its constitution, to sack eleven managers, following an
investigation of their cases. They were dismissed as anti-worker. Twenty-
four hours after the shura's verdict, the shura learnt that the director had
refused to carry out the order. As a result the shura ordered the factory
security to arrest the two highest-ranked managers and take them into the
factory where they were forced to pay back a Rls 7(),(KM) loan. They were
then thrown out. The shura later put the investigation of the case of the
director himself on the agenda (Kar, No. 7). There are many other
examples of such direct action.
The right to sack is the foundation of the power of a shura, not only
against the authoritarian elements of the previous regime, but against any
authoritarian elements who do not come to terms with the workers'
shuras. The constitution of the workers' shura of Behshar Car Company
clearly saw it as its right 'to preside over the employment and dismissal of
workers'. The shura leader said,
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Well, that is the way in our factory. We have changed any manager who does
things wrong and the [organization of] Nationalized Industries accepted
this. We had a director there (called Mr Bashirbord), who wasn't interested
in working in the manner of the shura; he'd want to work individually;
wouldn't take the shura into account. Despite the fact that the shura wasn't
yet legal, we stood firm and said, "We don't want him"; we changed him
(my interview).
In a quite different way, the workers' shura of the Philips factory in
the spring of 1981 put a few managers, including a director, on trial and
sacked them.
A fur ther implication of the right to sack is more vital for the
workers: it prevents the victimization of militant workers, including the
shura leaders themselves. The necessity of this demand was felt more
substantially as the trend of management from above began to develop
and provided the basis for a confrontation and threats of dismissal on
both sides. Bazargan fully backed both the new state managements and
the private owners against the workers. His support was expressed in
various circulars designed to curb direct action; the formation of the
Special Force in the factories; formation of the Purifying Bodies and
circulars to the public sector, warning the employees against the activities
of the shuras (Kar, No. 32). The Prosecutor General of the Islamic
Revolution in Arak warned all the workers in the city:
Memorandum to all Directors of the Aräk Factories:
I hereby order you to ensure that your employees and workers clearly
understand that they may not under any circumstances engage in propa-
ganda in the factories. Should you observe any such case, it should be
reported immediately, so that these elements can be prosecuted as counter-
revolutionaries (Kar, No. 16).
The mili tant workers in some factories were indeed sacked.
The workers' shuras had to resist and secure the right to sack for
themselves. Thus, the shura of Eir Persenan factory declared (in March
1978) that 'the employer has no right to sack any worker' (Farhang-i
Novin, No. 4). The Nevasa Company workers and the shura went on
strike, taking the employer hostage. They succeeded in getting their
sacked fellow workers back to work (Farhang-i Novin, p. 7). When I
visited Metal Works plant in Teheran, the managers had been on strike
for 25 days. The reason was that the shura had opposed the firing of a
worker by management, insisting on the case being closely investigated.
Securing the right to sack for the shuras would also be indispensable
to secure the jobs of fellow workers in the event of lock-outs. The Chimco
plant in Teheran, through its shura, refused to agree to a few workers
being laid off; and in Arak in March, workers and the shura of the Pars
Car Plant stopped work, declaring 'the employer has no right to hire or
fire anyone without consulting the shuras (ibid., pp. 8-9). It is worth
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noting that all this was happening at a time when, according to Labour
Law and Employment contracts, the employer still had the sole right to
sack any worker without any explanation.
Control Over Financial Affairs
Although financial information is generally regarded as the sole concern
of management, nonetheless, on some occasions demands for the control
of these areas are advanced. Generally, such demands are the result of
immediate concerns, as when an employer cuts wages on the grounds that
the factory is making a loss, or when an employer intends to lock up the
factory and put the workers on the dole. In such situations the workers
may fight to have the financial books opened and they will be convinced
of the correctness of management's decisions if they find the claims
justified. The same demands can also be made in a rather different spirit,
as part of a demand for workers' control. In the case of Iranian factory
shuras, both aspects are of significance.
The example of the Fama Beton cement works in Teheran illustrates
the first kind of case. Before the insurrection the employer began laying
workers off; some 165 of them were dismissed and eventually the factory
was entirely locked up two months before the insurrection. After the
Revolution all the workers started a campaign for the re-opening of the
factory and the payment of delayed wages. The demands were dismissed
by the management. After forming a shura, the workers staged a cam-
paign, putting forward new demands, forcing the employer to accept the
following conditions.
Return to work with the payment of delayed wages and benefits; forty-hour
week; monitoring properly the decisions of the Board of Directors, con-
tracts, new recruitments, the determination of wages and salaries; and an
inquiry into the financial situation of the company (Kar, No. 13).
In the Iran Cars state-run plant, I was told that in March 1981 the shura
was fighting against the management over the issue of profit-sharing
benefit (Special Benefit), opposing the government's new scheme. When
nothing satisfactory was gained by means of negotiations, the shura,
through its access to the financial department, withdrew the required
amount of cash to pay the workers.
The ideological dimension is more profound: it may be the product
of either a preconceived ideological tendency, or the metamorphosis of
an immediate defensive demand. Article 2 of the shura constitution of the
Amazon factory workers is devoted to 'monitoring the financial and
employment affairs of the company' which was to be conducted by the
Finance and Administrative Committees of the shura. The same point
was stipulated in the Constitutions of the s//i/ras of I-'anoos, Metal Works
and Behshar Car Company. The real concern here was not necessarily
immediate. In fact I put this to a shura member, asking what interests the
shura and workers had in such practices. His answer was as follows.
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Look, the reason why the Revolution was made at all, was because we
wanted to become our own masters; to determine our own destiny . . . We
did not want the situation where one or a few make decisions for two
thousand. When we, 2,5(X) workers, are working around these walls, we
want to know what is going on here; what we'll achieve in future, in what
direction we are running the company, how much profit we get, how much
we could take for ourselves, how much we could contribute to government
for national investment. For this reason, we never let management employ
somebody to make decisions. This would be a repetition of the same
previous mistakes to the extent that it would violate the rights of the
workers, which are in fact the rights of the Iranian nation (my interview).
This statement is made on egalitarian ideological grounds. This egalit-
arianism prevented the misuse of power, corruption and favouritism in
the units . A shura leader in the Metal Works in Teheran here describes
their activities:
During the second \hura, of which I was a member in the Central Office,
they [the management] had issued a cheque to withdraw a sum of six million,
one hundred thousand toumans (about $762,5(K)) from the company's
account. We discovered that and stopped it. The cheque had been issued in
the names of various branch representatives of the company. He [the
employer] claimed he wanted to pay off a debt. Later we found out that only
a very small part was debt in fact; the rest was to go to [the employer's]
brothers (interview).
The shura constitution of the Philips factory workers regards the
rights and tasks of the Committee for monitoring Finance, Administra-
tion and Management to be a) 'to list the entire property of the factory at
the end of each year', and b) 'to prevent corruption; to cut superfluous
costs, and to reduce high level salaries' [managers]. On the basis of these
rights, the shura, in the winter of 1980 in the period of management from
above, ordered the managers off the plant. It came across a case of
scandal in the sales department. It then set up a committee of inquiry
which after an investigation obtained sufficient evidence to hold a 'prole-
tarian t r ibunal ' in a factory mass meeting. The case was put forward and
the accused persons (two officials of the Finance Office) were allowed to
defend themselves. The verdict was announced by the mass of the workers:
guil ty. They were sacked. Within three weeks or so, the same procedures
and processes were carried out to put the top director on trial: guilty. He
also was sacked by the shura. In the second tr ibunal an official of the
Ministry of Labour was present (my interview).
This egalitarianism leads to a variety of practices which necessitate
control over finances. In the Caterpillar plant in Teheran, within the five
months of the Revolution, the shura exerted control over finance, trans-
f e r r i n g all the cash from the employer's personal account into the factory
account in order to pay off the wages when the employer had fled the
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country. The shura then gained the right of authority in financial matters,
presiding over the 'monthly report prepared by the Financial Office
about costs and incomes of the company, and direct control over the
costs'. The shura authorized the cutting down of salaries and the increas-
ing of low wages; it eliminated some existing privileges by issuing cards to
check absenteeism at all ranks (including technical managers); it equalized
the allocation of car parking spaces (formerly monopolized by particular
managers), stopped highly ranked employees from misusing factory pro-
perty and set up a single dining-hall for all employees. The shura also
prevented all employees from taking a second job outside the company
(Ghotbi, 1980, pp. 243—8). Such policies were common in all shuras. In
the Melli Shoe Plant in Teheran 'previously the Special Profit used to be
allocated on the basis of the level of wages . . . But this year we [shura]
put a maximum limit of 12,(HX) toumans.' 'The amount of Special Profit
paid to the workers and (white-collar) employees has been almost equal'
(ibid., p. 25).
Management of Production and Distribution
'Here is the office of the boss, just here where you are sitting. Previously
the boss was here; now we are here.'This is a remark of a shura leader in
Caterpillar plant (ibid, p. 22). It shows a radical difference between the
actual practice of control by the shuras and the formal degree and extent
of workers' control in the advanced capitalist countries (practices such as
control over special managerial functions such as discipline, allocation of
tasks, safety control, the measurement of results (in piecework payments)
or consultation over changes in techniques, insistence on improvements,
joint actions in policy-making and worker-directors). Undoubtedly such
strategies are gradual moves by the working class to gain control. Whether
or not they can be successful and are compatible with the particular
interests of the working class or merely serve capitalist control is another
matter (see Chapter 10).
Let us now look at actual instances of control by the shuras. We
have already discussed how the nature of struggle may transcend immedi-
ate demands. In this respect, the example of the Eirfo foundry works in
Teheran is remarkable. The workers put forward demands for the pay-
ment of delayed wages, Special Profits and supply of raw materials; the
dissolution of the conciliationist shura and the appointment of a manager
independent of the shareholders. A long struggle proceeded in which
Prime Minister Bazargan and the Revolutionary Council (the leadership
of the country) were also involved, and in which workers took three
managers hostage and imprisoned them, being confronted with the
rasdaran. Eventually they gained control and the following proposals
were agreed by a leading director/shareholder: 1) the expulsion of a
manager appointed by the owners; 2) Mr Gholizadeh [the leading director/
shareholder] to report to the factory for one half-day a week and co-
operate with the shura; and 3) the shuras monitoring function over the
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factory to be supreme in the responsible management of the plant. Any
company document without the signature of the shura would be invalid
(Kar, No. 49).
In another example, in May 1979, the Mitusac Company workers
were faced with redundancy. In response, they staged 'a 25-day sit-in and
a 4-day hunger strike. Result? . . . Nothing!' 'There remained only one
way out', they wrote in their leaflet, 'to take over the workshop, running
it by our power' (Kar, No. 9).
A proportionately high number of brick-making workshops resorted
to such forms of direct action and usually took over the factory. In Amol
in the northern Caspian Sea area, the workers in a number of plants took
control of the production and sale of products. A battle followed when,
despite the warnings of the shura, the employers rejected some of their
immediate demands. The shuras immediately formed special committees
concerned with the order of the plant, inspection, sales and dispute
settlements, etc. They started selling the products at a lower price (Kar,
No. 6). In similar plants in the town of Gonbad in the north, the workers,
after taking control of production, abolished the system of piece-rate with
results and substituted a fixed daily wage (Kar, No. 12).
Some workers wanted control for the sake of control. This notion is
expressed in the words of a Melli Shoe Plant worker.
Nowadays [generally] you don't need to tell a worker to go and work I It-
works himself; why? The reason why he didn't work [under the Shah] was
because he was under the boss's thumb. He couldn't speak out. Now, he'll
say: "the work is my own. I'll work." But now [specifically] when you don't
know where the products go, how much the prices are; for how much it is
being sold; in whose pocket the profit goes, etc., well, he'll become
demoralized. Now, it is the shura that must control all of them. It should
know how much the company produces; how much is the price and the cost
of production; how much the profit is; and where it goes. The shura must
know all these, and let the workers know. Then, the workers wouldn't
protest (Ghotbi, 1980, pp. 32-3).
This shura at its very inception expelled the existing boards of
directors, most of whom were experts in various skills. It then succeeded
in taking control of the plant and running it until state managers were
appointed. 'Some people thought, if these managers and experts left
here, the factory would be paralysed,' stated a shura leader. 'We even
guaranteed and did succeed in running the firm' (ibid, p. 28).
Similarly, for a period of five months preceding the arrival of the
state-appointed managers, the shura of the Caterpillar plant controlled
'all economic, social and political aspects of this company'. It controlled
conditions of employment, finance, the purchasing of raw materials, sales
and the co-ordination of work. The shura also dispatched a team of
employees to Geneva to purchase raw materials. Meanwhile it established
a committee of dispute settlement, sending the committee to various
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branches of industry at the same time, to encourage the spirit ofshuraism
among the workers ( ibid . , p. 2X). In short, 'the shura made decisions on
all aspects of the company until it became nationalized by the govern-
ment. But, since its nationalization we have only had a consultative role
with the state representatives' (ibid., p. 81).
' the Fanoos Factory shura was initiated and encouraged by the
management: it was a reformist strategy of a multinational company to
contain the radical actions of the workers. But it did not work. When the
workers were allowed to organize the factory committee, the extent of
the i r expectations and actual practices went beyond the limits desired by
the management. According to the workers' constitution, the fundamental
right ol\ shura is considered to be the overseeing of production, distribu-
tion and pricing. It reads, 'The task of this Committee is composed of
complete oversight of the process of production, from the supply of raw
mater ia l to its transformation into the saleable product.' In detail the
rights and responsibilities of the shura were:
a) to raise the level of output in the interests of the public, including
the employees of the factory;
b) to develop and organize the factory to cut dependency tics, in
such a way as not to damage production or the supply of raw materials;
c) a just pricing of products in accordance with the internal market
and income of the employees;
d) a just distribution of the products throughout the country, aiming
to reduce the influence of intermediary dealers;
e) supervision of the sale of the waste products.
We have already mentioned the extent of control that this \luira had
over finance, administration and management in the plant. Another area
of control which was of direct political significance was the task of the
Committee of Hefâzât and Entezâmât (security), formerly conducted by
SAVAK agents and the Army officials. Article 7 pointed to the shuru'*
authori ty over a) safety, hygiene and conditions of work; b) disciplinary
measures in the workplace, inspection of absenteeism and guarding;
c) dispute sett lement; d) formation of security cadres, composed of the
employees, against counter-revolutionary sabotages; e) military train-
ing; and most imortant, f) 'the purge of corrupt, anti-popular and idle
elements, in any position'. In this connection, the constitution stated that
following the presentation of evidence, the verdict will be binding with
three-quarters of the votes of all employees or two-thirds of the votes of the
MUSS Meeting. The convicted elements will have the right to he present to
defend themselves at the Muss Meeting.
There was a third group of shuras which did exert a considerable
degree of control over production, distribution and employment. Yet the
ideology of the shura protagonists was based neither on the class interests
of their rank-and-file workers (because they did not view control as ;i
means to meet immediate demands) nor primarily upon the class ideology
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of possession. They rather reflected the anti-capitalist ideology of the
rul ing clergy, and manifested a particular form of corporatism under the
Islamic state. Such corporatism was almost totally absent in the private
industries. The number of these shuras rose in the second period of
management from above. A typical example were the shuras of the
Behshar Car plant and Amazon factory. The Behshar Car factory shura
was a form of co-determination. Two of the shura members were appointed
to the Board of Directors. The shura, through its various sub-committees
(of production, sales, administration and finance) actively participated in
the organization of the plant. Rights and tasks were specified in a shura
constitution. Here is the statement of a shura leader.
The shura must he informed of the amount of raw material required, of the
source of supply and the way it is purchased, so that the employer cannot
paralyse the workplace by threatening a lock-out; and so that if he did, the
shura itself would intervene directly. The \hura should also obtain for
themselves sufficient information about, or have advisers on, sales and
marketing. The mam issue here is that the worker is not to he separated
from the product of his labour. He himself should have control over pro-
duction, purchase and the sale of the product (my interview).
On the other hand, there seemed to be co-operation between the
shura policies and those of the state-appointed managers. 'Fortunately,
the director himself believes,' stated the shura leader, 'that all the affairs
of the plant should be carried out with the consultation of the shura.' By
way of reciprocation, the shura also made vital concessions:
We are the followers of this government [pro-Khomeini Prime Minister
Rajaii] which is revolutionary and believes in Islamic Revolution. We must
obey the orders of the government, even if they are against us. We must
appreciate the position of the government. We now have a war in our
country with such high costs. I th ink it is wrong to press for henefits and
such-like every minute.
Typology of the Shuras
When we speak of the workers' control movement, we tend to infer that it
is homogeneous. Reality, however, is rather different. But it is crucial to
make distinctions between organizations and to identify those motives
which contribute to the class struggle.
The Iranian shura movement was no exception. Workplace organ-
izations took a variety of forms. To portray the heterogeneity of the
shuras, we have compiled a table of twelve factory shuras. The two
extreme sides are opposite ends of the spectrum. We may identify one as
the most successful and the other as the least successful; the area between
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Workers and Revolution in Iran
The most successful shura may be typified by the variables: full
control, militant/independent and universal view. These successful shuras
were those which exerted full control over and ran the workplace without
(any effective control on the part of) the officially-appointed manage-
ment. Their policies and activities were independent of the state and the
official managers and were based upon the interests of the rank-and-file
workers. The ideological motives for shura formation stemmed primarily
not only from immediate working-class interests but from the ideology of
possession (universal view). The Fanoos factory committee was an
example of this type of shura.
In contrast, the least successful committees reflected the character-
istics of the syndicate. From a defensive position, they in many respects
co-operated with the owners/managers. The low level of rank-and-file
militancy made the shura unable to take an offensive stand. The political
conditions of such workplaces, therefore, were less tense. The Alvand
factory shura seemed to be a typical instance of such shuras.
The militant interventionist tendency was found in popular shuras
which were involved in a high level of class struggle (Metal Works and
Iran Cars shuras). Despite the domination of state-managers, the shuras
which relied on class interests and universal ideology were never subjected
to the authority of management. At times they would encroach on the
sphere of managerial prerogatives by taking out money and paying
workers. Militant interventionism, though, unlike the control shuras did
not exert a high degree of control. It rather reflected an ongoing struggle.
A less mi l i t an t form was the consultative shura, such as the shuras of
Bloom Helm and Melli Shoe in the second period. Here, the management
saw the consultative function of these shuras as a channel to incorporate
them, while the spirit of rank-and-file militancy still prevailed. On the
other hand, these shuras rationally utilized their consultative role in the
interests of their fellow workers. Such a form of shura management could
not last long.
Lastly, corporatist shuras were another type. They would be com-
posed of workers and maktahi (Islamic) management, working for the
prosperity of the Islamic nation under the leadership of the clergy. In
practice, these shuras exerted effective control over various aspects of
management. They would not hesitate to launch a hard struggle to dismiss
liberal, professional and non-conformist managers whose strategy negated
the ideal of their work organization. Giving a contradictory impression, in
the short run, to the workers, they played a significant part in the politics of
industr ial relations under the post-revolutionary state. Meanwhile the
consti tutions of these committees ensured that not a single non-Islamic and
independent candidate could be accepted to shura membership.
We now turn to examine the major determinant factors which
influence the successor failure of a shura. A successful committee was not
an automatic outcome of pertinent objective conditions; the consciousness
and ideological orientation of the shura members, expressing the con-
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sciousness of the total workforce, was equally crucial (Fanoos factory). It
was also significant whether the ownership of the plant was state or
private. Under state ownership, shura formation was less laborious in
three respects: first, in that the ruling clergy put out remarkable anti-
imperialist and anti-oppression rhetoric. This kind of rhetoric always has
a double edge. While it might create the illusion of an anti-imperialist
state, at the same time it mobilizes the workers, conferring upon them the
power of manoeuvre, and hence a societal legitimacy to go onto the
offensive. Workers utilized conflicts between the policies of the liberals
and the clergy-dominated managers. And unlike the private sector, the
state could financially, at least in the short run, tolerate the effects of
workers' encroachments on the distribution of surplus.
The success of the shura fur ther depended on the position of the
enterprise in the market: in Iran, many of the worker-controlled industries
were or later became state-owned and many of them enjoyed a semi-
monopoly position. The character of the labour process and whether the
workers were craft workers with a relatively high degree of skill or
working within a division of labour with less room for manoeuvre was also
crucial. Of the two successful shuras, the Caterpillar works may be said to
represent craft-oriented work and Fanoos the latter kind. In the Philips
case, the disadvantage of the detailed division of labour had been com-
pensated for by co-operation between the intellectual labourers and the
manual workers. Solidarity was a further important determinant for a
successful workers' control movement.7 In this sense, solidarity acted to
'subjectively' overcome the division of labour.
The Ideologies of the Shuras
Two main theories provided a rationale for the actions of workers of the
shuras: firstly, the Marxism of left-wing organizations, which undoubted-
ly dominated debate, and secondly a considerable number of independent,
mi l i tant and interventionist shuras adhered to the Mudjahedin Organ-
ization. The latter 's conception of shura, as well as many of its political
ideas, are influenced by the left conceptual framework, but are presented
in the Islamic idioms and terminology.
The Marxian theoretical background of the workers' control move-
ment has been widely discussed. At this point, we shall deal with the
ideology of the corporatist shuras.
Corporatism of the Islamic Shuras
In the second and third periods of the labour movement, these shuras
spread to the majority of industrial workplaces. Having termed them as
shura-i su-esh (conciliationist) or yellow shuras, left-wing forces have
identif ied them with the management, holding that 'their only role is to
raise productivity, police the factory, serve capital and the capitalist
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state. ' But there was a serious contradiction in the attitude of these shuras
towards capital and labour.
Islamic Corporatism: Corporatism is generally a capitalist strategy which,
un l ike individual liberal capitalism, seeks to transcend class conflict by
integrating the state, capital and labour by reliance upon economic
motives or ideological appeal (such as nationalism). The strategy is
adopted when capital is unable to prevent labour from organizing and is a
classical pattern of control when market control is not possible. Corporat-
ism may take different shapes. In democratic corporatism, state, capital
and labour organizations are autonomous; this form is characteristic of a
prosperous period or country (such as Sweden). Fascist corporatism, how-
ever, is non-plural and hierarchical; the relationship of state and capital is
antagonistic. Corporatism may also represent a feature of a labour
organization pursuing a policy of co-operation with state and capital. The
peculiarity of the Islamic shuras was not their co-operation with state and
capital, but their opposition to capitalist management -because as shuras
they wanted to take control of management, and their alliance with the
state led them to pursue a mystical and egalitarian Islamic doctrine.
The Islamic corporatist shuras were characterized by militancy in
opposition to one-man management systems and to professional liberal
managers. The shuras in such plants as Behshar Car Plant, Amazon,
Gher Gehr-i Ziba and Darougar sacked the state-appointed managers
after a bi t ter struggle. These were managers who had not co-operated
with the shuras. There was a strong belief that the shuras had the right to
supervise, exert control over management and the spheres of production,
administration, hiring and firing, finance and discipline.
Kamali, a workers' representative in Majlis ( I ranian parliament), a
pro-IRP element, publicly announced, "I believe that the shuras must be
given the right to interfere in workplace affairs. But, we do not believe
that any shura is a genuine one. Because we believe that a shura member
before everything must be a true Muslim; otherwise it is not acceptable'
(Jelve-i Hugh Tââla, No. 3).
Is lamic shurus were religious, strongly anti-democratic and anti-
communist. The Amazon factory shura leader stated:
Just imagine that a member of the I'uykar or Mudjahedin had advancement
[becoming a shura member]: undoubtedly he wouldn't want the wheels of
the country to turn , he'd always want to cause damage, to incite the workers
to strike.
— What if he were elected by the workers?
We'd continue to oppose him, even though he was elected . . . If two
thousand workers elect a Paykari or Mudjahed, tha t is because W;; of them
are ignorant. In fact they get elected because of their hypocrisy I hey present
themselves as Muslims and get votes. When they come up [as the \lium
members] they would be opposed by me, by the management or by the state,
who would all see what they are up to.
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On the other hand, the internal regulations of the Amazon shura stipulated
that:
should the aim and intention of a shura member be contrary to the interests
of the Islamic Republic or violate laws, and disrupt the order of the company,
it will be the Islamic and canonical duty of the other members to report him
to the employees through the mass meetings.
There was a commitment to 'true' Islam and the Imam's line, i.e. that
fraction of the clergy in the state which followed the Khomeini doctrine of
Islam and organized in the IRP.
This form of corporatism represents an aspiration towards a frater-
nal, egalitarian society without oppression and decadence, to he brought
about by Islamic principles as an alternative to both capitalism and
socialism.
The revolution that we made was an Islamic Revolution. We didn't make a
communist revolution. Therefore [the shura members] must act within the
Islamic framework and ideology. The objective must he to implement an
Islamic economy, which is neither a capitalist economy nor a socialist II is ,111
economy based on itself . . . and, that means "for each according to his
labour". In a communist country people must work for the state. And in
capitalist countries there is [a minority of] people in whose hands capital
circulates. And in the communist system capital belongs to the state which
exploits people and pays them something. But Islam says: "No! the worker
who works should get the fruits of his labour" ( the .v/iwra leader of the I.T.N.
Company).
This corporatism shows an illusion of a mystical Islamic community
in which class conflicts are concealed by the brotherhood of all ommuh
(Mass) and in which the Imam at the head of the state is the guardian of
the community and the ultimate arbiter.
This ideological form stems from the ideology of 'possession' des-
cribed earlier, and the unique contradictory nature of the Islamic state in
Iran.
//ic Islamic State: The Islamic state is characterized by a dialectic between
Khomeini's view of Islamic society and the objective reality of the Iranian
society as a backward capitalist social formation. In theory, the project of
the valayat-i faghih represents a view of a homogeneous, egalitarian,
puritan and tribal form of community from the era of Muhammed — a
vision of a society in which the main division is between the subordinate
community and the dominant leader, or imam. As the arbiter and medi-
ator between God and the community, he guides the community by the
sacred rules of God of which he alone has a special knowledge.8 This form
of society, which may be an illusory ideal held by the most backward
section of the traditional petty-bourgeoisie, is threatened by both bour-
geois rule and by socialism.
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A ruler's subjective perception of the state and government is one
thing; the objective possibility for realizing this perception is another.
The seizure of power by the ruling clergy was a reflection of a power
vacuum in the post-revolutionary state. Neither the proletariat nor the
bourgeoisie were able to exert their political hegemony. The reason for
their inability must be sought in their historical development which is a
testimony of the weakness of both.
The anti-capitalist and anti-Western rhetoric of the ruling clergy
must be seen in the context of this contradictory state form. The initial
impact of this rhetoric on the masses (and the traditional left) was
undeniable. Such views of Khomeini represented him as anti-imperialist
and pro-downtrodden:
The deprived and oppressed [masses] should rise.
They should not wait for the oppressors lo save them (Kayhan, 19 June 1983).
The basis of domination over countries, including our country, is those rich
with big capital, who possess power to preserve themselves and their status.
These dispossessed t l'a berehneh ha) are our masters. If they had not fought,
we would have been either in jail or in isolation. It was those people who
saved us, putting us in these positions (Kur, No. 149).
The anti-capitalist and anti-oppression slogans of Khomeini had
practical/political implications. The pages of Kar, Jelve-i Hagh Ta ala
(Work, the Appearance of God) and Salehan-i Sazandeh, the magazine
and the weekly paper of the Khane-i Kargar, carried reports of how
Islamic shuras, or Islamic Associations fought the non-maktabi and non-
conformist managements and slogans like 'The shining villas of the capit-
alists are the result of the exploitation of the oppressed (peeneh dastan)\
Such slogans built up the corporatist ideologies of the Islamic shuras.
They conceived the state not only as one which directed society to an
egalitarian objective, but as a supporter of militant actions against
managements. (No corporatist shura could be found in the private plants.
The private appropriation of profit leaves no room for the corporatist
ideology.)
In search of an Islamic tradition of the concept o\ shura, the Islamic
activists and ideologues resorted to the Quran. This was an attempt to
defeat the monopoly of the concept of shura (council) by the Marxists.
Two major ayâts (extracts) were presented as the Quranic origin of the
concept; they advocate, at a high level of generality, consultation in the
performance of any work.9
The third period witnessed bitter conflicts between the Islamic
shuras and both the liberal and maktahi managements. Ideological con-
siderations apart, the corporatist shuras had by then gained a new social
status. The dismissal of the corporatist shura members by the managements
reached a point where the Ministry of Labour issued a Resolution against
Article 33 of the Labour Law, excluding the Islamic shuru members from
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arbitrary dismissals — - 'preventing the conspiracies against the Muslim
worker brothers by a few liberal managers and employers who disrupt the
formation of Islamic shuras' (Kayhan, 10 August 1981). Following the
announcement of the Resolution, the top authorities issued a series of
instructions, warning the Islamic shuras and lAs not to overreach them-
selves (see Chapter 10).
The corporatist Islamic shuras resembled the fascist syndicates of
Ciermany in their exclusiveness (anti-democratism), anti-communism,
and anti-capitalism. But there were significant differences. The anti-
capitalist and the radical slogans of 'towards factories' or 'workers' control
under national ownership' chanted by the left fascism of the Strasser
brothers were attributes of Fascism in rising, not in power. Fascism in
power smashed even that kind of labour organization. In Iran, on the
other hand, contradiction and chaos still remain. The ambiguous position
of the Islamic state towards the limits of private property and the impera-
tives of the Islamic political system operate as a fundamental impediment
to a peaceful compromise with the bourgeoisie. While the anti-capitalism
of Fascism as a movement was a typical sign of the petty-bourgeoisie in
revolt, the resentment of the ruling clergy was an apprehensive reaction
of a puritan community against the invasion of alien forces.
Shuras and Democracy
One of the central themes of debate on the workers' council movement is
the relationship between workers' councils and democracy. The notion of
workers' democracy has been the focal point of both revolutionary and
reformist strategies. On the left communism, the councilists have virtually
identified socialism with the hegemony of workers' councils as grassroots
organs of power from below (Bricianer, 1978), and for Gramsci the
workers' councils were both the vehicle of the revolution, and the em-
bodiment of socialist democracy (Clark, 1977).
The reformists seek industrial democracy under capitalist domina-
tion; this is practised in various forms of 'workers' control' policies in the
advanced capitalist societies. The emphasis here is on the interconnection
between the workers' council and democracy in the experience of the
Iranian workers. Did the formation of the shuras in fact imply a strong
desire for democracy?
For workers who had been under the scrutiny of the secret police for
over two decades, freedom of expression, assembly and organization
would have been extremely important. Speaking in the first period, a
Caterpillar worker said: The greatest grace that the revolution has
granted to us is freedom . . . Nowadays, a man can speak out and protest;
he can criticize; he can read books, can breathe . . .' (Ghotbi, 1979,
pp. 96-7). The indispensable role of freedom in unleashing the workers'
power of creativity may not be appreciated by a Western reader who
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enjoys the fruits of liberal democracy. For a Third World working-class
intellectual it is quite different.
While in their day-to-day debates and writings Iranian Marxists
attribute special strength and abil i ty to an abstract proletariat which it is
assumed will take control of state power in the future, they are surprised
when I describe aspects of my observations on workers' radicalism. Even
for them, the working class has. in real terms, been identified with
pauperism, misery, subordination and backwardness. This shows the
extent to which repression has prevented the working class and i ts allies
from appreciating its potential and actual radicalism.
In the backward capitalist countries democracy, albeit in its limited
bourgeois sense, is indispensable for the working class to develop its
potentiality in all political, social and cul tural domains. Paradoxically,
however, it is the working class itself that through its own organi/ation
can achieve democratic forms not only for its own benefit , but for the
whole of society. The working class can assume this role for various
reasons. In Third World countries, the working classes tend to grow com-
paratively faster than others. They have viable objective grounds for or-
ganization; and desire for freedom provides a bond for an immense major-
ity of the population — peasants, déclasse masses and middle classes.
In advanced capitalist countries the state, generally identif ied with
the bourgeois class, is able to provide values, norms and policies which
are perceived by the nation as embodying universal values and interests:
liberal democratic insti tutions and ideologies are the clearest examples.
In Third World countries the bourgeois class is generally weak and is less
able to ful f i l this hegemonic role. This tendency generates a vacuum that
either enables the working classes, in alliance with other masses, to play a
major part in the total politics of these countries or, as in Latin America,
provides the ground for the supra-class elites to take on state power, be
they generals, emperors or Ayatollahs.
In Iran it was the working classes in general, not the liberal bour-
geoisie, that brought about the universal conception of shuruism. The
idea of shuraism transcended the domain of industry, permeating offices,
schools, universities, farms and the army.
Throughout the first period, the Universities were run democratically
by shuras composed of the elected representatives of students, teaching
staff and administrative employees. In the rural areas where land had
been taken over, the villages were administered by the village councils. In
the armed forces, the Air Force technicians waged a sustained struggle to
set up shuras and to have the right to elect and recall their officers. The
bourgeoisie could never have invented the concept of ashura.
The workers' \hurus were, however, l imited to the workplaces.
They were not extended to the whole community. They acted both as the
organs of democracy (in terms of work organi/ation and political con-
siderations) and as instruments of repression — at the workplaces where
the corporatist committees were dominant.10
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The Political and Ideological Tendencies of the Shuras
Herein lies the basic politico-ideological distinction between the Islamic
corporatist and the left-wing shuras (including those of pro-Mudjahedin).
Factories were the first victims of the new state repression. Nonetheless,
some progressive shuras worked hard to maintain a democratic atmos-
phere. From the first period, their policy was to maintain a coalition
structure composed of anyone who was democratically elected by the
rank and file. A left-winger in the Caterpillar plant shura argued for a
coalition in the following way:
The main issue that we discuss here is that of economic problems of the
employees. Everybody, with any ideology [left or religious] holds the view
that capitalism must be dismantled in our society. We all agree on this, that
there shouldn't be capitalism in this country; a n d t h i i t classes in the forms of
exploited and exploiter must be abolished. We are talking about a classless
society; the Islamic ideology talks about Tauhidi [divine] society. When we
compare the two, there is no difference . . since there are various ideologies
and religions, we have decided to abandon any [sectarian] political discussion
here (Ghotbi, 1979, p. 125).
The religious member of the Factory Committee, however, provided a
more realistic and immediate argument.
The sole reason . . . is the election itself. We haven't elected each other.
They (the employees) have elected us. getting us to get together. They have
elected any views and any group they liked . . . We won't let anyone's views
or ideologies, however respectable for their holder, affect our works and
activities here (ibid., p. 127).
This was the main argument any left-wing worker could launch
against the mounting waves of manipulation and exclusivism in the legal
procedures to divest the shura elections of their substance.
Fanoos factory was probably one of the few plants which, in the
second period, still enjoyed a high degree of democracy. That was because
its left-wing shura exerted power over the management and Islamic
Association (1A) as well as over other informal organizations. All leaf-
lets, journals or any management announcements had to be confirmed
and stamped by the shura. As a matter of fact, it was enough to curb the
repressive activities of the lAs and the management, and workers' political-
cultural activities would flourish. My own experience of conducting re-
search provides a criterion for assessing democracy at the workplaces. As
Table 7.5 indicates, there were only a few plants which were still resisting
repression. In the factories with a democratic shura I was allowed to go
anywhere, to talk to anyone (Fanoos, Metal Works, Bloom Helm). In the
rest, I was under pressure to interview the fewest possible and preferably
particular workers. Some corporatist shura members prohibited me from
entering the workshops. Because I 'might cause trouble'. These shuras
were all Islamic.
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The corporatist shuras were ideologically repressive for they be-
lieved the shuras should comprise merely Muslim workers, the firm
supporters of the Islamic Republic. The sympathizers of Mudjahedin,
which is an Islamic organization, were also prohibited from standing for
the election since they were seen as left-wing. The argument that the
corporatist shuras (e.g. in Behshar Car Plant, Amazon, Teheran Auto)
put forward is summed up in the following remarks.
In an Islamic shura, all of the elected members must act according to Islamic
principles: helievers, supporters of the Islamic Republic etc. If a communist
or one from these groups [left] is elected, he naturally would want to enforce
his views or those of his organization. And this causes disruption . . . If they
infiltrated into the shuras, they'd natural ly oppose the Islamic Republic, and
obviously would cause chaos . . . Our revolution is an Islamic Revolution.
We haven't made a communist revolution. So the shura members must hold
Islamic views (I.T.N. shura leader).
On this view, it is sufficient to condemn everyone who does not
agree with the shura as anti-Islamic or communist. Radical Muslim
workers, any worker who criticized the shura, the management or the
government could be equally at fault (ibid., p. 127). While the corporat-
ist shuras were naturally the major opponents of strike action, the left-
democratic shuras advocated the right to strike even though it was illegal.
The Structure of the Shuras
The shuras in their essential forms do guarantee a certain degree of
democracy in the workplace even when functioning under undemocratic
rules of election. Theoretically shuras were the direct representatives of
the whole workforce and would exercise power through the organ of the
General Assembly (Majma Omoumi), and through recalling the Executive
Committee of the shura at any time. Though the constitutions of the
Iranian shuras varied in many respects, almost all of them conferred
ultimate power on the General Assemblies. The latter had the duty a) to
ratify the constitution prepared by the workers; b) to elect the shura
members; c) to examine the report prepared by the EC: and d) to ratify
the formation of the Union of the Shuras (US), and to consider whether
or not to join the US.
In many factories, in practice, major unexpected and/or unspecified
issues were brought to the General Assemblies. In no constitution was
anything said about strike action, for officially it was strictly forbidden.
But in practice, strike or other forms of industrial action did take place
during the first and second periods, and most of them were debated and
decided in the General Assemblies.
The Committees possessed the power of both decision-making and
implementation of their decisions. In this spirit they would distribute
their executive power among various sub-committees, depending on the
extent of workers' control. The EC of the Fanoos factory shura, for
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example, set up seven sub-committees, each with particular rights and
responsibilities specified in the constitution: a committee to oversee
supply, production, distribution and pricing; a committee for finance and
administration, for welfare, for cultural activities, for communications,
for technical affairs and security and order. More or less the same sorts of
committees operated in other factories, such as Behshar Car Plant,
Amazon, Teheran Auto and Saypa. All of these committees were ac-
countable to the ECs of the shura which itself was accountable to the
General Assemblies
That, however, is by no means the whole matter. Not all Iheshuras,
in any period, acted in accordance with the interests and in response to
the actual demands of the rank and file. And that explains why in most of
the factories frequent shura elections were held. Shura elections were
strongly influenced by political considerations and the factories were the
most sensitive sector of society. The state, directly or through formal and
informal mediations, would do anything to dismantle the shuras which
were thought to be infil trated by militant workers. As an angry worker in
the Metal Works explained,
the capitalists don't allow our shura to work . . . We have had seven shuras so
far. But they don't let them work. [These managers] now have gone off in a
huf f , and have gone up there, to delay our advances. They want us to stop
working. They want to make us go on strike. That's it. They've gone up there
because they want to dismantle the shura. They've already dismantled two,
claiming them [shura members] to he agents of SA VAK; and [then] they
paid them 55 thousand toumans (£5,5(X)) [for their dismissal); paying money
to SA VAK agents? And then they've said they [the shuni] spoke to Fa rah
during the Taughout [time of the Shah].
There was a tendency towards bureaucratization of \\\Q shuras; the
mass of the membership became dependent on the intitiative and strategic
experience of a relatively small cadre of leadership. Explaining the
bureaucratic trend in British shop-floor organizations, Richard Hyman
proposed three objective influences restricting the official activity of even
a mi l i t an t shop steward: 1) external pressure which acts against the
security of the organization and leads it to become cautious; 2) an ongoing
relationship with external parties, usually committing the official to respect
the rules of the game; and finally, 3) the rationale of officialdom (Hyman,
1979, p. 61). These considerations are most inf luent ial in politically
normal conditions. They are subject to modification in critical and
revolutionary situations. Indeed, the element of external pressure was
fatal for the shuras, and they had to respond against it, not only with
cautious conservatism, but at times with resolute militancy, depending on
the balance of forces at the workplace. Though the second tendency was
dominant in the first period, the strategy of conservative caution pre-
vailed in the second, when the rank and file would appear to be more
mi l i t an t than the shura leadership.
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The second consideration, i.e. respect for the rules of the game,
went with the first one. The balance of forces, however, would at times
diminish such respect on the part of the mil i tant shuras. The rationale of
officialdom explains a great deal. To elect a worker as the shura member,
the rank and file not only considered a candidate's militancy but his
competence and ability to represent them. The wide range of activities
and committees required that the shura members become full-time offi-
cials, dealing with the complex matters of totally intellectual labour. The
result was a new division of labour. (In almost all factories, officials had
offices with fu l l faci l i t ies . ) In these circumstances, the accountability of
the shura depended on how and to what extent the rank and file monitored
the elected representatives.
The democratic shuras would have no fear of holding a General
Assembly to supply reports. Indeed, the dependence of shuras on the
General Assembly, not vice versa, proved to be the major source of any
shura's bargaining power. The shuras of the Fanoos and Iran Cars factories
were of this type. In the former there was continuous contact between the
shura and the rank and file. The result of any activity or negotiations with
any authority would be reported to the workers. This form of rank-and-
file intervention reduced the bureaucratic tendency.
On the other hand, a corporatist shura could not be democratic,
either internally or externally. It had to be bureaucratic, for fear of
disclosing its activities and policies to the rank and file. In principle, the
shura's activities would become exclusively a matter of shura concern and
not the business of the mass of the workers. In practice, the committee
members evaded General Assemblies, or frequently postponed them.
Composition of the Shuras and their Unifying Role
Unlike the shop-floor trade unionism which protects the legally specified
interests of particular sections of employees, the shura represented the
whole workforce including white-collar workers and technicians. Such
representation was carried out at two levels: legally and socially.
In legal terms any individual employee was ent i t led to stand, with
qualifications, for the shura membership and be represented by it.
Objectively, any shura requires a kind of managerial competence and
technical expertise, in order to be able to supervise management. A shura
therefore encompassed not only manual skilled workers, but also white-
collar, administrat ive employees and even, at times, engineers.
This characteristic composition of the shuru membership was one of
its contradictions: on the one hand there was a need for the competence
of certain personnel, and on the other, the most competent members
were objectively authoritarian and anti-.v/iwra. The collapse of the second
shura in the Pars Metal Works plant resulted from such a contradiction
(see Chapter 9).
Yet an important feature of a shura was its unifying role. A shura
would essentially be a socially unifying organ against capital. It acted as a
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medium between the social position of the manual and intellectual
workers. This function was crucial, bearing in mind that the objective
division between the two has historically been very wide. In general, the
inst i tut ion of theshura is a moment in the transcendence of the division of
labour between manual and intellectual, precisely because it encompasses
practical and intellectual activities simultaneously.
The socio-political predicament of a society enmeshed in the prac-
tices of a new repressive state (from wage-cuts to the violation of
democratic rights and harassments) would generate general discontent;
and thus general solidarity among the different ranks of the workforce. In
l hese conditions, the potentiality and flexibility of the shuras to deal with
all-embracing economic and socio-political matters would render them
the institutional manifestation of these discontents and opposition to the
state.
Notes
1. This consolidation of power at state level and the following events do not
mean a solution of the labour problems. For an analysis of the contradictions of
this repressive strategy, and a more detailed examination of Islamic Management,
and Islamic Associations, see Chapter 10.
2. Even a prominent industrialist like Haji Barkhordär declared his support
for Khomeini when he donated RIs 2(X) million (£1.33 million).
3. Another writer puts emphasis on the War Industries Committees initiated
by the Kadets and the Octobrists in 1915 as a measure to free factories from the
Tsarist bureaucracy (Siriani. 1982. pp. 19-20).
4. By the term 'people' the worker means only working people. This is their
response, as I asked them to explain it.
5. Labour Law and Social Security Regulations, Institute of Labour & Social
Security, Appendix of publication no. 9, 1359, Teheran, p. 63.
6. Ibid.
7. Hence the argument of Beynon and Nichols that 'skill is not essential to
control. It is possible for unskilled workers, subdivided into routine repetitive
jobs, to use their collective strength to oppose capital' ( 1977. p. I O N ) .
X. For an historical examination of Shiu't and Islamic rule, see Ja'afar and
Tabari, 1981; and Tabari. 1981.
9. The literal translation of the extracts is 'To conduct a work, the Muslims
should consult among each other.' See Shoär, 1981.
10. For this discussion see my 'Labour and Democracy in Post-Revolutionary
Iran', in M. Parvin and H. Amirahmadi (eds), Post-Revolutionary Iran (Westview
Press, 1986).
141
Worker* and Revolution in Iran
Chronology of Post-Revolutionary Events



















The radio declares the victory of the Revolution.
Mass demonstrations of military personnel, Kurd-
ish people, Turkoman people, and women for
democratic rights.
Iran becomes an Islamic Republic after a refer-
endum.
Attack against the left, Kurdish and other ethnic
minorities. (The second phase of industrial rela-
tions begins.)
US Embassy is sci/ed; the hostage crisis brings
down the Ba/argan government. Meanwhile, fol-
lowing the embassy seizure, a new wave of labour
struggle escalates.
The Islamic Constitution is ratified after a refer-
endum.
Bani'Sadr is elected as Iran's first president.
The start of cultural revolution, Islamization of
educational, cultural institutions and industrial
workplaces. Meanwhile, a new crackdown on
labour militancy is waged.
An American rescue mission to free the hostages
fails.
The deposed Shah dies in exile in Egypt.
M.A. Raja i i , a maktabi Prime Minister, forms a
cabinet. From this period, the Islamic Associations
begin to dominate the workplaces.
Iran-Iraq war begins.
American hostages are freed.
The working-class struggles escalate as the state
abolishes Special Benefit (year-end bonus).
The conflict between Bani'Sadr and the Islamic-
Republic Party surfaces violently when a rally
organised by Bani'Sadr is attacked. Meanwhile, in
the factories, the confrontations between the lAs
and the liberal managements accelerate.
Bani'Sadr is dismissed as Commander-in-Chief
and goes underground.
Massive demonstrations against Khomeini in
Teheran turn into a bloody confrontation with
I'astlaran. Widespread guerrilla warfare against
the Islamic regime starts. (The third phase of in-
dustrial relations begins).
Bani'Sadr and Masoud Rajavi (the leader of the
Mudjahedin) escape to France, setting up the
/'lit' i'.merxenci- of the Shiirus
National Council of Resistance.
September 1981 Liquidation of opposition elements in the industrial
workplaces. The beginning of new inter-state fac-
tional conflict between the 'Imam's line' and the
lloj/atieh.* The confrontation between the lAs
and the Maktabi management escalates (the fourth
phase).
1 Fundamentalist ( r \ pnigmalisl) friction wi th in rul ing clergy.
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The workers' understanding of their situation was based on their own
experience; on the other hand, the left, the leaders, either lacked the
ability to analyse these experiences correctly, or relied on abstract con-
cepts which ignored reality. This chapter is therefore devoted to consider-
ing how the left-wing organizations conceived of the shuras and locating
the \hura experience in the context of the broader historical experiences
of the working classes in developing similar movements.
The Shuras and the Left
Each socialist group claims that it alone is the theoretical mentor of the
working class; the misunderstanding of political events by leaders affects
the conditions of the led.
The Confusion of the Central Concepts
In analysing the workings of the shuras we find that four main concepts
are used: control-i kargari (workers' control), edareh or modiriyat (man-
agement), nezârat (supervision) and dekhalat (intervention). These con-
cepts have remained undefined and have been loosely used. The terms
used have different connotations in the different workers' movements.
Control-i Kargari (Workers' Control): In general, workers' control in the
European Trade Union movements is taken to mean control by workers
of the labour process and the organization of work. The term is equivalent
to job control and various forms of restrictive practices, that is, the
demands and practices conducted under capitalist relations of production.1
Historically, the notion of workers' control derives from the revolutionary
situations in European capitalism at the end of the First World War (in
Russia, Germany, Italy and Britain) and the critical periods of capitalist
social instability especially in Europe in 1968 (see Chapter 1).
There has almost always been a tendency among shop-floor workers
— both unskilled and skilled — to resist domination and alienation in the
workplace and to demand a restriction on management's powers of
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control and genuine participation for workers. This tendency, along with,
but distinct from, capital's requirements for the co-operation and in-
volvement of the workforce in the production system, encouraged the
re-emergence of the debate on workers' control among the Western
labour movement. One definition of workers' control (which is wide-
spread among social democrats) involves the securing for labour of some
rights to determine the organization of the labour process in capitalist
production. In both definitions, control is limited to the point of produc-
tion itself.
Edareh/Moômydt (Management): While the management by the shura
of the affairs of the unit is not exactly the same as workers' self-
management, it is distinct from workers' control. The essential attribute
of self-management is the 'exclusive control and management of produc-
tive organization by [the] full membership on a basis of equality of vote'
(Vanek, 1975, Introduction). In Yugoslavia, for instance, the organs of
self-management are to a very large extent autonomous of the state,
operating in the context of the law of the free market (Baumgartner,
1979). In (Yugoslavian) self-management, the income of capital is assigned
not to the active participants (as is probably the case in producers'
co-operatives) but to the owners of capital (society) (Vanek, ibid.).
Nezârat (Supervision): This is widely used and is a vaguer term. Observa-
tion of the actual practices referred to by the term would lead us to
conclude that nezärat (like the term control in the Russian language in the
early development of the factory committee movement) signifies a system
of checks and veto by the shura on the activities of a capitalist system of
management. The term dekhalai (intervention), which is again widely
employed, points to direct action as a means of enforcing the right of
nezarat in specified areas where it has not been respected by the
management.
The Shuras in a Wider Context
It seems appropriate at this point to consider the characteristics of the
three major radical forms of workers' movements — syndicalism, guild
socialism and the factory committee movement — which bear some
resemblance to the shuras. An analysis of these movements may also help
to define what was specific to the shura ideology of the Iranian workers.
The origins of syndicalism go back to two historical experiences.
The first was the strategy of the Industrial Workers of the World in the
US, under the influence of the ideas of the Marxist Daniel de Leon. Their
idea was to re-organize the American unions on an industry by industry
basis, rather than trade by trade. The second source was the philosophy
of the Frenchman Georges Sorel, who argued for winning control of the
state through a general strike (Peiling, 1983, p. 125). This idea later
spread throughout most European countries, including the Welsh mines
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in the 1910s and Spanish industries after the First World War. The labour
radicalism that became identified with the syndicalist movement was
before then unprecedented. In Britain it took the form of 'challenging the
existing industrial order in a more fundamental manner' by a struggle 'to
oust the capitalists from the control of industry'. This involved 'a revolu-
tionary struggle for power' (Gallacher and Campbell, in Clark and
Clements, 1977, pp. 125-7). Also the National Council of Scottish
Workers' Committees called for a strategy to attain the 'industrial republic
of labour'(ibid., p. 130).
The syndicalist movement, however, confined its activities to the
industrial workplace, assuming in principle that 'social relations at the
point of production [were] the determining factor in the social structure'
(Hinton, 1973, Chapter 11). The syndicalists ignored the need for wider
political struggle by not acknowledging the dialectical relationship
between economic struggle, and the revolutionary political party. By the
same token, the syndicalists put more emphasis on the tactics of class
struggle and less on long-term strategies; more on action and less on
theory. In addition, like the theory of industrial unionism, it argued
against state socialism (Hinton, ibid.).
Guild socialism is a mixture of syndicalism and collectivism; it
assumes that the means of production should be owned by the state but
that control of production should be conducted by the guilds. Within a
pluralistic framework, guilds would be democratically organi/ed and
bargain on equal terms with the state. When the different guilds merged
to form a single union, capitalism would then, in practice, be transformed
by industrial unionism itself (Cole in Vanek, 1975).
The shuras, as perceived by the workers, bear some affinity to the
above movements insofar as their activities were confined to the point of
production. But, unl ike these other movements, the shuras were based in
single factories; they did not last long enough to generate a theoretical
perspective for the future; and they never had the opportunity to act as a
united political force in society. This was undoubtedly one of the major
defects of the movement. The shura organization, as conceptualized by
the industrial workers, was reminiscent of the characteristic features of
the Russian Factory Committees that emerged following the February
Revolution of 1917.
Misconceptions About What Happened
Almost all of the left was surprised by the sudden emergence of s/»/ms.
Almost all left-wing organizations, as well as the shuras themselves, were
confused about what to do and about what kind of possible role the shuras
could play politically. The left's theoretical knowledge about workers'
councils did not extend beyond a few articles by Gramsci. That the
shuras, as conceived by the left ist forces, were reminiscent of the Russian
experience, was based overwhelmingly on a version of that history which
is crude and mechanical methodologically, and uncritical politically. No
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other experiences are viewed or evaluated, nor have they learnt from
them — for example, those experiences of Germany, Italy, Portugal,
Spain, Chile, Eastern Europe — nor those particular forms of workers'
organization that emerged in advanced capitalist countries like Britain in
the Revolutionary conjuncture or those theories and practices developed
during stable periods.
Most of the literature on the workers' councils confuses two distinct
forms of workers' organization, through a misconception of the terms
factory committee and council/Soviets, when applying them to the Iranian
experience. These terms are generally employed to describe the experi-
ences of the Russian masses in 1905 and in the February-October 1917
Revolutions. In 1917 in Russia three types of workers' organization
sprang up in the early days of the February Revolution: factory committees
(fabzavkomy), councils (soviets) and trade unions (profsoyozy).2 In Farsi,
the term shura is used by commentators in all three meanings. In the
experience of Russian workers, the factory committees were the product
of specific revolutionary circumstances and of particular political,
economic and ideological transformations (the vacuum of power in the
workplaces and the emergence of a new ideology amongst the workers).
The factory committees were shop-floor workers' organizations which
were attempting to exert control over the process of production and
distr ibution. They were rarely involved in high level planning. They were
threatening the domination of capital at the point of production. In terms
of the formal extent of workers' control, the British shop-steward organ-
izations of the inter-war period were more successful than the Russian
factory committees (Smith, 1983). But the socio-economic conditions
and the balance of forces within which those two forms of workers'
organizations sprang up were radically different. While the shop-steward
movement was basically a defence by skilled craft workers against
deskilling, the Russian factory committee movement was part of a struggle
to weaken the position of capital in the workplace.
On the other hand, the term soviet (or council) referred to two
forms of organization: first , to the actual Soviet of Factory Committees
(the Executive Committee of the Conference of Factory Committees
held in late May 1917) and secondly, to the Soviet of Deputies of Petro-
grad (Ferro, 19"C7,vp. 150). In this Soviet, the workers could be elected
from the members of the factory committees, or elected from all the
workers representing a given factory on it. It was this last organization,
the Soviet of Deputies, which eventually questioned bourgeois stale
power, becoming a state within a state.
A number of commentators compare the functions of the shurus
with the shuras(!) of the Russian Revolution — the soviets. They con-
clude that the Iranian workers' shuras were not in fact shuras, but a
distorted type of the Workers' Councils/Soviets; and that workers' S/H//V/.V
were a kind of syndicate (Paykar, 25 and 58), at best a radical syndicate,
because they did not question the bourgeois state power and because,
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unlike the Russian soviets, they did not constitute an alternative rudi-
mentary form of proletarian state.
On the other hand, there was a tendency among most of the left-
wing groups to dismiss the shuras as a spontaneous activity of the working
class. Yet their emergence delighted the left, because they created a
justifiable ground for the left's relevance and rhetoric.3Theoretically, for
these groups the concept of shura hardly went beyond ahistorical quota-
tions from Lenin, for whom the political role of such organizations, to
stand against the bourgeois state, was the most important one.
The traditional left viewed lhcshuru\ in terms of their oppositional
role against the employers, or the government, a role that any radical
workers' organizations, including trade unions, could in certain circum-
stances play. Lit t le attention has been paid to the most significant and
distinctive character of the shura as an organi/ation of workers' control
which seeks to defy the division of labour at the point of production (the
division between management and executive).
Defining the success or failure of the shuras by their militancy,
left-wing groups divided them into three types: yellow shuras run by
pro-Khomeini and fanatical Islamic workers; 'real' s/i/m/s elected directly
by workers who might or might not serve the interests of rank-and-file
workers (if they did not, they were simply viewed as ignorant); and lastly,
the revolutionary shuras whose members were sympathizers with left-
wing organizations. The political tendency of the shura members therefore
became the criterion for the success or failure of a shura', to what extent
and degree, over what areas and in what condition a .shura exerted control
became irrelevant. Such an approach was furthermore unable to explain
the antagonism between the yellow shuras and liberal managements
The Workers' Conceptions of the Shura
We will now consider what conception the rank-and-file workers had of
the shuras. It is natura l ly difficult to draw up a clear-cut categorization of
the i r views. Some workers had already translated their perceptions into
the common terminologies such as nezâratur intervention; but these were
too vague to be useful.
We l imit ourselves, here, to the data collected through in-depth
interviews in three factories in Teheran: Metal Works, I.T.N. Company
(producer of electricity transformers) and Arasteh (producer of domestic
appliances). I limit my quotations to a few statements by workers, each
representing a distinct conception.
The statements suggest that three conceptions might be identified.
The Trade Unionist Conception
Q: What do you th ink the s/u/ra should do?
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A: Shunts must represent the real wishes of the workers; must get the rights
of the workers from the boss; mustn't let them be violated.
Q: Could the syndicate do this job?
A: The syndicates have been infiltrated by the boss's guards; if they had not
been, they would have been OK.
Very few workers expressed such an opinion. The shura, for them,
was only a means of representation of the workers in their economic
demand-making process.
The Universal Conception
Syndicates take only the workers' [economic] interests into consideration,
not the social [total] interests, or the interests of the whole country. But the
shura concerns itself with the whole social interests, the country's interests
. . . the syndicate would defend only workers' money [wages], getting some
money to the workers and forgetting about the rest ! Where the products will
be going, into whose pocket, etc. — these things are not the concern of the
syndicate (an I.T.N. Company worker).
Workers holding this view maintain that the shuras must have
responsibility not only to the workers, but also the society as a whole.
This ideology expands the social role of the shuras, as opposed to its being
limited inside the factory fences. On the other hand, however, it wishes to
act not simply beyond the factory walls, but beyond their class boundaries.
This populist aspect of this conception could not last long unless its
material basis is provided.
Control and Nezârat
We do want the shuras. It is not possible for seven hundred workers to go
up [to the management office] and negotiate with the factory directors.
We want a shura to be appointed, going up, solving our problems.
A: What kind of problems?
Q: Any; about wages, about the function of the factory, about sales, orders,
etc., those which are recognized by Law . . . The shura must intervene in
all these cases which are legal.
The first part of the statement seems to suggest a rather trade
unionist conception: the shura is conceived as the workers' representative
in negotiation with management. However, from the viewpoint of this
worker, its function goes beyond demanding the legal rights of the usual
shop-steward committee. For this worker, the problems of the factory as
a whole — its functioning, sales, purchases and so on — are considered to
be his problems. He feels his right to have a say, to interfere in factory
affairs. This is an expression of the ideology of possession.
It is striking that a large proportion of workers conceived of the
shura as the sole responsible body in the factory — the organ through
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which the workers could exert their power, could question those who
unt i l recently were ruling them in the factory.
We have formed and appointed this shura to be in charge of the factory, to
sort out the affairs and problems. We have built the shura for the sake of our
Revolution . . . But now we see that the directing body by no means agrees
with our shura.
And describing the anti-.v/zwra character of the directing body, he goes on
to say with outrage,
We produce so much! They [the management] say, "We have to take a loan
from the government!" Where does our product go then? Where do the sales
of this factory go? . . . What they get from the government belongs to this
country's wealth; it belongs to the whole people.
Worker K
The shura must be Islamic; must be recognized by law.
Q: What are its duties?
A: Its tasks should he that it must be resolute in the face of the directing
body and the l ike; must intervene in everything; must run this factory.
But this directing body destroys any shura we build.
Worker D
At the moment we are not talking about the economic interests. First of all
the factory should have an income, so that we can get some. But it hasn't had
any output; that is, it hasn't been found out whether it has or not. Because
we don't have a real shura to control the input-output issues, keeping them
under its own control . . . The shura must have the right [to control]. In
order to be able to do that it must be recognized.
And lastly, Worker E of I.T.N. factory:
We have built the shura to defend our rights, to be able to speak out.
Q: The syndicate could do the same job, couldn't it?
A: Well, the syndicate was eeonomistic: it expected us to work eight hours
tor some pennies; that was it. It didn't involve questioning who the
management was, what it was doing, what it bought, where the money
came from and so on. We were not involved in [these things] in the past.
But the shura tells the workers where the money (capital) comes from,
where it goes. The shura checks (nezurat) and intervenes in all things; for
instance, financial affairs; employment, purchase, sales and the rest.
There is, however, no mention of the management. So far everything
evolves around the shura. The workers proved to be extraordinarily
committed and responsible for the affairs of the enterprise. They con-
sidered it their right to intervene in its running. It was their right to
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question the managers. 'Where does our product go?' 'Where do the sales
of this factory go?' 'Where does the result of my labour go?' For these
workers, the concept of shura implied the material expression of their
strong desire for control over the organization and administration of
production. And this is indeed the definition of a shura.
Some Reflections on the Workers' Subjectivity
During the interview, the workers were keen for the legalization of
shuras. A positive attitude towards law, legitimacy and the like was not
limited to the sphere of workers' struggle. This could be recognized in the
social behaviour of most people. Any positive attitudes towards undesir-
able laws do not necessarily imply obedience to them. Four areas can be
identif ied where the workers expressed such views.
'Shuras must intervene in all those areas that are recognized by law.'
Such statements were mostly made by the workers who appeared to
support the Islamic regime. The politics of the workers depended less on
economic and sociological stratification (skil l , sex, age, occupation) and
more on ideological considerations. Working-class support for the regime
has been contradictory. Initially, the working class expressed large but
confused support; while it participated in official rallies, it rejected
government labour policies in the workplace. (This confused support has
now been replaced with clear opposition by the large majority of the
workers.)
Pro-regime workers were a tiny stratum which was sub-divided into
three groups. The first group were those who had been granted some
social or ideological role as functionaries of the formal or informal labour
organizations such as Khane-i Kargar (Labour House) or the Islamic
Associations. This group benefited materially from its privileged position.
The second group might be said to feel and articulate an identity of
ideological interest with the regime because of kinship relations; workers
whose close relatives held significant positions in the regime either as an
influential clergyman or as state agents fell into this category. Such
adherence reflected a tribal form of solidarity (probably an ideal form of
social relations from the point of view of the ruling clergy).4
The third group were influenced by the contradictory nature of the
Islamic state. They regarded the state as anti-capitalist and anti-
oppression. The mechanism of this influence has already been described
in the discussion on the ideological sources of the corporatist.v/iura.v in the
previous chapter. Any support, on this count, could be expected to be
highly vulnerable. Let us consider the statement of worker B.
The shura must he Islamic, must he recognized by law.
Q: What are its tasks''
A: Its tasks should he that, it must he resolute against the Board of Directors
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and the like; it must intervene in everything, must run the factory . . .
While Worker B believes in an Islamic shura and its recognition by
law, in practice he opposes the government's conception of the shura.
This contradiction in support is the reflection of a contradiction in the
state and between the workers' class interests and their views on the state.
Recognition by Law as a Guarantee
Our major problem is that the authorities do not recognize the shuras as
such . . . If they don't then they will be exactly like the syndicates, without
any difference . . . Now these days, the employees, how shall I put it, in fact
threaten the management. In such situations, then, the shura has to accept
the responsibility, meeting the demands of the workers. If it doesn't, then
how does it differ from the syndicate? What is i t , then, that constrains the
shura'! It is i t s non-recognition. If theshurasare recognized, then any other
problems will simply be tackled.
A struggle for reform is not necessarily reformism. The reform can
be a basis for a further advance. Demanding a guarantee from the state is
a common practice, from the Western trades unions to the Polish Solidar-
ity. The workers who had similar views to Worker B upon legality might
mean to get a recognized concession from the state. If they were legalist,
i.e. accepted the government's Resolutions on the shuras, they wouldn't
say 'the shura must intervene in everything.'
Caution before Repression
A cautious mentali ty is the product of a society dominated by repression
and a secret-police order. This atmosphere produces fear of colleagues,
lack of trust and a culture of insecurity. Such a social order was reproduced
by the Islamic state; formal and informal state organizations carried out
the task of social and ideological control in almost all public places.5 (To
the causes of insecurity we must add the notorious Article 33 of the
Labour Law according to which workers could be dismissed without
explanations, and the high level of unemployment.) In the course of
conducting an interview on the subject in the shura office in the Metal
Works factory, a shura member made the point clear.
hxcusc me, I th ink you will get better resul ts i f you talk to people one by
one, w i t h o u t anybody else being present, rather than talking to them
altogether in a group. You went into the shops — but perhaps the workers
can't speak the truth: there, here or anywhere. For this reason, I told you
that I wouldn't be interviewed.
Legalism as a Tactic-
Having been produced by despotic socio-political conditions, tactical
legalism is a distinct form of popular culture. The logic is to defeat the
enemy with its own weapons. There are countless examples of this tactic.
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In the infamous event of Carvan SaraSangi, the workers were reported to
have held the Shah's pictures in their hands.6 In a strike action, under the
Shah, in the Fiasco factory in Teheran, the workers, by covering the
machines with the Shah's pictures, made them virtually idle. In the Iran
National Car Factory (Talbot), in a strike incident under the old regime, a
meeting at which one of the managers was giving a speech was disrupted
by workers who were chanting, 'Long live the Shah'. This tradition is still
alive, but of course in different forms. Chants such as 'In the name of
Imam Khomeini ' , 'in the name of God', are utilized for protection,
neutralization and for further offensive purposes.
In the state-run Iran Cars factory, a severe confrontation occurred
after the shura withdrew funds from the financial department to pay the
workers their year-end bonus in March 1981. Some of the shura members
were jailed as the state reacted against the action. The workers withdrew
their claims in order to get their shura members released. The day I
visited the plant, the representatives of the Iman (Khomeini) and of the
Prosecutor-General turned up at the factory to settle the continuing
dispute. After a bitter argument between the workers and the representa-
tives, one Azerbaijani worker stood up and declared, 'Just as we brought
down the Shah's regime, we are able to bring down any other regimes.' At
this moment the workers started clapping. The worker stopped them by
saying, 'Takhir,7 please, my brothers' (Bayat, 1983).
In a society where self-expression and protest are banned, the
workers wil l take any possible channel to advance their struggle which
might not assume a conventional form. Perhaps that is why it appears to
be so hard to grasp, let alone foresee, the abrupt extraordinary mass
eruptions, unless we comprehend the complex social psychology and the
forms of expression of mass mi l i t ancy in such societies. Those kinds of
mass eruption were well demonstrated historically in Russia in 1905 and
February 1917 (Smith, 1980; Liebman, 1975), in Iran in 1978 and Poland
in 1980 (Singer, 1982).
Notes
1. This position is criticized by C'oates, 'Democracy and Workers' Control' in
Vanek, 1975, pp. 90-91. I have examined confusions surrounding the concept
'workers' control' in European l i terature, in Chapter 2.
2. For an analysis of factory committees in Russia, sec Smith. I'W3; Avrich,
!963;Ferro, 1980; Kaplan, 1969 and Siriani, 1982.
3. See for example Kar, no. 62. The traditional left includes organi/ations and
tendencies both of the Stalinist line, such as I udeh, iedaecn (both factions) and
Maoist groups.
4. See the remarks on the character of the Islamic state (Chapters 7 and 10);
also notice the pa te rna l i s t i c ideologies prevalent in the countryside, being carried
by the migrant peasants into the taetories, in Chapter 4.
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5. After 20 June 1981, Khomeini ordered people to spy on their neighbours.
Children were interrogated in the schools about family conversations
6. Carvan Sara Sangi is on the road between Teheran and the town of Karadj,
where the striking workers of ( 'hit-i Julian text i le factory, who were demonstrating
along the road, encountered the gunfire of the Shah's paramilitary forces in 1976.
In this event at least three workers were said to have been killed.
7. As regards the term lakbir, it should be noted that conventional kinds of
applause are considered to be an unlslamic form of praise, and have been replaced
by takbir— a call for the slogan Allah Akbar. Applause has thus become a form of
collective expression of opposition to, and independence from, the regime.
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9. Historical and Structural
Limitations of the Shuras
In this chapter the two major causes of the .v/mrw's disintegration are
discussed. Political pressure is analysed in terms of the policies of the
state and capital on the shuras, and historical/structural limitations which
were most clearly manifested in the contradiction between two aspects of
the work of management, that is co-ordination and control.
Political Pressure
The political factor is related to the attitudes of both the state and capital
towards the shuras. Although, for the reasons previously mentioned, the
relationship between the Islamic state and capital has long remained
contradictory, it was primarily the anti-authoritarian orientation of the
workers' councils to which they both expressed their opposition.
The State and the Shuras
At different times different fractions in the Islamic state adopted different
attitudes towards the councils. The Provisional Government of Mehdi
Bazargan, composed of liberal-religious elements, categorically opposed
the shuras and the notion of workers' participation. The provisional
government set up a Special Force composed of appointed inspectors
inside the plants to report on councils' activities. The P.G., instead,
advocated the establishment of syndicates.
The populist fraction of the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) known as
the 'Imam's Line' aimed at creating a form of Islamic corporatism in
order to integrate labour into the Islamic state. In general, corporatism is
a form of populist strategy which attempts to integrate the tripartite
forces of labour, capital and the state in order to make them work
co-operatively for the good of a 'beloved nation'. Corporatism in Iran had
a further ingredient of Islamic ideology: a corporatism of Islamic workers,
mashru, legitimate capital (or maktabi, l i terally Islamic, management)
and the Islamic state, all co-operating for the common cause of the
Islamic nation. By attempting to adopt such a policy, the IRP in practice
strengthened the notion of shuraiun, albeit with an Islamic character,
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employing it both in workplaces and in society at large in order to
discredit the values and the elements it considered 'liberal'. The policy
also aimed to pre-empt the socialist ideas and organizations with which
the idea of shuraism had been intertwined. The policy in practice also
weakened the position of workers by dividing the councils into 'Islamic'
and 'non-Islamic'. The non-conformist councils were later dismantled.
The 'fundamentalist ' faction of the IRP, the Hojjatieh sect, believed
that the very concept of shuras was irrelevant to Islam. It was argued that
power in Islam emanates from God, through the mediation of Imam and,
in his absence, through naib Imam (the lmam\ substitute on earth). As
inst i tut ions of power from below, shuras were considered to be unlslamic.
In 19X1, Ahmad Tavakoli, the then Labour Minister and a follower of
Hojjatieh sect, prohibited the formation of the new Islamic shuras for a
year. But the workers' resistance and the power struggle within the state
led to his dismissal. The power struggle over the nature of a new Law of
Shuras continued. Khomeini himself largely shared the view of Hojjaiich
on the issue of the shuras, and observers consider this to be the main
reason for the conflict between Khomeini and Ayatollah Taleghani — a
popular clergyman who died in 1979 and who advocated shuras.^
The State and Management Sabotage
The management and the Ministry of Industry were aware of the workers'
technical failings, and knew that they would be unable to pose a prole-
tarian solution to end the crisis in industry by running the workplaces
properly by themselves. A worker in the Metal Works clearly explained
th i s to me.
Mr T [the owner] is a capitalist Ho is now in the National Organization of
Industry, with Mr Neemat Zadch who was the Minister of Labour. At the
moment our engineers are also there, all conspiring against the workers.
The strategy of the liberal managers and the Ministry of Industry, under
the Bazargan cabinet, was to defeat the workers through the paralysis of
production by, for instance, going on strike or passive acts of sabotage in
production and administration. After the revolution when the ideology of
possession and control developed, the workers would no longer tolerate
authori tar ian relations within the workplaces. The strategy of managers
was to re-establish, as far as possible, the previously existing authoritarian
relations. Having failed to provide an institutional medium between
themselves and the workers, the liberal managers attempted to undermine
the workers' confidence. They were trying to shatter the authority of the
workers through their role in the technical division of labour. This effec-
tive and rather common strategy was supported by the liberal faction
wi th in the government, as a worker at Metal Works reflected:
These [state] managers are plotting with the boss against the workers. They
want to destroy the factory and then pretend it was our doing. We have been
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to the Ministry of Industry on several occasions. The answer was, "You go
and take to the streets, start striking and demonstrating!"
Management's competence in its functioning was a factor of pro-
duction which managers and the state refused to allow the shuras to use.
The state also used economic blockade as another strategy to make the
independent shuras yield by denying them access to other components of
the productive forces. Through its control over economic life via the
credit system, market and international transactions, the state could
easily manage to halt production. The impact of such intervention will be
clear when we remember that over 70%, and in some sectors (like
chemicals) almost 1(K)% of industrial raw materials, were imported from
abroad. According to one report, transactions with the SAKA plant
shura were banned by the state and the bazaar merchants, on the ground
that the shura members were communists (Rah-i Kargar). In the Orkideh
Chinese factory the state cut off the import of raw materials from West
Germany after the workers had taken control of the plant. Credit to two
factories of the Naz-Nakh and Isfahan Wool Industry were cut back by
the state, in order to dismantle the shuras. This was one reason why the
shura workers interviewed were sensitive about their competence to
conduct transactions with foreign countries.
Physical Liquidation
The use of force is always the last resort in exerting illegitimate domination.
Il may take arbitrary, legal-systematic and institutionalized forms. The
state used all of these means to liquidate the independent shuras
The wave of struggle based around workers' control in the first
period forced Bazargan to use legal forms or force to put down popular
agitation. The law of formation of Special Force in industry was passed
and implemented only three months after the Insurrection. The Special
Force was conceived to prevent the intervention of the shuras or strike
committees within managerial selection and management operations and
to control and report on the elements who were waging acts of sabotage
and disruption. The policy of use of force, in the first period, culminated
in August 1979 when the first wave of suppression was launched. Many
independent shura activists were arrested and a number of them executed.
The second wave of liquidation followed the closure of the universi-
ties, when a substantial number of independent-interventionist shuras
were dismantled. The factory shuras in Tabriz, an industrial zone in
Azerbaijan, were the primary victims. In Machin Sazi plant, the office of
the shura was sealed up following a demonstration by the loyalist workers
who had been organized by the Islamic Associations. The 40-member
shura was dissolved, and the members were sacked. A similar process
occurred in other plants (Tractor Sazi, Lift-Truck, Pompiran and
Compidro). The strong union of factory shuras:of Gilan province was the
next victim. Later followed the liquidation of factory shuras in the arma-
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ment industry Union of Factory Committees of West Teheran, the oil
industry, the railways and a number of others. Another strong union
was the Union of Factory Shuras of the Organization of Industrial
Development (UFSOID). This organization owned and controlled sev-
eral state industrial plants throughout the country. The UFSOID's
in tent ion of holding a country-wide congress was opposed by the
Min i s t ry of Industry. The UFSOID, however, went ahead with organiz-
ing the congress, after which the Minister of Indust ry ordered its
dissolution. The order was implemented after the holding of a counter-
seminar by loyalist workers and the members of the Islamic Associations.
( Is lamic Associations, the organs of pro-regime workers, played an
important role in harassing the interventionist shuras by spying on and
watching the movements of the shura members and through organizing
anti-shura activities.)
The role of the military forces, Pasdaran, in terrorizing and liquid-
ating the shuras was also crucial. Pasduran\ involvement in industrial
disputes started right from the insurrection when the new state author-
ity stil l had not been institutionalized. Their role increased, particularly
after the events of July 1981 when the clergy seized the state apparatus
by deposing President Bani'Sadr and ins t i tu t ing a crack-down of op-
position forces. I managed to observe the operations of the Pasdaran
who, in the Fanoos factory, rushed into the factory searching for the
shura members. In this event a number of the shura members were
arrested and the shura i tself was dismantled. In the Iran Cars factory, I
was told, following the June Days of 1981, the armed Pasdaran had
rushed into the factory and begun arresting shura members and other
activists according to a blacklist prepared by the Islamic Association. In
one day 73 workers were taken away. The shura leader, a pro-
Mudjahedin worker, had already been kidnapped at the factory gate,
and a few days later I found his name in the daily paper in the list of
executed people of the day.
It may seem confusing when I l imi t the workers' control activities
to only a few months af ter the insurrection, the first period, and yet s t i l l
speak of the l iquidation of the shura members in the third period. This
only shows that although the period of actual workers' control practice
did not last long, the desire for shuras continued.
The political crack-down was indeed a devastating blow to the
structure and the activities of the independent councils. It is, however, a
mistake to at tr ibute the disintegration of the councils wholly to the
political factors. I would argue that the internal contradictions of the
shuras should be considered as the major factor responsible for their
fa i lu re . In other words, for the reasons provided below, the real (vs the
formal) power of the shuras would have been undermined, even in the
absence of political pressure.
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The Internal Contradictions of the Shuras
In the previous chapter we concluded that for the workers the shuras were
the organizational manifestation of a desire for control over the processes
of production and administration of production. We have characterized
the first period of five to six months as the phase of control from below.
The shuras then began to be replaced by a one-man-management system.
Did the workers give in to the return of professional managers? Did
they launch any resistance against the professional managers and the
system they represented? While on several occasions the workers had put
the managers on trial and dismissed them, later — and months after
running the companies themselves — they requested the state to send
back these same professional managers. In our own research sample, the
workers in three factories — Amazon, Teheran Auto and Behshar -
themselves requested the Ministry of Industry to dispatch state-managers.
And in other factories the workers and the shura felt the need for pro-
fessional managers. That approach, however, by no means reduced their
commitment to the shura and their desire and demand for control. In
order to investigate this contradiction, it is necessary to understand the
workers' conceptions of management.
The workers wanted professional managers becuse they needed
their technical competence without which the very existence of the shuras
as effective organs of control over production and distribution would be
in jeopardy. A militant employee and the leader of the first shura in the
Iran Cars factory, explained that fact with regret.
As soon as the regime toppled, the shura was formed. The workers believed
it to be their right to interfere in any job. Management no longer made any
sense for them. They replaced the managers. They halted any "anti-worker"
plans. They launched efforts to provide raw material. Foreign managers
were all sacked. The management had actually been paralysed . . . How-
ever, the level of output w;is pretty low. The \huru would have to pay
salaries and wages. They s t i l l would have to get raw materials to the plant.
But it was a hard job. The shura then had to appeal to the government for
help. You know, the shura wasn't able to pay the wages for even one month.
Therefore, it had to come to terms with the state-appointed managers. As a
result, the shura in fact lost its genuineness'
A shura member in the Amazon factory was also convinced of the
necessity of managerial competence.
A question which one should not really deny is that, if a shura does not
possess the expertise of supplying things and of management, then it can by
no means replace the management. It has to have that expertise. There is no
question about it I f we had carried on in the same manner, i.e. running
the plant without the management, it would certainly have been a failure; a
one hundred per cent defeat. Because, where I [as a shura member] do not
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know anything about supplies, any foreign language and about how to
import materials, or when I do not have a legal authori ty , I wouldn't be able
to run things.
Workers' requirement for the technical competence of manage-
ment was not in accord with the whole management rationale. (The
character of the workers' struggle around the shura in the second phase
has to be seen in relation to this . ) This implies that the workers had to
accept only one aspect of management: the technical side. The case of the
Metal Works in Teheran is instructive here. Unlike in the other factories,
the Metal Works workers (with the shura) and the management were in
the midst of a hitter struggle on this very issue when I conducted my
research. Following the dispute the management had gone on strike for
25 days when I visited the factory. I shall, therefore, concentrate on this
particular factory.
Pointing to the management's strike, a shura member complained
bitterly.
When that gentleman [engineer-manager] says "I won't come under these
conditions", it was we who appointed them as provisional managers. Now.
they must come back and do their proper work. If they've resigned from
management, then they must turn up to their usual work. We will appoint
some other managers. At the moment a number of furnaces are out of order
— the two 12-ton ones, which are the heart of the factory.
Asgar, a skilled worker, reacted angrily.
Since the revolution we have tried to keep this factory on its feet; but we
have failed. [Why?] Because they don't allow it . . . These people [managers]
have gone and sat in the Central Office! What are the tasks of an engineer
[now one of the elected managers]? The engineer must stay at the factory
and work. Why has this engineer gone and sat in the boss's office? Who's
paying for it?
Other statements reiterate the message: 'The factory will be paralysed
while the management sits on its arse up there. The management must
work, to find out what the [technical] problems are' and 'My friend, this
factory needs only one manager, and one good engineer.'
A technicist conception of management might be defined as a
tendency among the workers not to accept the basic division of labour
between the functions of conception and execution; and yet, due to
technical inabil i ty, they have to come to terms with the necessity of using
the technical competence of the management. A 'natural conception' is the
tendency of workers who regard a division between the two functions of
conception and execution as essential and natural.2
The workers, in practice, both wanted and did not want the manage-
ment. This is not a contradiction in workers' behaviour, but rather the
reflection of a contradiction wi th in capitalist management.
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The Functions of Control and Co-ordination
The work of management or supervision is itself a specific performance of
productive labour.
Flows of input materials and instruments of labour must find their way to
workers at well-timed intervals for each activity. Finances must he available
for sales and borrowing to pay for labour power, materials and tools. The
final output must be marketed. (Friedman, 1977b, p. 77)
When a manager, a functional capitalist, performs the work of manage-
ment, he in fact creates surplus-value. 'He creates surplus-value not
because he works as a capitalist, but because he also works, regardless of
his capacity as a capitalist' (Marx, 1977, p. 382). This work, the function
of co-ordination of production, is necessary in any complex economy. For
'all directly social or communal labour on a large scale' requires a 'direct-
ing authority' in order to co-ordinate individual and social behaviour
(Marx, 1979, p. 449).
The second function of management is the exercise of authority and
power, the 'function of control' which is specific to 'all modes of produc-
tion based upon the antithesis between the labourer as the direct producer,
and the owner of the means of production' (Marx, 1977, p. 384). In
capitalist production relations, it is the major aspect of the work of
management. For the capitalist production process is never just a technical
process; it rests upon social relations of production — the relation between
labour and capital which is by nature antagonistic (Marx, 1977, pp. 449-
50; de Vroey in Nichols, 1980). Historically, the function of control
became dominant, especially with the advent of manufacturing, and
hierarchical management systems, and with the domination of real sub-
sumption of labour to capital. In the course of transformation from craft
production and co-operation to the manufacturing system, as with the
development of the division of labour with the manufacturing process, the
labourers who had control over the production process became sub-
ordinated to the requirements of capital (Braverman, 1974; Littler, 1982).
The individual labourers became deprived of their 'knowledge, judge-
ment and will ' ; what they previously possessed was now in the hands of
' the capital which [confronted] them' (Marx, 1979, p. 482). These two
functions of management under capitalism are separated only at the level
of abstraction. Under capitalist relations, they in practice reproduce each
other.
The function of co-ordination, in capitalist production processes,
developed after the transformation of craft production, the detailed
division of tasks, the deskilling process and the advent of the collective
worker: these fragmentations created by capital had to be co-ordinated in
turn by capital itself. Historically and theoretically, then, the work of
co-ordination corresponds with the diminishing autonomy of the labourer.
The diminution of autonomy necessarily infers the domination of authority
and power3 over the labourer (see also, Palloix, 1976).
161
Workers and Revolution in Iran
Any form of organization of production and of labour, influenced
by the requirements of the accumulation process tends to require a
strict division of labour and an ever widening gap between the func-
tions of conception and execution. Such a technical division of labour
corresponds to the social division of labour and the relations of power
and authority. An agent who performs the function of planning or
supervis ing carries a certain degree of authority over his/her sub-
ordinates. The larger and the more complex the structure of industry,
the less visible the actual power of the agents, since power tends to
become depersonali/ed.4
Let us now return to the workers in the factories of Teheran. On the
one hand they were determined to exert control over the processes of
production, distribution and exchange in their enterprises. They demon-
strated a strong desire to make decisions and take part in future planning
and they struggled to direct factory affairs. Practically, however, they felt
tha t they were unable to do so, because of the persistence of the existing
capitalist division of labour.5 For the Metal Works workers the most
viable method was to appoint managers accountable to the workers. As a
result, three members of the Board of Directors (two of them engineers)
were appointed. The result was that no substant ia l change occurred to
realize workers' desire to control. Contradictions, conflicts and confronta-
t ions continued to prevail. Simply speaking, what the workers aimed to
do was to assign the function of control to themselves, and that of
co-ordination to the managers. But as soon as the workers appointed the
managers as the co-ordinators, they inevitably had to accept their author-
ity and control. Neither the goodwill of the managers, nor their accoun-
tab i l i ty to the workers, were capable of creating workers" control and
allowing the workers to exert power over their own work relations. For
power is no longer personal but functional.
If the workers did not appreciate that reality, then it was most l ikely
to bring the person*,, the agents and the personified power under their
mount ing attacks. They, however, had started th ink ing beyond the im-
mediate personalities involved. The basic contradiction is expressed by
an angry worker in the Metal Works
The capi tal is ts don't allow our <>tiura to work. They [the shura members] do
want to work [tor us workers]. We have had seven s/n/ras so tar [Hut] they
don't let them work. [The managers] now have gone off in a huf f , and have
gone up there, to delay our advances. They want us to stop working. They
want to make us go on s t r ike That's i t . They've gone up there, hecause they
want to d ismant le the \hura.
They've already dismant led two. c la iming [the shuni] to he agents of
S A VAK, and [then] they've paid them 55 thousand toumans [about £5,5(X)]
[for their dismissal]! Paying money to SA VAK agents'' Then they have said
they [\hura people] had spoken to Farah [the Shah's wife] during the
Taughunt [Shah's rule] Using th is excuse, they've sacked them. And now
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;ilso, i t this shiira is dissolved and if we build another \hiira, they will
certainly dismantle that too Because the power is in their han<l<i.
The traditional sectors of industry are characterized by quite simple
labour processes and division of labour, and with more team work (for
instance, in the brick-making industry). Simple organization of co-
ordination and a much higher degree of autonomy for the workforce
combined with an easy supply of raw material made it possible for
workers to exert a great deal of control over the process of production and
distr ibut ion. In the brick-making industry an insignificant dispute would
lead workers to take control of the industry; th is happened in the cities of
Tabriz, Amol and Maragheh in the northern provinces. The main factor
preventing workers' control in these industries was political-military.
The Role of Skill
A brief review of the majority of workers' control movements attests that
skill and expertise have been determinant factors in the success or failure
of the movements; and that the skilled workers have been in the forefront
of them. In the German council movement of 1918-1919, the highly
skilled tool-makers, in particular the turners, were the leaders (Bologna,
1976, p. 68; Geary, 1976). In the defensive control movement in Britain
in the 1910s, the skilled craftsmen were the fundamental agitators
(Walker , 1981; Hinton, 1973; Zeitlin, 1980); in the Russian factory
committee movement after the February Revolution in Petrograd, the
strong skilled workers (of Putilov) were the most active (Smith, 1980,
1981). Skill and expertise were spontaneously used as a demonstration of
workers' abili ty to go beyond the predetermined bourgeois relations of
domination at the point of production; as a factor to break down the fetish
of managerial imperative; and as an ideological mediation to reveal the
historicity of the capitalist form of work organization.
Skill is necessarily an element of a (skil led) workers' ability; but it
wil l not necessarily develop class consciousness and class solidarity. In-
stead, it has tended to be a source of craft consciousness, shopism and
occupational sectarianism (Rosenburg, 1980), narrow-minded ideas and
sectarian interest-seeking mentality (Hinton, 1973; Stein, 1978). The
labour aristocracy of the late 19th Century in Britain was of this kind
(Hobsbawm, 1979, chapter 16): viewing their skill as their property. The
defeat of the shop-steward and German council movements are the result
of the sectarian mentality of those privileged skilled workers who
possessed a strong bargaining power (Walker, 1981; Hinton, ibid.,
chapter 10; and Bologna, 1976).
The conflation of skill and sectarianism is not inevitable. It is subject
to two qualifications: firstly, the sectarianism of the skilled and privileged
strata of a working class can be, to a very large extent, modified by the
political conditions of an undemocratic system. The metal-workers of
pre-revolutionary Russia were radically different in polit ical terms from
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the Brit ish labour aristocracy. Secondly, it is wrong to speak of skill in an
abstract sense. Ski l l s are also class-divided and ideological: there are
managerial skills and workers' skills. In this respect, the political orienta-
tion of each is conditioned by the positions of thei r holders in the process
of production, that is, whether they perform work in the labour process or
surplus-value extracting process. In taking ski l l as an abstract notion I am
here reflecting the spontaneous conception of the workers.
The Iranian Case
While the engineers in the Metal Works could have been the source of a
movement for offensive control, they turned out to be moving in exactly
the opposite direction. In Iran, an engineer is privileged both in terms of
his position in the social division of labour and in the technical division of
labour. On the other hand, in a relatively backward labour process, as at
Metal Works, the 'proletarianization of the new middle class, through the
social and technical dequalification of their positions' (Carchedi, 1975)
develops rarely, if at all. Furthermore, in the small, individual factories
we can hardly trace a bureaucratic managerial hierarchy and hierarchical
authori ty relations. Thus, the engineers in such plants as Metal Works
were themselves in authority, and thus within the surplus-value extract-
ing process
The workers appointed the engineers as skilled agents, in order to
enable the workers themselves to exert technical (and, along with it,
social) power. But in practice this appointment defeated its purpose.
Though necessary, the move ultimately resulted in the defeat of the
shura. The political/ideological solidarity of engineers could not effec-
tively help a shura to sustain itself and to exert power; so long as the
predetermined division of labour remained, the objective and real division
would transcend the subjective intentions of solidarity.
In a dual power situation at the point of production, the mass of
unskilled or semi-skil led workers (contrary to what Nichols and Beynon
assert) could only exert what I would call a negative economic power;6
they could oppose capital and halt production. In order to exert a positive
economic power, replace capital and reproduce and sustain their power
at the workplace, they had to transform the capitalist division of labour.
To achieve this necessitated the sci/urc of political power. For many
Marxists the question ends here. That is because for them power is
conceived as an abstract notion, to be exerted in the same way by any
group or individuals or to be transferred as soon as the agents change
positions ( t h i s is formal power). Real power can be exerted by each class
only in the ways appropriate and viable for that class. For example, the
working class cannot exert power by the same methods as those appropri-
ate and feasible for the bourgeoisie. Power is not a subject, but 'a system
of relationships, a structure' (Gorz, 1982, p. 52). And power is meaning-
ful only as long as it is exerted.
It seems reasonable to conclude that while the sei/ure of political
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power, i.e. the defeat of the old rulers, is necessary for workers' control
and for the exertion of workers' power, it is not sufficient. A systematic
attempt to change the dominant subordinating division of labour is the
only viable strategy.
Notes
1. I am indebted to Professor Envard Abrahamian for bringing this to my
attention.
2. The natural conception is expressed in the statement of a typical trade
u n i o n i s t worker, now a xhura member in the Arj factory.
Q: What is the necessity of a management while you have a shural
A: Well, 1 think there must be a management. I think (well, this is what I
personally th ink , others may th ink in some other way) we cannot manage
[without them]. Because in terms of literacy or intellectuality, we are not in the
position, say, to contact abroad. You know 95% of our materials come from
abroad; we must send telegrams, telex and such like. Therefore, we need a
management to supply raw materials, and somehow run the factory.
Q: Is the problem just the fact that you can't speak English or you need some
people to contact other countries'.'
A: Well, it is the problem. But apart from speaking l-.nglish and the res/, the fact is
that, that is not our task, that is. evervbodv must do his own joh. Suppose I am a
worker, I must do my own work.
3. Alan Fox distinguishes the two concepts of authority and power. The former
is t aken to refer to a relation in which 'subordinates legitimize the order-giving
role of the superior, and although sanctions are deemed necessary to deter or
punish transgression, these too arc legitimi/ed. ' Power relations exist 'where
sanctions are used to enforce conformity to norms which the subordinate perceives
as i l legi t imate ' (Fox, 1971. pp. 36-7). In our discussion, both of the concepts are
applicable.
4. For an analysis of the notion of power in capitalist enterprise, see the highly
controversial book by André Gorz, 1982. chapters.
5. Some writers underestimate the question of technical competence of the
managers, technicians or other experts, arguing that it is possible for the workers
to exert workers' control merely through a change in production relations. They
ignore the technical division of labour itsdl as the source of differential power
relations. André Gorz, for instance, in previous works (1978) advocates that view.
While he rightly stresses the ideological role of technology under capitalism, he
separates the two functions of management. This leads to his erroneous conclu-
sion that it is possible to use the expertise and skills of engineers and experts
without accepting the i r authori ty .
6. Nichols and Beynon argue that 'Skill is not essential to control I t is possible
for unskil led workers, subdivided into routine repetitive jobs, to use their collec-
t ive strength to oppose capital' (1977. p. 108). As a matter of fact, opposition to
capi tal is one matter; exertion of control over the production process another.
Every day we are witnessing opposition by the workers against capital throughout
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the world. But the opposition has not yet led to their actual control over the
production process. The question of whether or not, and how, the division of
labour can be abolished constitutes one of the most crucial issues of Marxist
theory. For some remarks on th is , see the concluding chapter.
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Industrial relations is a term widely used by industrial sociologists as well
as by state officials; it is disliked by most Marxists. It has been defined as
'the study of processes of control over work relations' (Hyman, 1975a,
p. 12) and deals with the attempts to exert control over work relations
made by labour on the one hand and capital on the other. Work relations
covers all relations to do with work and the workplace. 'Industrial rela-
tions' is, therefore, the study of aspects of class struggle in a particular
sphere -- the workplace -- manifested in and mediated by various
ins t i tu t ions and regulations.
In the case of Iran we have so far examined only one side of the
struggle for control, that is, the exercise of control by labour, reflected in
the.v/jwra movement. This chapter will analyse the other side: the strategies
of state-capital to control work relations and the workforce. We shall deal
with the objective and historical possibilities, limitations and contradic-
t ions of these strategies in the period 1979-83.
We have counterposed against labour the term state-capital instead
of capital. This is because, as we have pointed out, the Islamic state in the
form of valayat-i faghih took a somewhat autonomous position to capital.
This implies that there was both correspondence and conflict between the
interests of capital and state.
The reflection of this tense relationship may be most readily seen in
the sphere of industrial relations. Below we start by examining the types
of managerial strategies devised to control work relations and to over-
come labour resistance and industrial crisis in the three periods following
the Revolution.
The Strategies of Control
Ever since the emergence of capitalist industry various strategies to
control work relations have been practised. Determined on the one hand
by the law of value (i.e. the accumulation requirements in particular
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circumstances of capitalist development), and on the other, by the
workers' resistance, managerial strategies were faced with inner contra-
dictions and were thus transformed (see Friedman, 1977a). Table 10.1
summarizes the main strategies.
The strategies should be considered as falling into two broad
categories: long-term steady profit maximization and simple short-run
maximization. Any strategies are constrained and conditioned by the
level of accumulation of capital and the character of the class struggle. A
long-term strategy requires a systematic, thoughtful and detailed plan.
This is distinct from the strategy of short-term maximization.
Let us first briefly clarify each of the concepts introduced in the
table. Craft control has already been described in Chapter 5. This is not
really a strategy of capital. Historically, subsequent strategies were initi-
ated as alternatives to this form of labour process which is characterized
by the high level of control, both technical and social, exerted by labour
over the labour process. Craft control was dominant in the pre-monopoly
stage of capitalism, and relied upon the detailed knowledge of all aspects
of commodity production. The contradictions within this form of work
relation were first revealed when the control exercised by labour over the
production process ceased to be compatible with the requirements for
capital accumulation. The second bottleneck is quite distinct from, though
interrelated to, the first. In response to resistance and opposition, capital
needed to adopt a strategy of real subordination of labour, not immedi-
ately for maximization purposes, but in order to subordinate labour
ideologically, by dividing up the labour process, separating individual
labourers and divesting them of judgement and will, so making them
dependent upon the direction and control of non-labourers (Marx, 1979,
pp. 449-50; Burawoy, 1982 and Gorz, 1978).1 The development is not
just a technical transformation, but also an ideological and social one.
Hence the emergence of Taylorism.
Taylorism did not simply replace the craft control system, which
continues, in a limited degree, even now. But capital required a new
strategy compatible with its project of long-term profitability. Taylorism
assumed that workers were motivated by rational calculations of their
individual self-interests. Therefore it could be desirable to divide, as far
as possible, the various motions of a single performance, assigning each
to a single worker to perform. Payment of a higher wage to the first-class
workers was assumed to compensate for the monotony and meaningless-
ness of work. At the same time, as well as the technical subordination
result ing from the detailed division of labour and the strategic separation
of conception from execution, hierarchical and structural control re-
placed the simple control of the craft system (Edwards, 1979 and Littler,
1982a; Rose, 1975). It was the accumulation process and progress of early
twentieth-century monopoly capitalism that set up the material basis tor
this strategy (structural control). This is what Friedman calls direct con-
trol (I977b). The contradictions of Taylorism or direct control are
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demonstrated in the first instance by the fact that widespread division of
labour extended the Taylorian labour process to most parts of an enter-
prise or industry, thus categorizing almost all workers as first-class
workers with supposedly higher wages. In the second place, with the
universal practice of this strategy in the competitive market, the law of
value forced wages lower. Thirdly, contrary to Taylor's assumption, the
will of the worker is not simply guided by economic motives (Friedman,
1977a, pp. 49-50). The ideology of possession among the Iranian workers
offers relevant evidence to counter this.
Fordism, employed in America after the First World War, could not
be an alternative to Taylorism. Fordism was the mechanized version of
Taylorism. If, in the case of Taylorism, workers as fragmented organs
were controlled immediately by piece-rate or time-rate mechanisms and
supervisors, under the Fordist system they were controlled by automa-
t ion, getting direction and guidance from the machines. Alain Lipiet/,
together with Aglietta, has conceptualized Fordism as a particular stage
of global capitalism, and in so doing has added another important dimen-
sion to the concept. Lipietz refers to 'the continual ad/iutim-nt of mass
consumption to the historically unprecedented rise in productivity gen-
erated by intensive accumulation' (my emphasis) (Lipiet/, I9S2 and
Aglietta, 1979). This tendency for increase in the workers' real wages —
due to the cheapening of goods necessary for the reproduction of his/her
labour power because of higher productivity and despite a probable
decline in the value of wages — has a decisive ideological impact upon the
working class in their opposition to capitalism (Seabrook, 1978) and
capitalist work organization. It is therefore not unlikely to alleviate the
tensions resulting from the contradictions of Taylorism discussed above
(in particular the wage cuts due to market competition).
The limitations and contradictions of Taylorism and Fordism pro-
duced resistance from the workforce in the forms of a 'high rate of
absenteeism and of turnover, a large amount of wastage and of rejects,
and an increase in stoppages and sabotage' (Palloix, 1976, p. 62). This led
capital to seek alternative measures. As a result, a range of theories of
industr ia l behaviour developed and were used experimentally with the
aim of making work more interesting. Human factor industrial psychology
(HFIP) emerged in Br i ta in ; the Human Relations school in both America
(the Harvard Group and Chicago School) and in Britain (Tavistock
I n s t i t u t e ) (Rose, 1975). These schools, as Friedman (I977a, p. 52) sum-
marized, with their emphasis on human instincts and sentiments,
have suggested a combination of mak ing the work itself more interes t ing
(appealing to individual desires for sociabil i ty, security, challenge and
variety), choosing workers who best fit in with the tasks required, and the
sensitive and subtle exercising of managerial authority through the mani-
pulat ion of sentiment — encouraging venom against compctitois (particu-
larly foreign), "counselling" non-cooperative workers, and encouraging a
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feeling of team struggle through participatory and rewarded suggestion
schemes, and the judicious payment of loyalty-inducing perks, such as
company recreational facilities.
Industrial psychology and human relations theories were not the
only alternatives. The main alternative strategy was the actual reorgan-
ization of the labour process in a way that was responsive to the resistance
of the workforce such as neo-Fordism (Palloix)2 or responsible autonomy
(Friedman) or restrictive practices (Hyman and Elger) or job enrichment.
The new strategy, responsible autonomy, involves
allowing individual workers or groups of workers a wide measure of discre-
tion over the direction of their work tasks, and the maintenance of
managerial authority by getting workers to identify with the competitive
aims of the enterprise, so that they will act "responsibly" with a minimum of
supervision (Friedman, 1977a, p. 48).
The strategy of responsible autonomy or neo-Fordism is also prone
to contradictions as long as it is operated in the context of a market
economy. In contrast to the situation that predominates in Third World
countries, in the advanced capitalist societies the rate of capital resiliency
- the rate of response of capital to opportunity costs and the effects of
market rationale — is high and enterprise management has become an
active process. Management has to prepare to respond through continual
reorgnization of tactics to ongoing changes and requirements which are
independent of it. The need for higher rates of productivity brings a
change in the pace of work and the introduction of new machinery, which
require the consent of the workers, and thus an elaborate ideological
apparatus for co-opting the leaders, and in particular the rank and file.3 It
is therefore likely that, as Friedman argues, the management will resort
to the older strategies of direct control, in which case this would lead to
the emergence of new fundamental tensions and contradictions (1477b,
pp. 106-8).
Limitations and Historicity of Managerial Strategy
What followed were structural strategies of managerial control for a
long-term profit maximization. The strategy of structural transformation
of t he labour process has to be compatible with the long-term functional
policies of dominating the market, safeguarding opportunities for in-
novation, promoting brand familiarity and so on. The alternative to this
strategy may be called short-term profit maximization, which is a set of
functional policies.
According to this perspective, the manager/owner aims to achieve a
rapid turnover of capital, lower costs and higher profit, even though these
short-term objectives be in contrast to long-term stable profit maximiza-
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t ion. He prefers raw and unskilled but cheap labour to expensive but
skilled and stable labour; he prefers to produce goods of poor quality and
lesser costs to better but more expensive ones. In short, the policy is a
non-strategy which the manager inherits or has imposed upon him in-
voluntarily through the logic of accumulation and political insecurity.
This is the situation in most Third World countries
Structural strategies have emerged in particular stages and condi-
t ions of capitalist development. Some require an abili ty for a drastic
change in the organic composition of capital in favour of fixed capital
share, like Fordism; for some — a change to a system of co-operation or
Taylorism — this is not indispensable. Some strategies have as a pre-
requisite an ideologically paternalized workforce; such is the strategy of
participation and any form of responsible autonomy. While craft control
was the product of the strong bargaining power (of the skilled workers) in
the late 19th Century, responsible autonomy is the product of monopoly
capitalism, a strategy offered by capital in response to the resistance of a
workforce.
An analysis of the limitations and possibilities of managerial strategy
in post- (or pre-) revolutionary Iran has to lie located in the context of the
global distr ibution of technology and expertise which to a large extent,
though by no means entirely, determines structural strategies both in the
centre and the periphery. At this stage, therefore, the managerial strategy
of the periphery has to be characterized
Managerial Strategy and the Labour Process in the Third World
Frances Stewart, in her book Technology and Un({erdevelopment(\977),
wrote,
two or three hundred years ago, organisation [of production] in the now-
advanced countries was probably not all that dissimilar to conditions in large
parts of the underdeveloped countries today: traditional employment ties of
a feudal or semi-feudal nature operated side-by-side with self-employed
units (p. (i\ )
Despite the qual ifying phrases this statement deserves criticism.
Our whole argument is against such approaches. One of the major
features of Third World development is its uncvenness. As far as the
organization of the production and labour process in these countries is
concerned, this unevenness applies not only to a single country, but to the
whole of the Third World. The Third World is not an homogeneous
entity, but is characterized by, as Lipietz said, 'explosive fragmentation'.
Alain Lipietz divides the Third World into three categories. First,
there are those countries mainly dominated by Taylorism in labour-
intensive industries. This is the case in countries like Taiwan, Hong
Kong, Singapore and South Korea which pursue the policy of export
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subst i tut ion. In such sectors 'the transferred jobs are typically frag-
mented and repetitive, not linked by any automated system of machinery'
(1982, p. 41) e.g. they are jobs linked to sewing machines or electronic
products such as calculators. Alongside the repressive Taylorist adminis-
tration (structural strategy), political strategies are also required: the
strategies of regulation (social legislation), repression and regimentation
(p. 43).
The second category consists of those countries generally described
as periphery Fordism. This is the strategy, adopted in countries in Eastern
and Southern Europe, Brazil, South Korea, Mexico and Iran, of import
substi tution. The 'sub-Fordism' or the 'caricature of Fordist industrializa-
tion' in the Third World, according to Lipietz, is characterized by: (a) a
combination of import- and export-substitution economies (as with
Brazilian car assembly); (b) both a skilled and industrially-familiar un-
skilled labour force (cheap, close to major markets and endowed with a
skilled component); and (c) commodities (e.g. cars which, unlike T-
shirts or pocket calculators) have to find a large market nearby. The main
thrust of Lipietz's argument is that this strategy of Fordism has failed in
practice because of the industrial inexperience of the working class.
The third group consists of those countries whose economies are not
dominated by Taylorism or Fordism.
I shall now return to the particular case of Iran, which is character-
ized by periphery-Fordism.
Firstly, there is an indigenous labour process (craft, Taylorism)
which, even if overtaken by the modern technology introduced by foreign
capital, continues to be reproduced. In this situation the two (modern and
indigenous) labour processes either co-exist uneasily or co-operate along-
side each other — albeit with tension.
The second characteristic, which is common in most Third World
economies, is that alongside the backward indigenous sector there exists
a relatively modern sector. As far as the choice and importing of tech-
nology is concerned, technological developments in the advanced in-
dustrialized countries impose their dictates upon the host economy by
introducing highly modern techniques (Stewart, 1977, p. 59). Thus
modern organization of production and management techniques (or the
way in which the modern fixed capital is to be operated) is also imported.
Thirdly, despite the above point, the Fordism of the periphery is,
technically speaking, still labour-intensive. This is because most modern
industries tend to acquire a monopoly position because of the small size of
the Third World market (see also Stewart, ibid., p. 64). The non-
competitive conditions lead them not to bother to search for the most
up-to-date technologies which would increase the fixed-capital cost.4 As
a result, the tendency towards deskilling does not occur at the same rate
as in the centre. The organized workers therefore possess a strong bar-
gaining power. Skill is still in great demand by capital in these countries
(Bartsch, ILO, 1973).
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The counter-tendency is for the modern technology in these countries
to employ workers who come directly from the countryside and who arc
devoid of any industrial experience of wage labour. For them, therefore,
real subordination takes place without resistance, unless they acquire
sufficient work experience and industrial familiari ty and the values which
go with them.
Fourthly, Fordism is not simply a change in technology, but also a
total change in the whole economy: introducing capital-intensive tech-
niques, dramatic rise in labour productivity, mass production, production
of cheaper commodities and higher real wages. Thus, muss consumption
and change in the content of labour struggle going beyond wages and
conditions. The periphery Fordism, however, is unable to adjust mass
consumption to the rise in productivity generated by the modern tech-
nology. Higher wage demands arc still more important than the demand
for re-organization of the labour process; at best, protest over the lat ter
issue expresses itself in the demand for higher wages. In this situation, the
workplace becomes the centre of everyday tensions, and (if the opportun-
ity arises) coherent industrial action. This means that , in Iran (and similar
countries) the available structural strategies are unable to provide an
appropriate strategy for control. In the absence of an ideological medium,
the alternative strategy of responsible autonomy is likely to create a
chaotic workplace, the alternative to which would be a return to direct
control.
Managerial Strategies Under the Islamic State
We have analysed the patterns and limitations of the management system
in the Iranian industry in Chapter 5. The same underlying trend still exists
af te r the Revolution. The three forms of management, semi-craft, tradi-
tional and modern rational, which characterize the management system
should be regarded as the consequence of the form of industrialization in
Iran (as a part of the Third World). We also concluded in Chapter 5 that
the failure of structural strategies to control labour made the alternative
strategy of political oppression inside the factories indispensable.
We are now in a position to analyse the possibi l i t ies and contra-
dictions of the alternative set of strategies, functional strategies, which
the Is lamic state has at tempted to pursue in the face of industrial crisis. By
controlling the labour force and raising labour productivity, the regime
hopes to recover from the crisis, the political consequences of which are
of great concern to the regime. All these measures have to be analysed
bearing in mind the unique and contradictory nature of the Islamic state.
Two Forms of Management: Liberal and Maktuhi
Industr ial relations in Iran have strong political connotations. This trend
was reinforced after the Revolution when inter-state factional conflicts
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were directly reflected in industrial relations. The dual forms of manage-
ment are one outcome.
Liberal Management: This policy was in line with that of Prime Minister
Bazargan in the second period. It obeyed the logic of capital (as a social
relation), and involved respect and support for technocracy and the
implementation of rational, scientific management, dispensing with
Islamic idiom. Liberal management advocates one-man management
from above; maximization of profit through structural and functional
strategies; work ideology in its utilitarian concept; secularism in produc-
tion (people can hold what opinions they like so long as they do not
disrupt profitability) and the policy of containment in the sense of less use
of naked force and more peaceful settlement of disputes.
By the end of the second phase, and with the clergy possessed of the
entire state power in June 1981, liberal managers were losing the battle to
the maktabi management. Three trends played a part in this transforma-
tion. Firstly, the limitations and contradictions of liberal management in
relation to the shuras, that is, one-man management vs. control by the
shura. The logic of liberal management was totally unacceptable to the
shuras (both independent and corporatist) who resisted, fought and
expelled the former. Secondly, as a direct reflection of the anti-liberal
campaign of the IRP, liberal managements were under attack from
Islamic Associations. And thirdly, these managers did not show much
resistance against such opposition; they were either tried and/or sacked
by the workers (in Fanoos Company), or simply resigned (Pars Metal).
They did not see any attraction in staying in positions which did not fulfil
their socio-political interests.
Maktabi Management: This was a form of managerial control and indus-
t r ia l rationale which manifested itself in the policies and attitudes of
particular managers and was introduced late in the second and throughout
the third periods. Maktabi management arose because of the inability of
liberal management to bring about industr ia l peace. It was mediated, in
post-Revolutionary power politics, by the ideology, rationale and policies
of the ruling clergy.
It is management by those whose position derives not from certain
relevant skills (education or experience) but is based mainly on character
and personal, or more importantly, ideological connections with the
ruling clergy, especially the IRP. (This does not imply that all managers
lacked managerial skills.) They were in authority to preserve the presence
of the ruling party in the factories, these being the most vulnerable parts
of Iranian society. For them the policy of worker participation was
limited to the corporatist shuras and Islamic Associations. In essence,
their major policy was repressive one-man management; if they did not
achieve this, they demanded workers' cooperation in a participatory
management structure. Their strategy was hierarchical Islamic corporat-
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ism. Whilst profit maximization was their main objective, it was not the
only one. By nature, maktabi management is committed to certain ideol-
ogical and political measures, the implementation of which disrupts
production or wastes working time. This is only one of the contradictions
of Islamic management: in order to exert ideological control over the
workplace, i.e. in order to identify the non-Islamic workers and to
cleanse the factories of them, the management has to Islamicize the
factory by holding compulsory daily prayer ceremonies, delivering
speeches and so on. These practices create disruptions and wastage in
production.5 This type of manager views the secularism of liberal man-
agers as anti-Islamic. They use force and tight control instead of peaceful
dispute settlement and reformist mediums — a policy of repulsion rather
than incorporation.
The implication of this approach is that, in practice, there is a
tendency to create and support ideological gangs — informal workers'
organizations which are the functionaries of different external organiza-
tions of factional powers, such as Islamic Associations of IRP, Pasdaran
(Revolutionary Guards) and Basij (mobilization organization) etc. Such
alliances are based on ideological/political and tactical considerations.
This tactical aspect is crucial for a management which seeks to spy on
m i l i t a n t and politically independent workers, to crush the militant shuras
— in a word to use force.
This strategy has its own contradiction. The use of pressure gangs
(such as lAs) as executive agents for implementing unpopular policies in
essence grants them (lAs) a degree of power which, because of the strong
support of the state, is likely to assume a relative autonomy against the
(Islamic) management itself. This is indeed what happened in the third
period. In some cases it involved armed confrontation between the two
old allies.6
Maktabi management, when confronted with the workers' militancy,
employs repressive methods; and unlike liberal management they struggle
to stay in their positions, since they do have an interest in the system.
Maktabi management reflects the character, contradictions and the crisis
of the ruling clergy, mediated by the realities of industrial life.
The limitations and internal contradictions of these two types of
management have been examined. But, as Friedman rightly states,
contradiction does not mean impossibility, but rather, the persistence of
fundamental tensions deriving from wi th in (1977a, p. 53). Whatever the
contradictions of the maktabi management, it is not tolerant of diversity
and the autonomy of labour. So if managers remain in their positions they
do not tolerate the development of independent unions. This will be a
crucial hardship for the working class in future.
Let us now turn to see what strategies the state had to adopt to deal
with the fundamental questions of control of labour power on the one
hand, and of the workforce on the other.
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Industrial Crisis and the Management Strategy
The metamorphosis of managerial types and managerial strategies should
be conceived as the product of the dialectic of capital and the state: the
requirement of capital to reproduce itself (in terms of economic and
social relations) and the restrictive imperatives of the Islamic state.
Thus the assumption is that the economic, and in particular the
industrial crisis, following the Revolution (in the second period) is of a
more political than economic character. Economic crisis applies to a
situation where capital with a power of free movement falls into a contra-
diction created from within. During this process, it may call external
determinants (state, religion, family) into the service of solving its
contradictions. However, the crisis becomes political when those external
forces affect the 'natural' movement of capital and its ultimate goal of
accumulation.
In post-Revolutionary Iran the profitability of capital came under
two pressures: direct and indirect pressure from the state and workers'
class struggle.
Direct and Indirect Effects of State Pressure: The state was unable to
define its position toward capital, especially industrial capital. The clear-
est indication of this was the fact that by this date (late 1985) and after
years of debates and seminars the state has been unable to set limits to
private capital accumulation, i.e. the limits of mashrou or acceptable or
Islamic private property holding.7 Asa result of that matter and political
insecurity private capital is therefore reluctant to invest in the productive
sector. After a sharp decline during the revolutionary upheaval, industrial
investment in 1982-83 was still only one-third of its 1977-78 value.8
Small-scale workshops, however, are likely to have grown as a result of
the crisis in large-scale industry, protectionist measures such as exemp-
tion from unpaid insurance rates, and, more importantly, reviving the
master-client relations of production as the only structural managerial
policy toward self-sufficiency (Jomhour-i Islami, 23 May 1962).9 These
policies are underlaid by a populist ideology of'small is beautiful' domin-
ant among the ruling clergy.
The lack of appropriate conditions for industrial capital has inevit-
ably led to a boom in mercantile capital which is characteristically func-
tional almost in any circumstances, be it in war or famine, or pre-capitalist
social formations.10 The inevitable concentration of (70% of value of
ouptut) large-scale industry, after the nationalization of ownerless plants,
under the direction of the state has created a chaotic bureaucracy. This
chaos has had a direct impact in particular upon planning strategy,
purchases and credit systems.
The state-run industry is supervised by 15 state organizations,
including banks, Bonyad-i Mostazafin (the Downtrodden Foundation),
the Organization of National Industry (ONI) (with about 6(X) plants) and
the Organization of Development and Reconstruction of Industries. In
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this situation, as the Minister himself stated, 'the management of one
single factory may be shared by five or six organizations!' The mis-
management of plants is the consequence.
A rational systematic management (capitalist or whatever) requires
a highly skilled labour force and technocrats whose particular cultural
and political interests (let alone economic) have to be provided for. If
those cultural or political relations are not reproduced in the new en-
vironment, the intelligentsia is unlikely to co-operate under the present
conditions. The socio-political relations (social 'Islamicization') that the
state requires is by nature in contradiction to the socio-political aspira-
tions of the intelligentsia.11
Table 10.2
Selected Indices for the Large Manufacturing Establishments (1974= 100)
/976/7 1977/8 1978/9 1979/801980/81 1981/2 1982/3
Production 134.6 150.0 129.1 129.7 121.7 137.5 157.6
Employment 117.3 119.6 126.3 132.8 136.8 141.9 149.4
Compensation
paid to workers 167.8 209.8 325.7 526.7 630.3 683.4 762.6
Per capita
production 113.9 125.5 100.7 92.7 83.0 89.7 98.8
*Excludes the sugar industry and slaughter houses
Source: Bank Markazi Iran, Annual Reporta, various issues.
Workers' Class Struggle: This is another major determinant of the indus-
trial crisis of productivity. The state/capital attacks against the shuras'
imposition of authoritarian measures, and decline in real wages, have led
the workers to resort to various forms of struggle. Workers' in i t i a l ideas of
'work as ideology' and commitment to work 'for our Revolution' have
declined drastically. 'Both at the time of Taughour [Shah] and now, there
are only words — all talk and no action. Both then and now; nothing
happened. It's just bloody show.' (Arasteh factory worker, February 1981 )
If they outlaw the shura, from then on the workers will never let them [the
managers] inside here. If they dissolve the shura, they themselves must go.
(A worker in Metal Works)
Workers, thus , have resorted to a variety of protests and illegal
industrial actions: petit ioning, sit-ins, the detention of managers, strikes,
sabotage, go-slows and poor qual i ty production. In the post-revolutionary
era, the year 1979-80 marked the climax of the working-class industrial
actions. In this year some 366 industrial incidents (see table 10.3) were
reported. The number declined to 180 in 1980-81, and to82 in 1981-82 asa
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result of the mounting repression which forced the workers to resort to
covert industrial action. 1984-85, however, marked the start of a wide-
spread working-class struggle when 200 industrial incidents were reported.
Of these 90 were illegal strikes, the most important of which being the
strike of Isfahan Steel mill workers against the redundancy programme
(see Chapter?).
Figure 10.1
Trend of Wage Increases, 1977-83
WAGES
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 I982 1983
Source: Quarterly Economic Review: Iran, 1985
The working-class struggle together with disruption in management
and administration contributed substantially to the negative growth rate
of industrial productivity in the post-revolutionary years. According to
the official figures, production per worker declined with an annual rate of
10.6% since 1978 (table 10.2). In 1981, the Minister of Labour admitted
that the 'disturbances within the factories' resulted in a production decline
of 30% (Jomhouri Islami, 20 May 1981). There is no accurate figure for
1981-82, except that the state industries made a loss of Rls 60b (£04.b),
and that the industries overall were running at just over half their capacity
(51.2%) (Ministry of Planning and Budget). It was not until 1982-83 that
the adequate supply of raw materials resulted in positive growth in the
rate of production-per-worker in relation to the loss of the previous years.
Yet, after five years the net value was still 27% below its pre-revolutionary
peak value (table 10.2).
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Table 10.3
The Forms of Workers' Struggles in 12 Months after Revolution
Forms of struggle
1. Verbal protest, petitioning, leafletting




6. Ban on the sale of product
7 Detaining employers, managers; preventing
them attending the plant, or sacking them
8. Occupation of plants, controlling and running, or
managing it by workers, or formation ofshura
9. Other forms
Total reported confrontations with the Pasdaran


















































































































































Source Compiled from various Registered Labour Reports in the left-wing papers Kur and Pa\kar
Industrial Relations in Past-Revolutionary
The Crisis of Productivity
The concept of a crisis of productivity is intimately related to the struc-
tural l imitations of state-capital to exploit and control the labour power at
the point of production. It seems obvious that the most appropriate
method of countering such a crisis would be to set up a structural strategy
to exert structural control (as opposed to simple control); to set up the
labour process in such a way that the objective process and structure
extract surplus-value. This would require a transformation in the labour
process and high expenditure on fixed capital, machinery, managerial
education and so on. The present state in Iran is unable financially and
private capital is reluctant to carry out this modernization.
The alternative policies have been a return to the past and a resort to
a) absolute extraction of surplus-value (in conditions of real subordina-
tion), b) Taylorism (in the large-scale industries), and c) master-
apprentice systems (in small-scale ones). The two first strategies have
acted as alternatives to, and are being replaced by, one another.
Absolute Surplus-Value Extraction
Hours of work have been extended and wages have been cut. A shorter
working week (40 hours a week) was one of the major demands of the
industrial workforce after the Revolution when, in many places, the
workers themselves put the demand into practice (notably in the oil
industry and in car manufacturing). Despite the resistance and non-
recognition by the state of the 40-hour week, and despite the formal
ratification of a 44-hour week by the Revolutionary Council, the practice
continued unevenly in various workplaces (in the oil industry for over two
years unti l after the June Days of 1981 ). This achievement was attacked
as the independent shuras were disintegrated.
The policy of wage cuts was implemented through a series of cuts in
benefits and perks. The most important of all has been the abolition of
profit-sharing schemes which operated in 1,200 large industrial units
under the Shah. A major year-end bonus had become customary. Abol-
ished in February 1981, it was replaced by a formula of 20 days' wages
times the number of years worked (with a maximum of Rls85,(XK)), which
was by and large below the customary year-end bonus. This led to
widespread wild-cat strikes and protests in February-March 1981. Al-
though independent from the state, the private sector wholeheartedly
obeyed the pay policy. In May 1981 the Job Classification scheme was
virtually dismantled. The scheme would have financially benefited those
qualified by skill and long periods of service. The new policy of annual
wage increases (which did not increase the minimum wage), treated all
strata of workers as equal (an increase of Rls 40 = 25p per day) and
inflicted a wage cut upon the well-paid workers. The rest of the wage
increase (up to Rls 50) depended on harder work.12 In summer 1982,
Tavakkoli, the Minister of Labour, cut back the every-other-year bonus
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(a car) plus some other bonuses which had been won by the car industry
workers.
Shift work (quantitatively more utilization of the existing f ixed
capital) has been put into operation. The problem with this programme is
that the machines are all too old for over-utilization. As the industrial
officials admit , one of the major technical problems is the amortization of
the machines, which, if shift work continues, might lead to their total
collapse (Kayhan, 17 January 1983). The alternative strategy is to exploit
labour without necessarily increasing the cost of fixed capital — that is, a
version of Taylorism.
Taylorism?
The strategy of raising productivity, through bonus systems, above the
standard level, and based upon work study, was first proposed in the Arj
factory in May 1981. The objective of the plan reflected the prevalent
crisis at the time: 'with the implementation of the Plan the worker will be
given a better impetus for higher productivity' and, more crucially,
'because of the interdependent nature of production line and existence of
motivation, the workers will prevent some oftheir colU'tif>ues from engag-
ing in go-slows' (Jomhouri kslami, 30 May 1981).
Two months later, the Ministry of Labour announced a plan of a
similar nature (the Plan of Bonus Payments to the workers in Ettclâât, 3
August 1981). According to this plan, which was to replace the abolished
profit-sharing and year-end customary bonuses, each worker would get a
I ' / wage increase for a 1% increase in total standard output. The standard
level of output was to be calculated on the basis of the point of balance (a
level of output in a situation where the income and the cost of a workplace
were equal), the average output of the previous four years, timing and
customary practices. The ultimate criterion would be the one which
indicated the highest figure (Articles 1-3). The more interesting point is
the very short period of calculation of standard output — monthly,
though with mutua l agreement up to a maximum three months (Article
5). This meant that if the workers wanted to get a (1%) wage increase
they themselves would have to raise the level of standard output on a
monthly basis, while their wage basis would remain the same. This would
result in output rising higher than actual pay. Even in capitalist logic,
over-production of output means over-work (such as overtime) the
monetary equivalent of which is higher than the normal wage. In addi-
tion, in terms of labour relations, as an act of collective bargaining, this
plan required an independent workers' organization to exert control over
its implementation. This right is continually violated in Iran.
Introduced under Mir Sadeghi, a Labour Minister who supported the
corporatist shunts, the plan was virtually repudiated by Tavakkoli (the new
Labour Minister not sympathetic to even corporatist .shuras) who proposed
a Labour Law which was founded upon the free agreement of the indivi-
dual employer on the one hand and the individual labourer on the other.
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Master-Apprentice System
In May 1981 an official seminar on labour relations proposed a bill to the
Supreme Council of Labour, that
for the purpose of support for the master-apprentice system as a means to
cut dependency ties, and to give technical training to the raw labour force,
the trades and craft works may he allowed to operate outside the considera-
tions of the Labour Law (Jomhouri Eslarni, 23 May 1981 ).
The proposal, which was later ratified, implied that in order to raise the
level of output with lower cost the employers were allowed to disregard
basic workers' rights, such as limited hours of work, a minimum wage
level, restriction on child labour, conditions of work, internal work
relations and so on which had operated under the Shah. It could cover the
areas characterized by the semi-craft system of control analysed in Chapter
5, encompassing some 300,()(K) workshops and 5(K),(KK) workers. This
strategy was another example of how the productivity crisis encouraged
paradoxically pre-industrial production relations. Despite its consider-
able impact upon employment creation, the workshops, because of their
very low productivity of labour, were unable to contribute substantially
to the demands of the market.
Crisis of Hegemony
The productivity crisis was a crisis of the control of abstract labour.
However, the working class under capitalism is not merely a commodity
(labour power) tobe exchanged; it is above all a number of human beings
who are historically located in particular economic and socio-political
circumstances, and who react, resist, oppose and think. In other words,
the labour force (as distinct from abstract labour) also has to be controlled
itself in and outside the point of production, for short- and long-term
purposes. If a state-capital is by nature unable to exert that control over
its labour force, we may characterize this ;is a crisis of hegemony. We
shall discuss below the various strategies adopted by the Islamic state to
secure that hegemony, categorized into three main areas of control:
ins t i tu t iona l , ideological and political.
Institutional Control
The Islamic state is characteristically afraid of any form of autonomous
organization. For the latter, as an earthly entity, is very likely to develop
and become a rival to the government of God mediated by the present
mundane state. However, organization as such is a major aspect of this
state apparatus. Thus, any existing institution has to serve the Islamic
state.13 In reality, however, the state organizations serve not as a structure
for integrating the populace — i.e. as a means of creating a feeling of
un i ty and identi ty — but as an organization of control. In short, the
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attempts by the state to institutionalize discontent among the working
class have by and large failed.
Ideological Control
Ideology plays an underpinning role in the regime of the valâyat-ifaghih.
For the latter, Islamic society means, in one sense, bringing all aspects of
individual and social life under the observation and interpretation of the
Islamic ideology as interpreted by the ruling clergy. Intervention in and
interpretation by the latter of work relations result in distinct forms of
ideological control over the working class. Ideological control may mani-
fest itself in the particular interpretation of work ideology, corporatist
ideology and Islamization of workplaces.
Work ideology is concerned, on the one hand, with the question
of how people perceive the very act of working, and of why they work;
and on the other, with the idea of work which the dominant classes
or elements advocate. Work ideology both specifies and is the product
of a particular historical conjuncture, depending on a complex of
determinants.
For the ancient Greeks, work was simply a curse. So was it for the
Romans. Up to the time of Luther and the early development of capital-
ism, which was seen as being without intrinsic value, 'simply an instrument
of purification, charity and expiation'(Fox, 1971, p. 3). In the Protestant
ethic, however, all distinctions between religious piety and worldly activ-
ity were swept aside (ibid). The Calvinist ideology of work was the
foundation of modern factory discipline. Meanwhile, as Hill argues, work
was praised and idleness was regarded with contempt, since 'property was
just i f ied by work and was not justified without it, so that idleness should
be followed by expropriation' (in Anthony, 1977, p. 45). This was a
utilitarian conception of work. A work ideology may be one which values
'work as a social and moral duty (implying stigma and shame for those
who did not fu l f i l i t ) ' . This was part of the pre-Fascist Italian working-
class culture (Passerini, 1979, p. 93).
The crisis of productivity and a strategy of ideological control com-
bined with the religious character of the Iranian state to advocate work,
first and foremost, as a religious duty.
The hours of work are the moments of (ebadat) worshipping God, paying
debt to martyrs, the deprived people and the downtrodden of society.
Wasting even one moment is equivalent to violating the rights of the
deprived, and to disrespecting the blood of the martyrs.14
Based upon a hadis (quotation) from Prophet Mohammed that 'to work is
like Jihad in the service of God', the instrumentalist religious conception
of work is widely employed by the valayat-i faghih to raise the productivity
of labour. It advocates that the performance of work brings rewards
which are not material, but spiritual, granted not in this world but in the
next , in heaven. However, the penalty for misconduct is a matter for both
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worldly punishment as well as God's revenge, in the world to come. This
view is widely propagated by the special factory clergies.
Quite distinct from an instrumentalist (tactical) application, the
ruling clergy still propounds the principal (ideological) conceptions. One
version is the same as the work ideology of early primitive Christianity: a
means of promoting the health of the body and soul, guarding against
evil, idleness and decadence. It is in this context that Khomeini addresses
the workers: 'One day of your life is worth all the lives of the capitalists
and the feudals put together' (Khomeini's speech on May Day 1981).
As for the individual labourer, there is a wide gap between the
fundamental and pragmatic view of the ruling clergy. Pragmatically,
primarily as a reaction to the socialist and radical views on labour, the
regime grants great dignity and religious piety to labour and to the
labourer. The case is exemplified in the widely expressed hadis that
'Prophet Muhammad kisses the hands of a worker', and that 'labour is the
manifestation of God'. And,
the value of work and the worker in Islam is higher than that in any other
materialist ideology (maktab). Following the Islamic world view, we view
work and the worker to hold divine value, not merely material value. A
worker is one who, obeying the command of God, endeavours to develop
the earth and its materials . . . Thus, the workers are of divine value; and
obeying that command is a divine and Islamic duty; it is not merely of a
material value (President Khamanei, May Day 1981 ).
On the other hand, the worker is essentially assumed to be a mere
commodity or an object so that the procedures for its exchange, according
to Labour Minister Tavakkoli, are to be found in the section on hiring
(not employment) in the Islamic Feghh. While under German Fascism,
'the labour relationship is a community relationship based on honour,
faith and care' (Neumann, 1979, p. 342), the proposed Iranian Labour
law is based on individual agreement according to which labour is hired
for a certain period to conduct certain kinds of work.15
The other contradiction confronting the regime is the fact that by
dignifying the work and worker the social and political significance of
workers becomes manifest; interestingly, the alternative strategy, that of
terrorizing the workers, would have the same result. There are countless
examples suggesting that the state equates any limited trade union demand
and action with the 'extended operations of imperialism', and so places it
next only in abhorrence to Iraq's invasion or the abortive US operation in
the Iranian desert (»eeJomhouri Kslarni, 5 December 1981).
In the valayat-i faghih's ideology, atomization of workers in the
workplace goes side by side with the integration of the whole working
class into one single ideological mass: Ummat-i Eslàmi (Islamic mass). In
Fascism, the denial of individuality took the form of a massive labour
front with 25 million members. The Islamic state, however, strives to
deny the 'classness' of the working class.
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The workers must approach the labour questions through the Islamic view.
The differences in expectations and trade demands must not divide the
various layers of population, must not damage the Islamic brotherhood
The (elh(uli) a the i s t ideologies attempt to use these means to define the
workers as a class, so separating them from the Islamic ummat (people)
crushing the uni ty of Muslim ummat (President Khamenei, ibid).
The denial of the working class has been accompanied by a denial of
those manifestat ions and symbols which express it; by changing the word
kargur (worker) to karpazir (one who agrees to do work). This is an
at tempt to destroy the main identity of a worker — his name. By such a
strategy, the Labour Ministry attempted to end the idea of kârgar which is
so widely associated with the words socialism, left and enghelab-ikargari
(workers' revolution). This shows how certain historical-cultural symbols
become a subject of (class) struggle.
Referring to the massive propaganda campaign carried out by the
Nazis, Franz Neumann reflected, 'Propaganda is violence committed
against the soul. Propaganda is not a substitute for violence, but one of i t s
aspects. The two have the identical purposes of making men amenable to
control from above' (1969, p. 356). Valayat-i faghih's means of com-
manding people's will is the use of massive propaganda machines based
on modern and traditional mediations. As for the workers, Islamization
of workplaces goes hand in hand with the Islamization (better to say
regimentation) of leisure. The factory is assumed to be a barricade
against koffar ( inf idels) , where the agirs (labourers) have to listen to
' official religious sermons as well as perform 'the divine duty of produc-
t ion ' . Hence, massive dispatches of factory mullas, a religious t rans
formation of the atmosphere in factories, the putt ing up of special pic-
tures, posters, huge slogans on the walls and the loud broadcasting of
official speeches during break and lunchtimcs etc.16 At every moment the
state is announcing its presence to each and every individual.
Political Control
When ideological control fa i ls , political control becomes inevitable. The
state strategy of ideological control has, to a large extent, failed among
the working class. They have rejected work ideology based upon religious
duty, even though the workers themselves had initially developed a
strong populist work ideology and work commitment immediately after
the revolution.17
The strategy of political control of the workforce functions through
the mediation of some workers' organizations (Islamic Associations) and
direct pol i t ical-mil i tary l iquidation by the repressive Islamic state
apparatuses: I'asdurun and the committee guards.
Islamic Associations: Islamic Associations (IAs) are the most important
labour organizations the valayat-i faghih can utilize to exert political
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control over the workforce. They therefore merit a more detailed
consideration. According to the constitution of the Islamic Republic,
the lAs were set up for Islamic educational, cultural and social pur-
poses. In practice, however, they acted, with the encouragement of
leading founders of the IRP, as an alternative labour organization for
the independent shuras. The internal dynamism and socio-political role
of the lAs are determined by the dialectic of, on the one hand, the
inter-factional conflicts within the state, which we have referred to
f requen t ly , and on the other, by the internal (ideological) attributes of
the lAs.
The lAs were gradually set up in the first period of control from
below. The second period of management from above saw their rapid
growth as the conflict between the ruling clergy and the liberals erupted
during the US embassy seizure. The Labour House (Khane-i Kargar),
once the central headquarters of the independent and radical shuras, was
ransacked and became the headquarters of the lAs, and later, of the
corporatist shuras. The IRP now utilized the I As as its direct arm inside
the workplaces to oppose resisting shurus, on the one hand, and liberal
managements on the other, advocating instead Islamic shuras and Islamic
(maktabi) managements. When the inter-factional confrontations sur-
faced after the war (with Iraq) and culminated in the July Days, the lAs
enjoyed great support. Prime Minister Rajaii, a man of the ruling clergy
- whose strategy of merging lAs and shuras had been defeated -
addressed the workers in March 1981 and said, 'I am standing by my
word; and I am proud to say again, that "we shall support the lAs as long
as there is blood in our veins",'and continued, 'You! Member of I A! You
would have reached the point of purity when you recognize only the Imam
as political leader' [as opposed to President Bani'Sadr]. The third period,
following the July Days of 1981, was characterized by the consolidation of
the positions of Islamic management and lAs, followed by a period of
confrontations between the two. The historical mission of the lAs seemed
to be over. The growing authority of the lAs, which would in practice
threaten the authority of management, was opposed by the new Labour
Minister Tavakkoli. Khomeini and other officials called on the lAs to
concentrate their activities only on social and cultural matters. This
official rebuff to the lAs resulted in managements (both maktabi and
liberal) gaining the upper hand, and a wave of dismissals of the activists of
both the I As and Islamic shuras.18 While such moves were backed by the
Labour Minister associated with the hard-line Hojjutieh faction, the
populist and pragmatic faction, followers of the Imam'* line, still did not
(and do not) wish to alienate such instrumental organizations; though at
the same time they attempted to limit their power to the sphere of
consultation instead of decision-making. Musavi Ardabili, the head of
the judiciary, formulated their function in the statement, '[in a factory]
the management is the brain, the IA the eyes, the rest the hands' (Kayhan,
1 1 March 1983). Following this shif t in policy, the settlement of disputes
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between the IA and Islamic shura members was assigned to a revolutionary
tr ibunal situated in the Labour Ministry.
The I As, it is clear, were the product of a particular set of contradic-
tions. They themselves, by their very nature, also continue to be contra-
dictory entities. The role of I As is one thing for each faction of the ruling
caste in their power struggle and quite another for workers. It is to the
latter that we now tu rn . The actual functions of the I As may be summar-
ized as follows:
1) Indoctrination of labour with the ruling ideology. The official
title given to this function is cultural activities.19 It is concerned with the
Islamization of the whole atmosphere of the factories through organizing
meetings, exhibitions, mass prayers, publishing and distributing Islamic
papers, organizing ideological classes and eliminating Western culture
(ibid., pp. 23-36). In this sphere, the translation of the concepts of labour
relations into Islamic idioms assumes a particular significance: a sit-in or
strike becomes an anti-Islamic action (herum) and the price to be paid is
def ined . It is the IA which decides what actions are Islamic and what
anti-Islamic.
2) Policing the workplace. The official version of this function is
political activity. The (Juicleline is absolutely clear on this crucial task: 'To
reject the elements opposed to the Islamic revolution' (p. 37), 'to fight
against [political] groups and counter the deviationist lines; to stop and
search those non-workers intending to enter the factory' (p. 38), 'to give
resolute support to Islamic [political] currents, and to condemn and
l iquidate entirely the anti-Islamic currents'. This official task gives total
authority to its members to check and spy on the workers who complain
or put forward simple economic demands. The Commission for Identify-
ing the Labour Force, organized by the I As of ONI, provided the criteria
for identifying counter-revolutionaries inside the factories (in Internal
bulletin, March 19X1); that is those involved in 'discouraging workers to
the future of the revolution; unreasonable demand-making; provocation
of workers and rumour spreading; unjustifiable criticisms; lack of honesty;
dependence on East and West and af f i l i a t ion wi th counter-revolutionary
groups' (i.e. socialists and Mudjahedin or any other pro-working class
organizations). These criteria speak for themselves
The effect of such policies, in particular in the July Days and after,
was devastating for the workers' movement. In this period, long blacklists
of opposition workers were submitted to the internal and external armed
f'a'tdaran, who, with the close co-operation of the lAs, carried out mass
arrests.
Prior to the July Days, the Khane-i Kargar (Labour House), the
centre of I As, became so powerful that it could independently organize
resistance cells inside the factories. Their tasks were intelligence, military
and ideological-political. A document explains the tasks of the intelligence
unit as, among others, 'to identify reliable individuals and those committed
to the Revolution'; 'to identify non-Islamic, deviant elements'; 'to infil trate
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the members of shura, IA and the management, checking their move-
ments'; 'to report the available information to the leadership of the cell';
and lastly 'to obey conscientiously the leadership of the cell' (Enghelab-i
Islumi, 17 March 1981). Pursuing a political objective, the lAs were
committed to give military training to their members, forming military
Basij (mobilization) groups.
3) Mobilizing role. This was what the Guideline termed 'social
activities' (pp. 41-51) and concerned not only the workplace, but also,
more importantly, society at large. At the workplace they mobilized their
members or other amenable workers to break strikes; to collect contribu-
tions for war refugees, to encourage workers to be dispatched to the war
fronts; to secure constant contact with the workers' families of war
victims. In this sphere, I As attempt to mobilize the workers on moral and
ideological bases.
The external role was more significant, as the lAs attempted to
mobilize workers in pro-regime demonstrations and rallies, or - - in
official terminology — 'to be present actively on the political scene of the
country' (Guideline, pp. 40,45). The July Daysof 1981 saw the lAs adopt
an active mission of mobilization to organize counter-demonstrations
against opposition rallies.
Who are the activists of the I As? No research has ever been carried
out to identify who these workers are, and why they are so destructive.
Our observation at a car factory in Teheran suggests that four groups of
workers were members of the IA. a) The ex-foremen or ex-supervisors
whose interests, in terms of both financial and authority relations, were
jeopardized by the revolutionary movement. They joined lAs by adopting
an appearance of Islamic behaviour because they saw the IA as a vehicle
for disruption; b) a few workers who, apart from work in industry, had
land and agricultural activities near Teheran, who were probably in
search of a position through the IA and who had no fear of risk of indirect
wage cuts or of the management strategies which the I As would defend;
c) the workers whose close relatives were influential in the government
or in clerical circles; and lastly d) those workers who believed that the
state was pro-mastazaf (downtrodden). The agents in higher echelons of
the IA enjoy the material rewards of their social position and political
status and role.
The nature of their tasks (and my observations) suggest that, quite
apart from even corporatist shuras, their power rests not on workers'
support, but rather on careful support by the state which gives them
significant power of manoeuvre. By the mass of workers, they are viewed
as new SA VAK agents who grow beards instead of wearing ties.
Militarization of the Factories: Policing the factories was completed by a
militarization process. Its major function is the creation of an atmosphere
of terror and insecurity for the mili tant. In their turn, various formal and
informal organizations have set up their own labour military units which
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arc designed to organize their own loyal workers and give them military
t ra in ing: among these are the Organization of Mudjahedm of the Islamic
Revolution (not the opposition Mudjahedin-e Khalgh), Khane-i Kargar,
Sepah-i Pasdaran (revolutionary guards), committee guards, flaw/-/
Mustazafin (mobilization units). In the troubled factories armed and
uniformed mili tary units patrol, and in some plants, notably car plants,
fu l l units of committee guards are stationed to be in control of the
day-to-day movements of the workers.
Conclusion
We have seen so far that industrial relations in post-revolutionary Iran
(and probably any country with similar circumstances) have been exten-
sively intermingled with politics. This implies that the present industrial
crisis is not merely economic but is also political and has, in practice, been
caused by and resulted in a perpetual covert resistance and non-co-
operation of the labour force. The co-operation of labour (by any means)
is indispensable for industrial prosperity in a situation where the imple-
menta t ion of the structural strategies of managerial control (advanced
Taylorism, Fordism, neo-Fordism and so on) suffer from severe limita-
tions — the characteristic of most of the Third World countries
This has two important implications. In the specific case of Iran, the
present political form is unlikely, by its very nature, to be able to secure
the co-operation of the labour force. The crisis is therefore likely to
remain. On the other hand, it is possible for an alternative democratic
political form to transcend the existing crisis, despite the persistence of
structural limitations; but this can only happen by the strategy of extensive
democratic participation and free involvement of the producers in their
actual process of labour.
Notes
1 See in particular the historical study by Marglin in Gorz, 1976, p. 20. Palloix
is right to criticize the one-sidedness of such a position; but he underestimates
capital's need for profit maximization (Palloix, 1976, p. 62).
2. Neo-Fordism is not an appropriate term, since it implies a cont inui ty with
Fordism, whereas the actual practices and ideological effects of the two strategies
are different.
3. The resistance of the workers in the printing (newspaper) industry in Britain
is noticeable; in particular the long str ike of S()( i AT members in I9H3 against the
l-'inancial Times management plan to introduce new machinery.
4. There is a big d i f fe rence between the techniques used in Talbot in Iran and
that in Britain for production of the same car.
5. This contradiction is obvious in the two statements made by the Minister of
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Industry in one interview. On the one hand he stated,
A maktabi manager, the one who runs a factory in an Islamic system, is not
merely a manager, hut also the leader of that small society. He has a duty to
direct the society towards ideological, cultural and economic dimensions; his
task should not be just to achieve a high productivity (Etteläät, 1 August 1982).
On the other hand, in reference to the existing conflicts:
I view the problems as social [in fact political]. If our chaotic social problems
were solved, that problem will also be tackled . . . We haven't still been able to
find a specific social relation (mechanism) to explain whom these difficulties
originate from, and how they happen (ibid.).
6. The political confrontation and power struggle between the two organs
culminated in Telecommunications in Teheran, in 1982. Wondering about the
sources and the logic of such conflicts, the Minister of Industry commented,
We have still not beeen able to find a specific social relation to explain whom
these difficulties originate from, and how they happen. We have factories
whose IA and Islamic shura are in conflict with the Sepah-i (I'usduran) of the
region. Sometimes there are two-two or three-three ambiguous composition; it
is not known who is with whom. This differential pattern leads to the situation
where you do not have a specific, unified system. I have documents indicating
that in some factories, for instance, management, shura and IA are all in good
relations, but have conflicts with the sepah; or on the contrary, management
and IA are in good relations, but are against the shura (Etteläät, l August 1982,
Appendix).
7. There are factions in the state which advocate free enterprise. The so-called
Hojjatieh faction is the main one. However, they are not the determinant ten-
dency. Various elements committed to what is called 'Imam's line', the Minister of
I n d u s t r y , the Prime Minister and the Director of the Organization of National
Industries (ONI) — opposed the privatization of state-run plants (see Etteläät, l
August 1983; Kayhan, 12 and 13 April 1983).
8. The Director of the ONI states:
One of our major problems is the interference of irresponsible organs; the
problem derives from the fact that these organs lack procedure and the know-
ledge of management. It even entails interference from outside the factory,
which naturally inflict undesirable impacts, obscuring the responsibilities.
(Kayhan, 13 January 1983).
9. According to official figures, industrial investment increased with an annual
average rate of growth of 1 1 % in value terms over the period 1977-78 to 1982-83.
However, the very high growth of the numhen of the indus t r ia l establishments
(average annual rate of growth of 166%) indicates that mainly small capital tended
to invest (Bank Markazi Iran, 1980-81).
10. Merchant capital is believed to have made a considerable profit. However,
there is no evidence to suggest that the big bazaar merchants give support to the
regime. My own conversations with a few leading political figures in the bazaar
gave quite the reverse impression in late 1980-81. In an attempt to offset the
bazaar discontents and to rationalize the economy. Khomeini eventually ruled out
the nationalization of foreign trade in 1984.
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1 1 . See A Bayat (1986), 'The Politics of Economic Disorder in Post-
Revolutionary Iran'. Paper presented at the 4th Annual Conference of the Center
for Iranian Research and Analysis, Washington DC, 5-6 April 1986.
12. This was to be evaluated by a committee composed of representatives of the
Islamic shura, supervisor and the employer (Jomhouri-i Eslâmi, 25 July 1981 ).
13. Islamic attitudes toward [institution of] consultation is different from those
attitudes on council systems in socialist and Marxist societies . . . we do not
consider it to be correct that admin i s t ra t ion system of a country to be based
on election from below to the top. That's not the case in our system. We
believe in valayat-i faghih, and in the fact that valayat (government) is
authorised from above to bottom (Labour Minister Tavakkoli, Ettelàât,
May 1983).
14. President Khomeini's message for May Day 1981
15. Article 10 of proposed Labour Law defines the labour contract as the
ta-ahhod (obligation) on the part of the karpazir (worker) to perform work for
payment of o/ra/(wage); and acceptance (paziresh) by t he employer (sähe hkar) to
pay ojratfor the ownership of the work (amal). The word ojrat is not equivalent to
wage (dastmozd) but a payment for the hiring of objects or animals. The proposed
Labour Law was rejected by workers and by the populist faction in the state. The
Labour Minister. Tavakkoli, was later pressurized to resign.
16. The official ideology could not tolerate even the historical origin of May
Day to be secular. 'This is,' says an official of Labour House, 'a distortion that the
Marxists of Second International in Paris have committed . . . On the basis of our
researches, we have found out the fact that the attitudes of the protagonists and
the main participant force of the May Day were in fact religious' (Jomhouri-e
I'.sliimi, 22 April 1982).
17. In a metal factory in Teheran, I attended a mass prayer at the factory's
mosque. Out of a workforce of 7(K), less than 20 workers, most of them old, were
in attendance. The rest of the workers were playing football in the factory yard or
chatting. From then on (spring 1981), participation in mass prayer became com-
pulsory in the factories and offices. In another plant, a junior manager explained
that the workers themselves demanded prayer sermons, but did not participate.
Instead, as I observed, they would sit in the sunshine talking.
I K . A review of the internal debates of the regional IA's weekly meetings
indicates that a considerable part of the meetings are devoted to the tensions and
confrontations between them and the managers. In one meeting it was said, 'The
ONI with unlslamic managers has a new plot against the lAs. It wants to dissolve
the lAs and put its own men in (Jornhouri /-.slami, 26 December 1982).
19. The details of the functions of the lAs have been spelled out in Pamphlet
No. 3 of the Bureau for Mobili /ation and the Development of Islamic Culture of
Workers, A Guideline for the f-'unt nu/is <>l Islamic Associations, Ministry of
Labour.
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11. Workers' Control and
Political Democracy
Introduction
If the councils (shuras) in Iran failed to sustain themselves partly owing to
their own internal contradictions (leaving aside the state's political
pressure) why was it correct for socialists to support them instead of the
syndicates which fight for limited and immediate demands for better
wages and working conditions?
Such a question could be applied to most of the failed experiments
of the world working class. In the history of the international labour
movement, there have been numerous examples of working-class struggles
that have failed due, in part, to their own shortcomings; and yet they have
been enthusiastically advocated by socialists. Indeed, the basic problems
with which the Russian factory committees and the Italian factory councils
were confronted were the same as those of the Iranian shuras. In the
revolutionary situation and as a part of revolutionary process, a dis-
equilibrium arose in the workplaces between personal and structural
power relations; that is, while the personal authority of the functionaries
of capital (managers, technicians and supervisors) was seriously ques-
tioned by the working class, the division of labour inherited from the past
tended to persist because of the practical impossibility of altering it
overnight while maintaining production levels (Bettelheim, 1978; Smith,
19X0, 1983 and Siriani, 1982). As the inherited capitalist division of
labour persisted, the corresponding authoritarian power relations were in
the long run reproduced. And this, as far as the workers' councils were
concerned, meant defeat.
The formation of the shuras should be viewed as part of the anti-
monarchic revolutionary process. The idea of the shura was not invented
by the theoreticians; it emerged out of a new working-class consciousness,
the ideology of possession, and the inability of capitalism to respond to
working-class demands. Many demands made by the workers in the
revolutionary situation were of trade-unionist character, that is for limited
and immediate ends. Yet the failure of capital to meet these demands
provided a condition for the working class, through direct action, to take
control of industrial enterprises. The combination of these practices and
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the ideology of possession provided them with the concept of the shura
and workers' control as a solution to the post-revolutionary economic
crisis. The shuras served as an organizational means and way of trans-
forming existing power relations at workplaces. In my view, a call for
trade unionist action and organization would have been wrong. It would
have been subjective, because as stated above, the councils emerged
through the working class in response to an objective economic-political
situation in which capital was unable to meet the labour demands. Con-
versely, a trade unionist approach — preventing labour intervening in
managerial prerogatives — would have lagged one step behind the militant
approach of the working class itself. My interviews clearly indicated that
almost all of the respondents resented the syndicates. Thirdly, it would
have denied the working class a unique historical experiment — an
experiment in which the class could test its capacities and experience new
areas of control both at the workplace and in society at large which had
previously been the undisputed domain of capital.
This chapter is devoted to discussing and speculating about the
impact of council organizations upon institutionalization of democracy in
society at micro and macro levels, envisaging a socio-economic order
wi th in which such democratic practices might exist, and finally making
some general points as to how workers' control itself can be reproduced.
The General Implications of Workers' Control
Much has been written about the general significance of workers' control.
Numerous versions have been put forward from syndicalism to guild
socialism, the co-operative movement, workplace unionism, socialism
and above all councilism (Hin ton , 1973; Gallacherand Campbell, 1977;
Cole, 1975; Pannekoek, 1950; Rene, 1978; Coatcs and Topham, 1968).
In the present section I shall restrict myself to the workplace and social
implicat ions of workers' participation.
Workplace Level
Alienation is the chief characteristic of capitalist social-economic
organization and the capitalist workplace, which is regulated by the
t rad i t iona l division of labour. In discussing the alienation of labour,
Marx ident i f ied three aspects: alienation of the labourer from a) his/her
labour , the products of his/her labour and thus from him/herself; b) the
conditions of his/her labour, meaning that the social and technical
condit ions w i t h i n which the worker performed his/her tasks were con-
trolled by others; c) other people who controlled his/her labour (Marx,
1964, pp. 112-13) . Since Marx's t ime the degree of a l ienat ion has
deepened dramatically. The development of new technology and
methods of production has increased productivity and the rate of ex-
p lo i t a t ion , transformed the labour process by intensifying the detailed
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division of labour, and deepened the subordination of labour to the
modern structure of management.
This intensification has not proceeded without resistance. The
workers have responded to it by strikes, absenteeism, sabotage and
growing demand for participation (Palloix, 1976; Friedman, 1977b).
Reacting to such disruptions, management has tended to propose from
above various strategies of participation and work humanization.
An important dimension of workers' control is the reducing of
alienation in the workplace. By our definition, workers' control means
exertion of control by the workers over the processes of production and
administration. This points to the workers' ability to determine how, how
much and what to produce, and in what ways things should be organized.
As Bahro wrote, this restructuring of the division of labour is 'far more
than a remedy against monotony, as it is often envisaged today' (1978).
Genuine participation means, above all, restructuring the organization of
production and administration in such a way that the workers can re-
assert their humanity as free producers.
The Problem of Kffiidency and Workers' Control
It is not uncommon to find opposition to workers' control on the grounds
tha t it is inefficient and chaotic. To begin with, inefficiency may be a
problem of not merely workers' control but also of an authoritarian
one-man-management system. Under workers' control a possible ineffi-
ciency should be attributed not to the alternative organization of produc-
tion as such, but to the fact that, in most cases, workers' control is
expected to function in an unfertile ground, that is, in the context of
inherited capitalist technology and hierarchical management regimes. It
is this contradictory combination that may cause disorganization and dis-
ruption. What is required is a way of transforming the existing technology,
making it compatible with a new organization of labour.
The very concept of inefficiency is problematic; it is an ideological
concept and an area of class struggle. For a capitalist management, it may
mean reducing costs (including that of labour), higher output per worker
and competitiveness in the market. In contrast, for workers it may imply
job security, higher living standards (higher wages) and the usefulness of
their products to society as a whole (even if they are not competitive).
Thus we may use the concept of socialist efficiency as an alternative to
'efficiency'. This concept transcends the narrow one of industrial efficien-
cy and includes also the social development of labour, initiatives,
emancipatory work organization and socially useful products.
Workers' participation can cause higher output on both ideological
and structural grounds. 'It is almost a matter of common sense' as Paul
Blumberg wrote two decades ago, ' that men will take great pride and
pleasure in their work if they are allowed to participate in shaping the
policies and decisions which affect that work' (1968, p. 123). My own
observation on the Iranian experience suggests that as long as the workers
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feel that they really participate, that they really exert power, productivity
rises (e.g. in brick-making plants in Azerbaijan, Chite-Jahan textile plant
in Karadj). But an awareness of the merely formal nature of participation
leads to passivity and opposition. A similar pattern was reported in Chile
under Allende (Zimbalist and Espinosa, 1978, p. 185; Levenson, 1979) in
the USSR in the 1920s (Rakovsky, 1980) and Cuba (in Carciofi, 1983,
p. 202).
In real participation, output may rise not simply because workers
work harder or longer, but because they find a situation where they can
express their initiatives and their latent abilities and develop themselves.
Capitalist production relations and work organization suppresses initiative
and uses only a limited range of workers' abilities.
It becomes clear, as many have suggested (see Marglin, 1978), that
in general management's concern about the organization of production is
not merely to promote efficiency for higher profit, but to restrict the
influence of labour over the conditions of production and administration.
In 1973 some experiments in work humanization and job-enlargement
were put into practice in the American Polaroid Company. Despite a rise
in the productivity, management stopped the experiment. In an interview
with Nation, the manager explained why.
It was successful. What were we going to do with the supervisors — the
managers? We didn't need them any more Management decided that i t jus t
didn't want operatives that qualified . . . The employees barely revealed
ability to carry more responsibility was too great a threat to the established
way of doing things and to established power relations (in Jenkins, 1973,
pp. 314-15).
Social and Ideological Implications
The establishment of workers' control from below, however embryonic it
may in i t i a l ly be, is not simply a technical change, nor just a modification
in the organization of production at enterprise level. It has important
social and ideological implications.
By striving to restructure the production process and alter the
traditional relations and hierarchies the workers experience a new area of
control, achieving a new power status which was previously an exclusively
managerial prerogative. As they experience this process, workers' per-
ception of work, power and society tend to change. Such an experience
confers on the workers a new perception of their role in society; they
cease to be subordinate and exploited and discover their right and ability
to determine the direction of production. This change in ideology, if
sustained, is in social terms immensely significant. For it not only involves
the workers in th inking differently about themselves and about other
classes, but also involves the rest of civil society, notably the dominant
classes, in acquiring different attitudes towards these workers and their
relations with them. 'Working people should no longer be identified as
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subordinate, miserable, crippled and regrettable creatures, but as human
beings with initiatives and ability of offering alternative ways of organiz-
ing the economy and society.' This change in mentality means that the
workers acquire a confidence in their ability to offer an alternative mode
of work and make other classes believe in their (workers') ability to carry
out such an historic task.
Political Implications
In the preceding section we envisaged a learning process within which
workers' control might be accomplished and workers achieve an ability to
maintain that process. This learning process, however, does not occur in a
vacuum. A free political climate must exist to allow labour to demonstrate
its initiative and develop itself. A genuine industrial democracy can be
implemented only in the conditions of political democracy and free and
collective decision-making. But how can such conditions be brought
about?
In the actually existing socialist states, where state power is exerted
in the name of the working classes, the scope of industrial democracy
does not not much exceed that of the market economies (Harastzi, 1977;
Holubenko, 1975; Tiktin, 1973). The partial control enjoyed by workers
in the USSR is only negative. Negative control is the ability by the
workers to disrupt production, administration or planning without the
state being able to do anything about it, precisely because the state is
of f ic ia l ly ruling in the name of the working people (Tiktin, 1973). In the
Yugoslavian self-management system, on the other hand, a more demo-
cratic form of state goes hand in hand with democratic control at enter-
prise level.
The situation in the Third World is still very different. Lack of
political democracy, let alone workers' control, is almost universal in the
capitalist peripheral countries. Given our argument that workers' partici-
pation can be meaningful only in democratic conditions, it might seem
that industrial democracy in the Third World is impossible. But in the first
chapter, I provided evidence to show that Third World workers have in
practice fought for workers' control and in some countries, have achieved
it. Here, I want to argue that workers' participation in a wider sense can
be a means of achieving political democracy in Third World societies.
Capitalism and Democracy
The concept of political democracy is relevant to both capitalist and
socialist social formations. In socialism it refers to a system of self-
administrat ion and popular control over the political and economic-
organization of society. In a capitalist social formation, political demo-
cracy is manifested in bourgeois democracy. This is the rule of capital in
the context of a democratic government under which citizens are legally
197
Workers anil Revolution in Iran
entitled to participate in the determination of the polieies 'to he executed
by the state in its capacity as sovereign legal subject' (Jessop, 19X2,
p. 274). In order that such participation can be realized, some other
pre-conditions are necessary, including the institutionali/ation of certain
political freedoms (freedom of association, freedom of speech, free elec-
t ions ) and parliamentary control over the executive and administration
( ib id . , pp. 274-5). Yet within this political framework, the reproduction
of capi tal is t relations is guaranteed by the capitalist state.
Bourgeois democracy can vary in terms of the actual formal legal
procedures and extent of political rights. There exists an enormous
variety, in terms of the degree of democratic practices, in today's capital-
ist societies.' Only a few Third World countries are administered in a
bourgeois democratic manner.
What then determines the degree of democracy in a capitalist society?
A relationship can be established between the nature of capitalist develop-
ment and the form of the state at the level of a social formation. Milton
Friedman argues that democracy can be reali/ed only in a free market
economy which he regards as non-exploitative and crisis-free, '['his theory
is hard ly tenable, as the free market exists in many Third World countries
which are ruled despotically. It might be argued that in the la t ter countries
the free market is disturbed by state interventions. Against this argu-
ment , Sweden illustrates that state intervention in the economy is not
necessarily an obstacle to democracy.
As against the Friedmanite theory, the capital logic school of the
British left maintains, following Lenin, that 'a democratic republic is the
best possible political shell for capitalism' which is both exploitative and
crisis-str icken. Some sympathetic critics of this view go on to suggest that
the bourgeois-democratic state is the best possible political shell for
capital to the extent that 'the bourgeoisie is politically and ideologically
dominant' (Jessop, 1^82). These critics, however, do not explore the
reason for the weakness and strength of the bourgeoisie; and fur ther their
analyses one-sidedly concentrate on the logic of capital, giving l i t t le or no
a t ten t ion to the role of labour.
I sympathi/e with the view that the establishment of democracy,
like the enactment of laws, is the result of the conflict between social
forces (classes) in a given society. More specifically, in a given capitalist
social formation and at a given historical moment, the scope and depth of
democratic practices depend upon two factors. Firstly, the degree of
capital expansion; secondly, the intensity of class and popular struggle.2
By capital expansion I mean the scale of capital accumulation, produc-
t ivi ty , the extent of the development of productive forces and social
relations. By class struggle here I mean the degree of the historical
development, the organization and militancy of the social classes and
other social groups (e.g. women) in a given country — the classes and
groups where the self-realization of democratic freedoms are an objective
necessity. (The working class and the new middle class are in this category.
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Whereas the mode of reproduction of existence of the self-sufficient
peasantry or the traditional petty-bourgeoisie does not necessarily require
democratic conditions.) A high degree of class struggle may arise in the
independent and militant activities of class and popular organizations,
such as working-class organizations like trade unions, social and cultural
societies, political parties, professional societies, cultural and ethnic
establishments and so on. Thus the degree of democracy, in a given
historical situation, depends primarily on the dialectic between these two
determinants.
How is political democracy related to capitalism? This relationship
may be characterized by the following features.
1. Hegemonic rule. The establishment of hegemony is the ideal type
of capitalist and indeed any other rule. An hegemonic capitalist state is
one which rules with the consent of its subjects. This arises out of the
integration of the whole civil society into the state through some kind of
representative (democratic) political system in which the principal ob-
jective, capitalist socio-economic organization, is guaranteed. As far as
capital is concerned it is only under such conditions that democracy can
be tolerated or even be desirable. Whereas advanced capitalism may be
able to set up the conditions for a hegemonic state, backward capitalism
cannot guarantee such opportunities.
2. Bourgeois class rule. Advanced capitalism implies the develop-
ment of a bourgeois class in terms of economic and political organiza-
tions. Such a class may be capable of establishing a socio-economic and
political order (modern state) controlling the state apparatus. However,
where a weak bourgeoisie exists the state tends to dominate and be
independent of civil society, including the bourgeoisie itself.
3. Economic satisfaction. Advanced productive forces and high
productivity offer a higher standard of living by raising real wages much
higher than the value of pro/Juction. Economic betterment and a higher
living standard for the working classes can be an important ground for
political integration. Weak capital and a low level of accumulation cannot
offer such rewards.
4. Impersonal relations. Advanced capitalist social relations tend to
objectify and depersonalize the existing dominant class and power rela-
tions. This characteristic of advanced capitalism presents the state as a
neut ra l agent acting for the well-being of the whole community. This is
the ideological basis of integration. In backward capitalism, on the other
hand, the residues of traditional (ethnic, kinship and patriarchal) rela-
t ions lead to the retention of personal relations between the individuals,
and between the latter and the state.
The interaction of the two determinants — the degree of capitalist
development and of class struggle — can result in at least four possible
political conditions. At the risk of a gross simplification, these may be
presented as follows:
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1. Strong C + low degree of CS —» Democracy
2. Strong C + high degree of CS —» Instability (Democracy —
non-democracy)
3. Weak C + low degree of CS —» Non-democracy
4. Weak C + high degree of CS —» Instability (Non-democracy —
democracy)
C = Capital
CS = Class struggle
+ combination
—» consequence
It is possible to argue that the reason why liberal democracy is
practicable, at the present time, in the advanced capitalist societies is
because capital has developed sufficiently to enable the (capitalist) state
to co-exist with the struggle against it, with the democratic institutions
which 'historically have come to exist in opposition to capitalism'
(Therborn, 1977). Capital in these countries can contain the fluctuations
of the class struggle. The periods of capitalist boom are not only periods
of capital's economic hegemony, but also of strength in the labour move-
ment. In periods of crisis, however, a weakened capital is obliged to
encroach on the existing democratic rights in order to save itself (as in the
UK now). If the labour movement is divided and weak at such times,
anti-democratic legislation is inevitable. However, if popular organi/a-
tions are united and militant, the outcome can be different: either a
chronic crisis and instability, or a dual-power situation which, depending
on numerous mediations, may lead to the defeat of either the labour
movement or capitalist state.
It should now be clear why democracy in the backward capitalist
societies is scarce or highly fragile. In these countries, in general, a weak
capital is operating — that is, the scale of capital accumulation and
productivity are low, the propertied classes are politically weak and social
relations are to a considerable extent personalized. In such circumstances,
if popular forces are unorganized, the weakness of capital opens the way
for the domination of undemocratic state power (Situation 3). These
authoritarian state-forms are objectively required to control the potential
forces of the populace and its spontaneous movements which result from
the contradictions of the socio-economic system that these states strive to
construct, i.e. backward capitalism (as in Pakistan, the Shah's Iran, the
mi l i t a ry regimes of Latin America).
Are undemocratic political systems a permanent feature of the
Third World? No doubt, weak capital in the Third World is forced to
retreat where a rich political culture — in the form of traditions of
organization, solidarity and democratic institutions — exists. In these
circumstances the resultant balance of forces does give rise to an exercise
of democracy. Yet these democracies tend to be restricted, tense and
fragile and thus cannot last long (Situation 4). The history of capitalism in
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Latin America has been a history of weak capital integrated with inter-
national capital, combined with a tradition of organization and struggle,
giving a history of precarious and intermittent democracies.3
Popular Democracy and Transition
For reasons outlined in the first chapter — the crisis of hegemony of the
state or ruling classes and failure of reformist policies — revolutions and
radical changes do occur frequently in the Third World. Between 1974
and 1978 alone 15 countries in the Third World went through major
revolutionary upheavals (Halliday, 1983). A revolution may sweep aside
an old socio-political order, but it will not necessarily lead to a new
democratic system. In a revolutionary situation, the fact that no one
group effectively exerts power offers the possibility of change and a free
political climate. Yet, in the process of the consolidation of the new
regime, this freedom may be curtailed and eventually the revolution may
be defeated. What conditions are required to institutionalize and re-
produce a stable democracy?
Some tend to see the solution in strengthening the position of
capital. It is argued that in these societies, owing to the historical weak-
ness of the ruling classes and, forthat matter, the strength of the state (in
particular the rentier states which control the major economic resources),
the strategy must involve making the civil society, especially the bour-
geoisie, independent of the state. This strategy envisages a liberal market
economy like those of Western Europe.
This argument is like Friedman's: it involves the freedom of the
capitalist class (among other classes) from state control and the freedom
of the market from state domination. This view has already been dis-
missed. The very concept of periphery capitalism implies that Third
World countries are not experiencing the same pattern of development
and class formation as the advanced capitalist countries did.
To envisage the feasibility of a democratic order in a backward
capitalist social formation, we have to take into account the specific
situation of each country. Yet, situations are related to and influenced by
a general rule which is the conclusion of our discussion so far. Since weak
capital (as a totality of socio-economic relations) cannot provide the
conditions for a democratic state in backward capitalist social formations,
then class struggle should be the point of attention. Let me elaborate this
with reference to Iran.
Theoretically, in a capitalist social formation such as Iran, the
consolidation of political democracy cannot simply be brought about by
the goodwill of the political leaders, however sincere they may be in
wishing to establish democracy. A strategy of mass democratization is
necessary to establish and strengthen popular organizations and develop
a culture of free participation. The balance of forces between class
struggle and the accumulation rationale can be altered to the benefit of
the former only by creating and extending the economic, political and
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social organizations of the working class, political parties, professional
societies, women's organizations, peasant organizations, neighbourhood
and regional councils and above all the organization of workers' par-
ticipation in production, services and state administration.
But the extension of such mass organizations will come into conflict
with the requirements of capital, eventually creating a political impasse in
which violation of democratic gains and frequent coups would seem to be
inevitable. Hence, to achieve a democratic rule in these societies a revolu-
tionary change is vital. First and foremost it must transform the existing
power structure through subverting the social, military, administrative and
economic bases upon which the old regime rests. Though necessary, this is
still not sufficient to guarantee democratic practices and processes. It is not
hard to imagine that the new state can easily be bureaucratized, the new
army transformed into a repressive organ, and the state become a capitalist
enterprise running an inefficient nationalized economy.
To avoid such a tendency a new set of power relations must be
established with the following features:
a) Political order
\. The old power structure must be transformed so that it rests upon
the democratic mobilization of people at the grass-roots in the economic
sector, state administration, neighbourhoods and nationalities. Here,
civil society can express its opinions and influence the political processes
through its immediate organizations which would send elected repre-
sentatives to form a national legislature.
2. This state form would derive its legitimacy from the representa-
tion of popular mobilization and mass organizations. In this it differs from
the liberal democratic state.
3. Under such a state, the freedom of intellectual activities and
expression of political ideas of any kind is conceivable. (It must be
stressed that we cannot afford to regard one particular ideological
orientation as the truth and suppress the rest.) Such a political order will
be able to provide conditions for the realization of pluralism — a pluralism
of the transi t ional period.
b) Economic order
A mixed economy should be established. The state would own the
large and strategic sectors, and private capital would be free to operate in
small-scale productive units. Even in the aftermath of political change the
market would sti l l be necessary to perform the task of production and
distribution.
Two important points have to be made here. First, in political
terms, although a form of pluralism has been envisaged, this would not be
the same as the bourgeois pluralism which operates in the conditions of
capitalist hegemony. This democracy of the transitional period would be
a pluralism operating in a political system in which exploitative and
oppressive classes were no longer dominant and the state apparatus was
at their disposal
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In the economie sphere, although we are talking about a mixed
economy, it would he a mixed economy unlike that which operates under
capitalism. While the latter is based upon private/state ownership plus
private and/or individual control from above, under the democracy or the
transitional period a mixed economy would be characterized by public/
private ownership and collective control (largely in the public sector)
through the strategy of workers' participation.
Thus, I am envisaging a social organization in which the bourgeois
class sti l l exists but is subordinated to a revolutionary structure of popular
political power; there is private ownership in the means of production but
restricted to small-scale operations, and subject to the activities of labour
unions; the market does function, but is counter-balanced by the inter-
vention of the state. In short, Iran can no longer afford to be an Indonesia
(an authoritarian capitalist state) or another Ethiopia (an authoritarian
one-party state) but it can try a Nicaraguan road.4
Undoubtedly, the transitional period is characterized by tensions
and contradictions. If the new state can maintain its hegemony through its
reliance upon an active popular participation; if in political and cultural
domains, the state can provide viable alternatives to those of the bour-
geoisie; if, in the economic sphere, the labour councils and unions can
sustain their momentum, then the transition to a socialist society may be
possible. Otherwise, once again, capitalistic values and/or an authoritarian
rationale will inevitably be brought to the fore in order to 'save the
revolution'.
In this process, the operation of the labour councils in industry, the
service sector, state administration, educational establishments and in
local neighbourhood councils and among the ethnic minorities would be
of immense value. Amongst these, the grass-roots and independent
labour councils can play a vital role, for they can contribute to the cause of
democracy both directly (as an independent and unified organization of
the working people) and indirectly (as democratic inst i tut ions in which
employees would experiment, practice and learn democracy in a system-
atic way). Labour councils also would provide an institution of collective
control in the public sector.
Through the medium of workers' councils workers would be actively
involved in production and administration, and would comprehend the
problems involved in the administration of affairs and the possible con-
f l ic t between their own immediate interests and the interests of society.
This involvement and understanding is politically crucial. An authoritarian
one-man management, unlike the system of collective control, will rapidly
lose t h e confidence of the workers when it fails, for economic reasons, to
respond positively to the demands of the workers. If workers continue to
press, the management's response is l ikely to be use offeree.
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How to Reproduce Workers' Control
If workers' control is fundamental to the consolidation of political
democracy in a transitional society, then the basic question is how to
bring it about and maintain it; how to preserve its institutions from
degeneration to powerless and merely formal bodies.
The workers' councils in Iran, the shuras, failed to reproduce them-
selves effectively not only because of external pressure (political repres-
sion), but also because of their own internal contradictions and the
inherited division of labour.
The internal problem was a conflict between the long-term and
short-term interests of the councils. For the Iranian workers the shuras
were the institutional manifestation of their keen desire to determine the
process of production and administration. In practice, they demonstrated
a real enthusiasm for making decisions and taking part in future planning;
they struggled to direct the factory operation. Their efforts, however,
brought them into conflict with the traditional capitalist division of labour.
The workers who had fought so dramatically against the professional
managements, and who had put the latter on trial and dismissed them,
later requested the state to send back these professional managers after
running the industrial workplaces for months! This contradiction in the
workers' behaviour reflected the dual function of management — co-
ordination and control. The function of co-ordination is related to the
technical co-ordination of affairs, that is, maintaining harmony, avoiding
waste and so on. It is required in all complex forms of organization. The
function of control, on the other hand, is to preserve the power relations
w i t h i n the production process. This function is specific to authoritarian
forms of organization. The two functions can be separated only at the
level of abstraction. In reality they reproduce each other.
The workers transformed the existing management system. In so
doing, however, they felt that they needed, in the short run, the sk i l l s of
professional managers, simply in order to maintain production. But the
re-instatement of the very same managers meant, in effect, the re-
establishment of the same technical and social (or power) relations. So
the workers both wanted and at the same time did not want the existing
management system. Thus, on the one hand, restructuring or modifying
the existing system of the division of labour was essential for the survival
of the councils in the long run. The consolidation of the councils, there-
fore, required new relations and a new system of management. On the
other hand, their survival, in the short run, depended on the traditional
forms of managerial competence/In short, the councils wanted the same
managerial functions without the associated power relation« Obviously
this was unrealistic. In the hierarchical structure of management the
position of each agent carries a specific degree of power which is exerted
objectively.
The fact is that the working class as broadly defined docs possess a
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power of negative control, in the sense that it can subvert the control of
capital over the enterprise or the whole economy through strikes and
sabotage (and over the whole society through revolution). This is indeed
a gigantic power. The point, however, is to translate that negative control
into a positive control in the sense of a theoretical and practical capacity
to produce and reproduce a new order which can provide the conditions
for, and be based upon, the exertion of real power (as opposed to formal
power) by the working people, that is, to bring about in Bahro's terms a
're-division of labour' (1978).
Marx's conception of the division of labour, according to Rattansi
(1982a, 1982b), evolved in three stages. Initially, Marx equated the
division of labour with class and exchange. In the second stage, beginning
with the Poverty of Philosophy, he developed the two concepts of 'social
division of labour' and the 'division of labour in manufacturing'. In his
later works, notably in Capital, he took the sphere of production as his
point of departure for an analysis of capitalist economy. Marx then
abandoned his earlier ideas on class and the division of labour, attributing
a transhistorical and at times natural character to the division of labour —
even if classes were dissolved, the complete abolition of the division of
labour would not necessarily follow. Yet the crucial question remained:
to what extent was it feasible to fight against relations of subordination
and to secure the exercise of workers' power without abolishing or
restructuring the division of labour?
To transform or modify the existing division of labour is something
which is beyond the capacity of theory alone. Practice, experience and
learning are vital. Unfortunately the fate of workers' revolutions in
contemporary history have been such that we cannot learn much from
them. In post-revolutionary Russia, despite a fundamental change in
power structure and social relations, forms of the division of labour
characteristic of capitalist organization of production remained. East
European countries have followed a more or less similar path (Bahro,
1978). Yugoslavia has developed a unique model of self-management in
which relatively autonomous and democratic enterprises (local demo-
cracy) operate under the conditions of market relations.
In China, the Cultural Revolution, according to Bettelheim,
attempted to revolutionize the division of labour within the enterprises
through ideological struggle. Bettelheim has suggested that in the transi-
tion to socialism it is possible to transform the division of labour by an
ideological-political struggle, that is, by rejecting productivism and by
putting proletarian politics in command (1974, pp. 74, 102). The question
of why workers' participation in Chinese industry did not continue is
beyond the scope of this book. Bettelheim attributes that failure to the
rise of the right and the strategy of what he terms the 'great leap backward'
(Burton and Bettelheim, 1978). In contrast, some writers, including the
activists of the present-day Chinese Democracy Movement, have ques-
tioned the whole project of the Cultural Revolution itself, describing it as
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a form of feudal-fascist dictatorship (Chen, Erjin, 1984, pp. 16-17) in the
context of which popular participation was no more than 'mass regi-
mentation dosed with terror' (Benton, 1984, p. 65).
I t seems that at least two conditions have to be met to facilitate a
gradual development of workers' control: a) the direct involvement of
the working people in their own affairs, developing a learning experience
and, b) the state's strategic support.
a. In industry and service sectors, the councils, by involving the mass
of the employees in the process of production and administration, can
learn and experience the ways in which the traditional division of labour
can be restructured. Once they have removed the political obstacles, the
workers may discover an alternative organization of production and
develop alternative forms of production and socialist management. All
this would mean that the mass of the workers would no longer be the
powerless tools and mere appendages of machines and bureaucratic-
structures, but labourers with manual capacity and intellectual know-
ledge who would acquire the power of determination not only of an
enterprise's affairs, but in the long run, economic planning process. This
would mean the gradual conquering of new domains of authority.
This process would involve a long-term strategy of permanent class
struggle by introducing a new culture of production as a viable alternative
to the dominant hierarchical division of labour. This new culture of
production would necessarily be related to the changes in other domains
of social life — culture, social and individual values. Here, then,asBahro
(1978) argued, the concept of (economic) growth would have to change
from quantitative orientation to qualitative orientation. With the same
token, the concept of need, luxury and comfort would also have to
change. The question then would be 'to create objective conditions so
that everyone can prefer to know and to be, instead of to possess' ( 1978,
p. 281)
b. We have already assumed that the future Iranian government, at
least at the level of intention, would be democratic. In addition, we
discussed the pre-conditions under which such a state form might be
sustained, concluding that the extensive empowerment of popular organs
(in production units, enterprises, state administration and educational
establishments and among ethnic minorities) could guarantee a popular
democracy in Iran in future. It follows then that the councils are both the
pre-condition and product of the popular struggle. Political pre-conditions
for workers' control are that not only would the shuras not be destroyed
by external pressure, but that the state would provide conditions for their
self-development. At the macro-level, the state would have to tailor
various dimensions of socio-political and cultural life to the requirements
of workers' participation. The education system would have to be trans-
formed to respond to the requirements of this strategy. A constant
connection between the educational institutions (schools, colleges,
research centres, etc.) and workplaces would be necessary. Within the
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industr ial units there might be organized technical-educational classes on
production, management and administration to bridge the gap between
the spheres of conception and execution. At the level of'social relations,
social status based upon the existing hierarchy, and differentiated salaries,
would have to be el iminated. The mass of the labourers in industry, state
institutions and so on would be encouraged to organize in political, social
and cul tura l groups.
These developments at the workplaces would underline the social
role and social acceptability of the working class among the rest of the
population. Thus, the changes would not be simply technical, but also
provide conditions for ideological changes. Here, my stress is upon the
significance of the cultural hegemony of the working class, in the sense of
the capacity of this class to offer a viable alternative way of life to be
desirable and practised freely by the whole civil society.
Notes
1. For an historical survey on th is issue see Therborn (1977).
2. Here we are concerned not with the emergence or e\iahli\hment of demo-
cracy — democratic constitution or institutions — but rather the continuation and
rcf>ro(lnction of democracy in a given country.
3. See a valuable article by Therborn (1979). Therborn says tha t 'where it has
been strong — in Argentina, Bolivia, Cuba and Chile . . . the working class has
been an important democratic force in Latin America' (ibid, p. 85). Bolivia and
Turkey exemplify two different and interesting situations in which the combina-
tion of the rule of weak capital and prevalence of popular struggle has resulted in
successive mi l i ta ry coups as well as fragile democracies since the 1950s. For
Bol iv ia , see an excellent study by James Dunker lev (1984), and for the case of
Turkey see Keyder (1979) and Taylan (1984). I have discussed the relationship
between labour and democracy in post-revolutionary Iran in my 'Labour and
Democracy in Post-Revolutionary Iran' in Amirahmadi and Parvin (eds), Post-
Revolutionary Iran, USA: Westview Press. I9S6 (forthcoming).
4. For post-revolutionary Nicaraguan political economy, see Petras (1981,
1984), Nwafar(1984), Weber (1980), Irvin(1983), Black (1983).
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